

Perspectives on South Africa-**China** Relations



Funeka Yazini April and Garth Shelton (eds)

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Perspectives on South Africa-China Relations at 15 Years

Funeka Yazini April and Garth Shelton (eds)



**Africa Institute
of South Africa**
Development Through Knowledge

Perspectives on South Africa China Relations at 15 Years

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About the Editors

■ Funeka Yazini April

Funeka Yazini April works at the Governance and Security Programme with a focus on industrial development. Ms April is a Master's of Arts Graduate of the International Affairs at the University of South Carolina in Columbia, South Carolina. Her various publications include: South Africa's Governance Challenges: Assessing The South Africa – China Mineral Case, *Contemporary Politics Journal*, Volume 15; South Africa's Industrial Framework Action Plan (IPAP2P): Challenges and Prospects, *The Thinker*, April 2010; Understanding as Aspect of China's Economic Governance and Economic Growth, *Africa Insight*, Volume 41; Assessing South Africa's Foreign Policy Options: Implementing Civic Interest Groups as a Source of Soft Power, *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, February 2009; Global Dynamics of the South China Sea Tussles, *Polity*, December 2012; An Analysis of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, and the Nationalisation of Minerals Debate in South Africa, *Africa Insight*, July 2012; A Comparative Analysis of Industrialization in the Case of the African Union and the Association of South East Asian Nations, *Africa Insight*, Volume 42(3); and Criticism of BRICS Development Bank is Unwarranted, Analysis and Opinion Section, *The New Age*, April.

■ Garth Lawrence Shelton

Garth Lawrence Shelton is an associate Professor at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. His academic and professional qualifications include: PhD from Wits University, with a thesis entitled *Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence and Non-proliferation: The Case of South Africa*; a National Security Certificate from Christian Albrechts University, Kiel, Germany; and a MA (with distinction) from Wits University, with a dissertation entitled *United States - South Africa Relations 1974-1979*. Since 2002 he has been an associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at Wits University, Johannesburg, South Africa. Professor Shelton is: a Director of the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD); a Director of the Wits University East Asia Project (EAP); and a Director of the Africa-Asia Society (AAS). He has published three books (on China and Africa) and 56 articles and academic papers (on East Asian topics and security related issues) in national and international journals, including journals published in the USA, the UK, Japan, France, Switzerland and Australia. He has presented academic papers on East Asian and security related topics at 37 national and international conferences. His

fieldwork research in Asia has included visits to 26 cities in China, 10 cities in Japan and visits to South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia. His fieldwork research on China-Africa relations has included visits to 11 African countries. He was a visiting Bradlow Fellow at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), in 2002.

Notes on the Keynote Speakers

■ Marius Fransman

His Excellency Marius Fransman is Deputy Minister of International Relations and Co-operation of the Republic of South Africa. Fransman served as Provincial Deputy Secretary of the ANC Western Cape from 1997 to 2004 for three consecutive terms. Concurrent to this he was mandated by the late ANC Provincial Chair, Dullah Omar, to head the fishing desk from 1997 to 2004. This task was primarily related to liaison with fishing communities and lobbying and advocacy for the rights and long-term sustainability of this fragile sector. He played a key role in the initial transformation initiatives in this area and worked closely with fishing communities in the Western Cape. This was a period of intense transformation and the implementation of new policy. In 1999 he became provincial elections coordinator under the leadership of the provincial secretary. His primary role involved strategy formulation and implementation, fulfilment of elections objectives and operation. After the 2004 National Elections he was deployed to a new portfolio as MEC (Provincial Minister) for Local Government and Housing Western Cape. In July 2005 he was deployed to take up position of MEC (Provincial Minister) for Transport and Public Works, Western Cape and he served in this position until August 2008, when he became Western Cape MEC (Provincial Minister) of Health. In May 2009 he was appointed to the National Parliament of The Republic of South Africa and served in this august position as Parliamentary Chairperson for Higher Education and Training, which provides oversight for all Institutions of Higher Learning as well as Further Education and Training/ Skills Development through the 23 Sector Education and Training authorities that administer a skills and training budget of R21 billion. This portfolio placed him at the heart of the ANC Government's priority focus areas of education and health.

■ Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju

Professor Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju is currently the Interim Executive Director at the Africa Institute of South Africa – Human Science Research Council. She holds the following qualifications: BSc Agriculture, 1978 (Swaziland), MSc Plant Breeding, 1982 (Nigeria) and PhD Plant Breeding/Virology, 1990 (USA). Professor Lukhele-Olorunju is an internationally respected scientist, researcher, administrator and educator. In alignment with this, she has worked as a researcher and academic at universities in Swaziland, Nigeria, South Africa and the United States of America. She supervised

undergraduate and postgraduate students in the field of agriculture. Other experience includes national, regional and international consulting and management of international agricultural projects, collaborative research projects with various Institutions such as USAID, FAO, CGIAR institutes and the University of Georgia (USA). As a plant breeder, she released 12 groundnut varieties between 1983 and 2012. It is further important to note that, Professor Lukhele-Olorunju managed three research institutions, as Group Executive, at the Agricultural Research Council of South Africa from 2002 to 2008. Professor Lukhele-Olorunju has published much in the field of agriculture and continues to publish in peer-reviewed national, regional and international journals. Professor Lukhele-Olorunju is an ASI member.

■ **Rasello Terence Mashego**

Rasello Terence Mashego is the Acting Mayor of Tshwane. He was born in Graskop in Mpumalanga in 1953, and moved to Katlehong in 1960 where he began schooling at Dukathole Primary School. From Katlehong Secondary School he proceeded to Bethesda Teachers Training College in 1972. At this time he was already an underground operative of the then banned ANC. He was arrested and sentenced in the Pietersburg Magistrate Court and served his prison sentence at the Pietersburg Prison. On his release, he pursued his studies privately and later taught at Ithuteng Commercial High School from 1975 to 1982. He joined the UDF in 1986 and became Secretary of SANCO Mabopane branch in 1994. He served in the Branch Executive Committee of the ANC in Mabopane from 1995 to 1997. He became a member of the ANC-REC Eastern Region in 1998 and served as a member of the disciplinary committee. From 1994 to date he has been at the forefront of the Elections Campaign of the ANC. In 1999 he enrolled at UNISA and completed a Certificate in Provincial and Local Government Law. This sharpened his understanding of Local Government processes and legislation. He joined the Madibeng Local Municipality and later the Bojanala District Municipality and put his acquired knowledge to the practical test. He emerged with distinctions from both municipalities in service delivery related matters and was appointed Chairperson of the Public Participation process for the District of Bojanala, Head of Protocol for the District of Bojanala and Convener of the Bojanala Communications Forum. These achievements earned him the title 'General'. He joined the City of Tshwane in 2009 as the Chief Whip of Council until 2011, in which year he was appointed a Member of the Mayoral Committee: Community Safety and Leader of Council Business, Chairperson of the CAPEX Committee. He is a member of the REC and Coordinator of Elections of the ANC in the Tshwane Region.

■ TIAN Xuejun

His Excellency, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary TIAN Xuejun, of the People's Republic of China to the Republic of South Africa. From 1985 to 1988 he served as staff member and Attaché of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the State of Kuwait. From 1988 to 1991 he was the Attaché and Third Secretary of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the People's Republic of Bangladesh. From 1991 to 1992 he was the Third Secretary of the Department of Personnel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. From 1992 to 1998 he was the Second Secretary, then the First Secretary of the General Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. From 1998 to 2003 he was Counsellor of the General Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. From 2003 to 2004 he was the Secretary of the General Office, the State Council of the People's Republic of China. From 2004 to 2007 he was the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China to the Hellenic Republic. From 2007 to 2012 he was the Director General of the Department of Personnel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.

Notes on the Contributors

■ John Forje

Professor John Forje is an Adjunct Scholar of the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) Nairobi and the former Sub-Director and Senior Research Officer, Ministry of Scientific and Technical Research in Cameroon. He is also a Founding Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Buea, Cameroon and a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Yaoundé in Soa, Cameroon. He holds a PhD, Fil Dr, MSc, MA and Fil Kand in Political Science, Science and Technology Policy, International Relations and European Politics from the Universities of Salford and Hull (UK) and Lund (Sweden) and a Diploma in Public Management from the Advance Institute of Public Management (ISMP) in Cameroon. As a Research Assistant at the Research Policy Institute, University of Lund (Sweden), he coordinated the preparation of “Country Reports” of many African countries for the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTED) 1979 in Vienna, Austria. He was a Research Fellow at the African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS) Ijebu-Ode, Ogun State, Nigeria (1995-1996), and was a member of the Adjudicator team of evaluators for the First (2008), Second (2011) and Third (2013) African Public Civil Service Awards under the auspices of the African Union/African Ministers of the Public Services. He is also a member of the Cameroon Academy of Sciences, African Association for the Public Administration and Management (AAPAM) and other International Organisations. Most recent publications include: *Capacity Building and Quality Service Delivery in Africa* (Lambert Academic Publishers, Germany); *Century of Change: Symposium on African Unity* (2011); *Here The People Rule – Political Transition and Challenges for Democratic Consolidation in Africa* (2009); *The Challenges of Administrative Political and Developmental Renewal in Africa – Essays on Rethinking Government and Reorganisation* (2009); *State Building and Democracy in Africa: A Comparative and Developmental Approach* (2009); *Science and Technology in Africa*, Volume 10; *Longman World Series on Science and Technology* (1988); and *The Rape of Africa at Vienna*, Lund 1979.

■ Liu Guijin

His Excellency Ambassador Liu Guijin is Dean of China-Africa International Business School at Zhejiang Normal University, PRC (2010-), President of the Chinese Society of Asia and Africa Studies (2012-), and served as Special Representative of the

Chinese Government on African Affairs and Darfur, Sudan (2007-2012). He was also Ambassador to South Africa (2001-2007), Director General of African Department, MFA (1998-2001), Ambassador to Zimbabwe (1995-1998), Deputy Director General of African Department, MFA (1993-1995), and the Political Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy in Ethiopia (1991-1993). Mr Liu Guijin graduated from Beijing University of Foreign Studies in 1971 and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the same year. He served in the General Office of MFA (1972-1981), the Chinese Embassy in Kenya (1981-1986), and the Department of African Affairs (1986-1990) for many years.

■ Meican Sun

Meicen Sun is a PhD student of international relations and law at the University of Pennsylvania, where she focuses on international security, international institutions and Chinese foreign policy. She received an A.B. with Honors from Princeton University, and was a worldwide winner of the prestigious Undergraduate Award for her paper on China's voting in the UN Security Council. Her paper on China and UN peacekeeping recently won the APPC Scholars Award for Best Paper at the Advancements in Public Policy Conference at George Mason University. Sun previously worked for the Center for Strategic and International Studies in DC, and the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. A Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leader and a Track-II diplomat, Sun regularly attends conferences on international security, writes on related subjects, and is an expert on U.S.-China relations, China in Africa and peacekeeping. She is a bilingual speaker of English and Chinese, and is proficient in French.

■ SHU Zhan

His Excellency Ambassador SHU Zhan is a Research Fellow at the Institute of African Studies, Zhejiang Normal University. Recently retired as a diplomat, he has worked in Chinese embassies in Ethiopia, Namibia, South Africa, Eritrea and Rwanda. He began research on Africa in 1977 at the Institute of West Asian and African Study (IWAAS) and the Chinese Academy of Social Science, with a wide range of experience in Eastern and Southern Africa politics and economics. He has translated and co-written scores of papers and books on South Africa and Africa. He completed his post-graduate studies at LSE and the University of Durham, UK. He is a visiting Scholar at the University of Zimbabwe, the George Mason University (USA) and the University of the Witwatersrand (SA).

■ Yu Ke

Dr Yu Ke is a post-doctoral fellow at the Human Sciences Research Council. She holds a Bachelor of Economics degree from the University of Shanghai for Science and Technology in China (1998), a Master's degree in International Business degree from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in Norway (2003), and a PhD degree in Educational Management and Policy Studies from the University of Pretoria in South Africa (2008). Her publication record spans the authoring and co-authoring of over 15 journal articles, reports and conference presentations. Her current research interests primarily include: identity and otherness; China, Africa and other comparative aspects of oriental, occidental and Africa culture and society; violence, crime and corruption; research governance (research impact and ethics); and disciplinary characteristics and inter/trans-disciplinary evolution.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
BASIC	Brazil-Argentina-South Africa-India-China
BNC	Bi-National Commission
BRICS	Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa
CADF	China-Africa Development Fund
CCTEG	China Coal Technology and Engineering Group
CDC	Cameroon Development Corporation
CIs	Confucius Institutes
CODESRIA	Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
CPC	China Communist Party
CSC	China Scholarship Council
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DIRCO	Department of International Relations and Co-operation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GERD	Gross Domestic Expenditure on Research and Development
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
G7	Group of 7
G8	Group of 8
G20	Group of 20
G77	Group of 77
IBSA	India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum
ICBC	Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
ICTs	information and communication technologies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDC	less developed countries
LIMDEV	Limpopo Province Development Corporation
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPRDA	Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NICI Plan	Plan développement l'infrastructure nationale d'information
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PGD	Partnership for Growth and Development
PRC	People's Republic of China
R&D	Research and Development
RITA	Rwandan Information Technology Authority
ROC	Republic of China
S&T	science and technology
SACP	South African Communist Party
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAGDA	South African Graduates Development Association
SAITIS	South Africa IT Strategy project
SARB	South African Reserve Bank
SARS	South African Revenue Service
SETAs	Sector Education and Training Authorities
SEZs	special economic zones
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SNAJ	Swaziland National Association of Journalists
TRIPS	Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USIP	US Institute of Peace
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Keynote Addresses

Opening Address

Professor Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju, Interim CEO of AISA

Professor Phindile Lukhele-Olorunju's opening address emphasised the importance of the Ambassadorial Forums and stated that these are one of AISA's flagship projects that fulfil the organisation's mandate of providing and disseminating knowledge to all local and international stakeholders. She noted that the South Africa-China Ambassadorial Forum was important because 2013 marks the 15th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and South Africa. She further reported that His Excellency Ambassador TIAN Xuejin reported in June 2013 that, 'Great changes have occurred everywhere over the years, but there has been at least one constant: China and South Africa have advanced shoulder to shoulder as the new South Africa has developed'. Another Ambassador she quoted was His Excellency, BWJ Langa, who wrote in the *New Age* (online), that China occupies a pre-eminent position in South Africa's foreign policy agenda.

Professor touched on the history of the relationship between South Africa and China as it predates 1994; the year South Africa got its first democratically elected government. She stated that the history of this relationship can be traced back to a thousand years ago in Mapungubwe, Limpopo Province, which was the centre of the largest kingdom in Southern Africa, with a thriving trade in gold and ivory with China. However, she did not go into much detail of the history of this relationship, but mentioned some crucial milestone in this relationship that are worth being noted. In 2000, the Forum for China Africa Co-operation, known as FOCAC, was established, serving as the chief instrument of engagement between the People's Republic of China and Africa. The year 2005 saw the development of the strategic partnership with a focus on political solidarity, economic development and socio-cultural cooperation. In 2011 South Africa joined BRICS and participated in the 3rd Summit hosted by China and South Africa assumed the position of co-chairperson of FOCAC in 2012. South Africa will hold this position until 2018 and will host the FOCAC Ministerial in 2015. Recently, South Africa hosted the 5th BRICS Summit and celebrated 15 years of diplomatic relations with China.

She went on to state that South Africa and China have been hosting Bi-national Commission meetings since 2001 and the cordial relationship has been expressed in many ways (political and economic). China has become Africa's single largest trading partner: in just over a decade merchandise trade increased almost 20-fold, from about 10.5 billion

USD in 2000 to more than 200 billion USD in 2012. South Africa is now China's largest trading partner in Africa (30 per cent) followed by Angola (19 per cent). Business and economic ties between the two countries have grown significantly since the establishment of diplomatic relations.

She highlighted how much focus has been placed in the media on the Peoples' Republic of China's trade engagement with Africa. She mentioned that the picture portrayed in the media is that mutually beneficial relationship that includes, support for the African Agenda; skills and knowledge transfer; increased Foreign Direct Investment which includes the agri-industries, electricity, road construction, textiles, tourism and telecommunications; the support includes debt relief of 1.3 billion USD in write-offs promised at the Beijing Summit in 2006 and 5 billion USD China-Africa Development Fund just to mention a few.

Overall, she noted the impact of China in South Africa by stating that this relationship has had a great impact on the entire continent of Africa. Reports show that China supports the African Union, participates in regional arrangements of SADC, is committed to the implementation of the continental development program (NEPAD), and South Africa serves with China on the UN Security Council. In this respect, she urged everyone that the relationship between South Africa and China should be encouraged and ensure that the benefits of this relationship spill over the continent.

Welcome Address

Mr Terrence Mashego, Acting Mayor of the City of Tshwane

The Acting Mayor welcomed all guests to the City of Tshwane and noted that Tshwane brags with being the host of a number of research houses and embassies. He noted that there were three major developments in the first two decades of the 21st century that significantly influenced continental and global affairs. The first was the rise of People's Republic of China to the summit of the global economy and in the process becoming the single biggest source of foreign direct investment on the African continent. The second was the formation of the forum for China-Africa cooperation in the year 2000, which clearly marked the turning point in the institutional consolidation on the relations between the People's Republic of China and the rest of the African continent. The third is the formation and eventual invitation of South Africa to participate in the most dynamic economic and political force of the 21st century which is the BRICS. All these three developments have made it clear that world affairs have changed permanently and Africa's place in global affairs will never be the same again. He thus emphasised that a forum of this nature is important in reflecting on these developments and pave the way forward for both countries and Africa as a whole.

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Ambassadorial Keynote Address

*Ambassador TIAN Xuejun, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China
to the Republic of South Africa*

In his address, Ambassador TIAN Xuejun emphasised the importance of the South Africa-China Ambassadorial Forum as an event that brings together friends of South Africa and China to review what South Africa and China have achieved in the past 15 years and to look ahead into the future. The Ambassador stated that though China and South Africa are far apart, the friendship and exchanges between the two countries date back to ancient times. Fifteen years ago, on January 1st 1998, China and South Africa formally established a diplomatic relationship. This was a milestone in the bilateral relations, and opened up a new era. The past one-and-a-half decades have witnessed profound changes in the international landscape, as well as major developments in South Africa-China ties. He continued to share his observations on the South Africa-China relationship and raised three questions. The first question was how do we assess the development of this bilateral relationship over the past 15 years? The answer to this question was summed up in three words.

Firstly, the *strategic vision* of the two countries has promoted and sustained the relationship between South Africa and China. The relationship between the two countries has achieved historic leaps and was elevated from partnership in 2000, to strategic partnership in 2004 and comprehensive strategic partnership in 2010. Frequent high-level exchanges have guided the developments of bilateral relations, and have been the strong driving force behind the cooperation in various areas between the two countries. For the past 15 years, almost all successive Chinese leaderships, including Presidents, NPC Chairmen and Premiers of the State Council, have visited South Africa. Likewise, many South African leaders visited China on various occasions. In July last year, President Zuma visited China and attended the opening ceremony of the fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. And in March this year, the new Chinese President, Xi Jinping, paid a highly successful state visit to South Africa and attended the fifth BRICS Summit in Durban during his first overseas trip after taking office.

Secondly *velocity*, which, in this context, refers to the amazing speed at which the SA-China relationship has been growing for the past 15 years. He used economic relations and trade as an example: the bilateral trade volume was only about US\$1.5 billion when the diplomatic relationship were first established. But in 2012, the figure reached nearly US\$60 billion, which means an increase of about 40 times in the past 15 years. For the first 8 months of this year (2013), the trade volume reached US\$44.2 billion, registering an increase of 13.3 per cent from the same period last year. China has been South Africa's largest trading partner, largest export market and largest source of import for the past four

consecutive years. Meanwhile, South Africa is China's largest trading partner in Africa. In 2012, more than 130,000 Chinese tourists travelled to South Africa, an increase of 56 per cent from the previous year. South Africa, compared with other African countries, has the largest number of sister cities with China and the largest number of Confucius Institutes and also attracts the largest number of Chinese tourists and Chinese overseas students.

Thirdly, the *vitality* of the relationship, which comes from the convergence in the strategic interests and objectives of both countries. Both South Africa and China are developing countries and emerging economies. They face similar opportunities and development challenges, and share broad consensus on major regional and international issues. He went on to state that the vitality of this relationship is reflected in the rich content and diversified forms of the exchange mechanisms.

The second question that he posed was: what are the reasons for and what can we learn from the continued development of the South Africa-China relationship? He then summarised the answer to this question in 6 short sentences: the long-time traditional friendship is the fundamental source, the leadership' engagement provides the right guidance, the mutually-beneficial and win-win cooperation in all areas is the driving force, the broad consensus on major issues is the bonding tie, the regular exchange mechanisms are the guarantee of constant and smooth communication, and the close and frequent people-to-people exchanges are the foundation.

The last question that the Ambassador posed was how the growth of the South Africa-China relationship can be promoted in the future? He answered this by mentioning that South Africa and China have been supporting each other for common development purposes for the past 15 years. Currently, the international landscape, as well as both countries are undergoing profound changes. This brings major opportunities to the development of the bilateral relationship between South Africa and China. From the domestic perspective, both China and South Africa are in a key transitional period. The Chinese government is working to deepen reform, change the pattern of economic growth and readjust the economic structure to push economic development into Season Two, featuring improvement of quality and efficiency. In the meantime, South Africa has promulgated the National Development Plan, a blueprint for the next 20 years, and will embrace a second phase of transition, with economic and social transition as the focus. The two countries share many similarities in state governance.

He further stated that, from an international perspective, it is way too early to be optimistic about the international economic and financial situation. Global economic recovery is still weak and fragile, the spill-over of the monetary policies of some developed countries has started to be felt and a number of emerging economies are experiencing turbulence in their financial markets. On the other hand, emerging economies represented by BRICS countries are enhancing solidarity and coordination to jointly address challeng-

es, and they remain the engine for global economic development. The South Africa-China relationship has become one of the best examples of cooperation between developing countries.

The Ambassador emphasized that a review of the great achievements of the past 15 years makes both countries confident about their future. China is now working to fulfil the Chinese Dream for the prosperity of the country, the renewal of the nation and the happiness of the people; while South Africa, the Rainbow Nation, is also exploring the best path for future development. South Africa-China relationship is like a giant vessel, carrying the profound friendship and common aspiration, hoisting the sails to a shared destination. He mentioned the three sails that will make this relationship smooth.

The first is the sail of unity. Unity gives us strength. No matter how the international situation changes, China and South Africa should always remain good friends, good brothers and good partners. Both South Africa and China should be even more committed to the traditional friendship, enable closer high-level exchange, enhance political mutual trust, and treat each other with respect and equality for win-win cooperation and common development. At the same time, the unity and cooperation between China and South Africa have gone beyond bilateral scope. Both countries should also enhance their coordination and cooperation in international organizations and multilateral mechanisms, like the United Nations, the G20, BRICS, etc., to jointly safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.

The second is the sail of cooperation. South Africa and China should further expand and improve bilateral trade, scale up two-way investment and give full play to the role of mechanisms like the Bi-national Commission (BNC) and the Joint Working Group, and facilitate major cooperation projects in trade, investment, energy, communications, agriculture and human resources. At the same time, South Africa and China should explore cooperation in areas like education, science and technology and culture to enrich the contents of the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and South Africa. In 2015, the sixth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation will be held in South Africa. The Chinese side looks forward to working together with the South African side to lift the new type of strategic partnership between China and Africa to a higher level.

The third is the sail of friendship. Both countries should look ahead to the future and nurture the amity between people, enhance cooperation in cultural and people-to-people areas, and try to ensure the success of the 2014 South African Year in China and the 2015 Chinese Year in South Africa. He urged that particular attention should be given to exchanges between the young people of the two countries, so that they can carry forward the traditional friendship of the two countries. He concluded by challenging both South Africa and China to work together in promoting this relationship.

Keynote Address

Former Deputy Minister Marius Fransmen of the Department of International Relations and Co-operation

In his keynote address, he expressed his sincere gratitude to be speaking at the celebration of the relations between Republic of South Africa and the People's Republic of China. He mentioned that the event was possible because of the rich and shared common history between the two countries. He also mentioned that the event presents a special opportunity for both South Africa and China to pause, look back and reflect on the journey that both countries have travelled together.

Deputy Minister stated that this gathering can bring much closer stakeholders in the field of Diplomacy, working together to navigate challenges facing both countries, and bringing into the fold innovative ideas on how to advance the relations with like-minded states such as China. South Africa values the relations with academics as they continue to add value and enrich the work the government does in international engagements.

He went on to acknowledge the presence of Prof Garth Shelton, who has written extensively on South Africa-China relations and quoted from one of his publications, aptly titled, *China, South Africa and Africa*, in which Shelton observes that: "the Party-to-Party relations have led to a deeper friendship and closer understanding between South Africa and China, enhancing the official State-to-State interaction". The Deputy Minister stated that this quotation was particularly true because already in 1963, the then President of the ANC, Comrade O.R. Tambo, visited Beijing to give more impetus to the idea of strengthening Party-to-Party relations. He then noted that this shows that the relations between the two countries extend well beyond the 15 years that is celebrated this year. Furthermore, the South African Communist Party (SAP) has throughout the years, even during the dark days of apartheid, maintained close contact with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As a result, these relations were taken to greater heights and witnessed the creation of what was to be known as a consultation mechanism between the CCP and the SACP, in 1998.

He mentioned President Jacob Zuma's remarks during the State Visit to South Africa by President Xi Jinping's in March this year: "Historians continue to uncover evidence that contact between Africa and China predates the written record. It is said that our own Kingdom of Mapungubwe had contact with China nine centuries ago. Regrettably, colonialism, imperialism and apartheid interrupted contact between our countries". He urged that as South Africa and China celebrate the 15 years of diplomatic relations, they should be mindful of what binds them. He noted the common history of both countries as continuing to be a shining light in all that is done in advancing issues of development, and they must be central to the engagements. He emphasised that this historical linkage must reverberate in the course of the South Africa-China journey.

The Deputy Minister acknowledged that, in the past 15 years, a lot has been achieved between the two countries. The most notable period marking some of the milestones was the celebration of the 10th Anniversary in 2008, when both countries took stock of their great achievements and reflected on what had to be done to achieve the goals that had been set. Since then, China has become South Africa's largest trading partner in the world. In turn, South Africa has become China's largest trading partner in Africa. This can only be a remarkable story of two nations of the south working together side by side to advance issues of common interest and mutual benefit.

The Deputy Minister emphasised the history of both countries stating that it even goes back to when China's seat at the UN was restored in 1971, for among the 76 countries that voted in its favour, 26 were from Africa, accounting for more than one-third of the total. It was for this that later, when expressing his appreciation, Chairman Mao Zedong said it was the African friends who carried China back to the UN." China has more than returned the favour and today, both countries build on these early blooms in deepening the mutual goal in transforming institutions of global governance. He further noted the successes of the relationship with China, a few years ago, when South Africa was lobbying for membership of the then BRIC: it was China in the forefront of this campaign. And South Africa became a non-permanent member of the UNSC, it was because of the role played by China in championing its support for South Africa's membership. For all this support, South Africa cannot overlook the influence that the historical bond played in advancing South Africa's interest in the multilateral and other foras of note.

The Deputy Minister showed gratitude for the fact that South Africa is associated with a country that has become the 2nd biggest economy in the world and expected to become the biggest economy in the world by 2030. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1998, the partnership has progressively developed through three phases, namely: a partnership in 2000, a strategic partnership in 2008 and a comprehensive partnership in 2010. He further mentioned that it was under the presidency of former president Nelson Mandela that South Africa recognized Beijing as the sole legitimate government of the whole of China. Former President Mandela had the foresight to steer the South African foreign policy towards an economy that would in future be the biggest in the world. He undertook the first State Visit by a South African Head of State to China.

Moreover, he stated that this legacy was continued by President Mbeki when he visited China in 2001 and President Zuma in 2010 and their respective counterparts reciprocated accordingly, in between these State Visits, there were other visits by the Heads of States to and from China, such as President Zuma's visit in July 2012 to attend the FOCAC Summit. The regular high level exchanges signalled the importance of the South Africa-China partnership. He noted that this dynamic relationship has grown over the past 15 years,

to reflect a comprehensive strategic partnership built on: political trust; a commitment to economic interaction in a more balanced manner that would deliver sustainable mutual benefits; and cooperation in the multi-lateral fora.

The Deputy Minister said that in the year 2000, then Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited South Africa. This visit witnessed the signing of what was to be known as the Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership between RSA and the PRC. This Declaration was a midwife of the South Africa-China Bi-National Commission (BNC). By December 2001, subsequent to signing of this agreement, South Africa and China had signed 32 Agreements. In 2008, the partnership was elevated to a strategic partnership and then to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2010. The latest state visit to China by a South African Head of State was by President Zuma in 2010, during which the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed. Discussions were held to establish a mechanism that would monitor and unblock any challenges that impeded the implementation of bilateral agreements and major projects between the two countries.

He continued to state that this year, on 26 March, South Africa received President Xi Jinping on a State Visit to South Africa. One of the key outcomes of this visit was the signing of the Terms of Reference of the Joint Inter-Ministerial Working Group (JWG); this meant that the JWG could begin its work. It was during this particular visit that President Zuma placed on record that: “Mr President, your visit today takes place within the context of the fifteen years of formal diplomatic relations between our countries. This important milestone will be observed in many ways throughout the year in both countries. It has been proposed that next year be heralded as the ‘Year of South Africa in China’ and that 2015 be declared the ‘Year of China in South Africa’. We can therefore look forward to many activities that will bring our countries and peoples even closer”.

The Joint Inter Ministerial Working Group, which would meet in Beijing would add to the existing mechanisms and coordinate implementation of bilateral Agreements and major projects. The BNC was also scheduled to take place in close proximity to the JWG in November 2013. Thus far, South Africa and China agreed on the need to work towards establishing a more equitable trade structure. A Joint Working Group on Trade Statistics was established during the BNC in 2010 to look at trade patterns and statistics. It was encouraging to note that Hon Minister Davies of Trade and Industry, at the opening of the South African National Pavilion at the China International Fair for Investment and Trade (CIFIT) (held from the 8th to 11th of October, in Xiamen, China), announced that China has committed to encourage its enterprises to increase investment in South Africa’s manufacturing industry. This is aimed at promoting the creation of value-adding activities in close proximity to the source of raw materials. It will not only contribute towards beneficiation and value addition of the South African primary commodities, but will also assist in job creation. China bestowed South Africa with the status of “Guest of Honour Country”

at CIFT, in celebration of 15 years of diplomatic relations.

Amongst a number of tangible products of South Africa's economic cooperation with China is the recent launch of the Hisense Plant in June this year, in Atlantis, in the Western Cape Province. It is believed that this new investment will not only create the 1200 jobs stated, but also stimulate other related businesses around it, particularly SMMEs and self-employment of the youth. While South Africa is experiencing a decline in tourists from its traditional European markets, mostly due to the recession and the financial meltdown the world has recently experienced, figures from Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), reflect that between 2010 and 2011, the number of tourists from India and China increased. In 2012, South Africa saw the number of Chinese tourists to South Africa increase to 132 334, from 84 883 in 2011. In the first quarter of 2013, the numbers amounted to 54 494, compared to 41 161 for the first quarter of 2012. The upward positive trend in this regard should be leveraged and encouraged, as tourism greatly contributes to GDP and at the same time boosts small businesses and informal trading.

The Deputy Minister also stated that China continues to count itself amongst the countries that provide the necessary support in the education system of this country. The government of China has been offering scholarships to South African students to study in China. From this year onward, the number of scholarships awarded to our students has increased to 200, spread over a five year period and translating into 40 scholarships per year in various fields. These scholarships are coordinated by the Department of Higher Education and Training. This year an additional 15 scholarships in Jewellery Design were offered through the Vaal Diamond Company.

He continued to state that he hopes that this partnership will continue to strengthen beyond the next 15 years. The two countries should continue to work towards bridging the trade deficit and advancing industrial development and beneficiation through foreign direct investment, throughout Africa. Advancing South-South Cooperation and the African Agenda through multilateral structures such as the G77+ China, BRICS and FOAC, as well as the UN, will remain some of the fronts at which China's support will always be appreciated and cherished. He further acknowledged that more still needs to be done, but, overall, South Africa is happy with the progress made thus far. He mentioned that he envisioned the two nations bound by history to realise their common goals and aspirations. He also mentioned that South Africa is inspired by its common developmental challenges with China to work more, together, much closer to realise their developmental aspirations. This is a challenge that both countries must place before them. To ensure that these relations, inspired by South Africa and China's shared common history, can work towards creating better living conditions and dignified livelihoods for all people.

Introduction: An Assessment of South Africa-China Relations from a National Interest Perspective

Yazini April and Garth Shelton

INTRODUCTION

The basis for South Africa's relations with China rests on four pillars: China's contribution to the defeat of colonisation in the rest of Africa, and particularly apartheid in South Africa; China and South Africa's shared strategic approach to global issues and international relations; China's support of Africa's development efforts, coinciding with South Africa's foreign policy commitment to the African agenda; and the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa alliance (BRICS).¹ Trade relations have played a fundamental role in the formation of all four pillars, with trade mushrooming as China became South Africa's biggest trading partner in 2009. Total trade between the two countries amounted to US\$14,1 billion (ZAR119,5 billion) in that year. By 2011 economic trade between the two countries grew to US\$45bn (R363bn).² The foregoing, coupled with the celebration of South Africa and China's 15-year relationship, provided a scholarly opportunity for reflection on the past and the future.

Over the years, bilateral trade has surged from an initial \$1,6 billion to \$45 billion.³ As trade relations continued to boom, 2013 records established that China had surpassed the US, becoming the number one destination for South African exports. Apart from oil, South Africa imports mainly consumer goods and capital goods. China has become the manufacturing capital of the world, and a large amount of South Africa's mineral products go to China. For example, material is exported to China to manufacture cellphones, which are then imported back into South Africa in huge numbers – there are more cell phones in South Africa than there are people.⁴ The bulk of South Africa's exports to China have mainly comprised of mining products, particularly iron and steel, heavy chemicals and nonferrous metals, totalling around \$5,5 billion a year.⁵ In return, South Africa imports Chinese clothing, machinery, electronic equipment, furniture and footwear.

In terms of investment, in 2007, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) invested \$5,46 billion in the Standard Bank of South Africa – China's largest financial investment in that year. Chinese and South African officials went on to sign a series of mem-

orandums of understanding about investment in 2010, with respect to clean energy, power transmission and railways; and a \$303,6 million-loan agreement was concluded between South Africa's third-largest cell phone operator, Cell C, and the China Development Bank.⁶ Cement producer, Jidong Development Group, and the China-Africa Development (CAD) Fund have agreed to set up a \$200 million-plus cement plant in the Limpopo province, another major investment by China over the past few years;⁷ and Chinese manufacturer First Automobile Works has invested \$100m to build a vehicle assembly plant in COEGA, a Special Economic Zone in the Eastern Cape. So far, the project has produced 1 000 jobs.⁸

It must be noted that Chinese-led investments have been reciprocated with South Africa's entry into China. For example, global brewing giant SABMiller has opened 50 breweries in China,⁹ while South African energy firm Sasol, whose coal-to-fuel technology continues to attract global interest, has established collaboration with Chinese coal company Shenhua in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, and Shaanxi Province. Other South African investments have been in the fields of boat making, media, restaurants, mining, financial services and banking.¹⁰

But what does all this economic development mean for South Africa? In the final analysis, a country's foreign relations policy consists of self-interest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests and to achieve its goals within the international relations milieu.¹¹ Furthermore, no nation is an island. Because domestic policies are constantly affected by outside developments, nations are compelled to enter into dialogue with target or initiating entities or to form alliances for the purpose of enhancing their status quo, increasing their power or prestige and ensuring their survival in the international system.¹²

This publication assesses diplomatic relations between South Africa and China over the past fifteen years by evaluating economic and political progress from a national interest perspective. Progress is measured against variables such as trade growth, people-to-people development, partnerships, and the implementation of state agreements, all against the background of the theory of national interest. Both Henry Kissinger and Robert Art make it clear that the identification of national interests is crucial for the development of policy and strategy. National interests help determine the type and amount of national power employed as a means to implement a designated policy or strategy.¹³ Art asserts that the most fundamental task in devising a grand strategy is to determine a nation's national interests. Once national interests have been determined, they drive a nation's foreign policy and diplomatic relations by influencing the basic direction that it takes, the levels and required resources needed, and the manner in which the state must employ them to be effective. Due to the critical role national interests play, they must be strategically crafted and not merely assumed.¹⁴

South Africa and China's national interests can be demonstrated through their do-

mestic and foreign policy agendas, which are both globally based. South Africa's constitutional democracy is regarded as the entry point in determining South Africa's national interests as a country. The 1996 constitution is supreme and encompasses the recognition of international human rights law. The preamble makes explicit reference to various values within a historical context, such as 'Building a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.'¹⁵ From a global perspective, South Africa has made the African agenda its main focus through supporting institutions such as the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Peer Review Mechanism and the New Partnership for African Development, in order to promote sustainable socio-economic development in Africa and to achieve political regional integration over the long term.¹⁶

With regard to China, the Africa policy of the Chinese government is rooted in 'development' and what it calls 'mutually beneficial cooperation'.¹⁷ Officially, China states that it 'unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. The fundamental goals of this policy are to preserve China's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, create a favourable international environment for China's reform and opening up, and modernization construction, maintain world peace and propel common development'.¹⁸ In 2007, Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang made a statement about China's eight-point diplomatic philosophy that included the following points:

- China will not seek hegemony. China is still a developing country and has no resources to seek hegemony. Even if China becomes a developed country, it will not seek hegemony.
- China will not play power politics and will not interfere with other countries' internal affairs. China will not impose its own ideology on other countries.¹⁹

Recently, in January 2014, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary, Xi Jinping, asserted that China should be 'proactive' (*fenfa you wei*).²⁰ In essence, while China may keep to those principles that will further its economic interests, it may abandon its previous foreign policy, influenced by Deng Xiaoping's 'hide its strength and bide its time' (*taoguang yanghui*),²¹ and shed the image of being a reluctant stakeholder. China's proactivity in the global arena, particularly in regard to South Africa, begs the question of whose national interests will be pursued. In other words, while the two countries have a lot of common interests, the question is how successfully they can balance their national interests in advancing their powers as actors in the global arena, while maintaining successful diplomatic relations.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

This book is divided into nine chapters, some of which derive from the *South Africa-China Diplomatic Relations at 15 Years* conference. The chapters are arranged under three over-arching topics: South Africa-China political and economic relations; South Africa and China people-to-people and knowledge transfer; and South Africa and China in Africa.

Chapter Two and chapter Three fall under the first topic, South Africa-China political and economic relations. Both chapters begin by first providing a detailed background analysis of historical, diplomatic, and current relations between South Africa and China.

Chapter Two raises the theory of national interests and how this influenced South Africa's recognition of China in 1998, due to South Africa's ambition to play a major role in international affairs; China's support for African liberation struggles; and the long historic friendship between the African National Congress (ANC), the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the China Communist Party (CPC). The author further articulates how, over the past 15 years, the relationship became a partnership for the advancement of a new global order, the common foreign policy objective identified by Presidents Mbeki and Jiang in December 2001. This partnership was further strengthened by Presidents Zuma and Hu in August 2010, with South Africa looking to China for support in restructuring the United Nations (UN) in line with the Group of 77 and China's UN Programme for Reform (A/51/950) as well as the Declaration of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Ministerial Meeting of the G-77, which would bring strong permanent African and possibly South African representation to the UN Security Council.²²

South Africa relies on China as a key partner in advancing the regeneration of Africa in terms of investment, financing and infrastructure, and many observers have identified China as Africa's key development partner.²³ South Africa also hopes that south-south co-operation will translate into the reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), opening the way for greater permanent representation for the African continent and the democratisation of decision making on global political issues. This chapter basically provides a strong argument for South Africa's national interests in partnering with China on the continent, and promoting the country's interests at a global level.

Chapter Three once again provides a broad overview of the development and growth of South Africa-China relations. The chapter also attempts to demonstrate how relations between the two countries have developed advantageously over the past 15 years,

beginning with the partnership established in 2000, which was then upgraded to a strategic partnership (based on equality, mutual benefit and common development) in 2004 and further elevated to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2010.²⁴ The author is very pragmatic, however, in addressing the trade imbalance between the two countries, and asserts that despite growing trade figures, the current pattern is unsustainable. The author also emphasises that the onus is on South Africa to promote its national interests by restructuring and diversifying its economy. South African companies need to be more aggressive and dynamic in exploring China's growing market to get their reasonable share. China, the author argues, needs to address the trade imbalance by partnering with South Africa and addressing practical hindrances on the way.

Finally, the author argues that, as the biggest economies in Asia and Africa respectively and fellow members of G20 and BRICS, South Africa and China have a lot of common interests and broad consensus on both domestic development and international issues, which could further the national interests of both. Particularly since both countries feel obliged to coordinate their positions and work together to represent and advance the interests of developing countries in the United Nations, the WTO and other international organisations on issues like development and poverty reduction, south-south cooperation, regional conflicts resolution and environmental protection.

Chapter Four is an economic study that assesses how the mining trade industry can be used to promote industrial development. Resource trade, which has been identified as one of China's national interests that drive its foreign policy, has raised a lot of debate regarding China-Africa relationships. This chapter examines whether or not South Africa can utilise its 15-year bilateral relationship with China to resolve some of its current mining challenges, particularly since the South African mineral industrial complex remains a challenge for the country. ASA Metals is a joint mining venture in Limpopo, of which South Africa owns 40 per cent and China 60 per cent. ASA Metals serves as an excellent case study, because it demonstrates not only what could be done to promote mineral industrialisation between the two countries, but also how both countries are in a position to effect industrial changes in the mining process.

As a way forward, the chapter provides examples of how a partnership with China in the energy sector could benefit South Africa's mining sector, as China is now the second-biggest energy producer in the world and has a relatively strong foundation for energy production and supply. In regard to technology, another collaboration example is provided, as China is fast becoming a world leader in mining technology. The chapter argues that diplomatic relations between the two countries could play an effective role in benefitting the national interests of both countries.

Chapter Five, by Ke Yu, addresses a public diplomacy element in the form of education and exchanges between South Africa and China. The author provides extensive background information on South Africa-China education and cooperation gaps. It is revealed that China's involvement in South Africa's human resource development has been recent and also relatively minor. China-African bilateral interactions are shown to be sparse, scattered and nominal in their scale and impact, pointing to an evident deficit in knowledge base and therefore a need for further examination. The author's assessment is divided into three areas: Sino-African educational engagement; South Africa-China educational engagement (within South Africa's overall human resource challenges and experiences); and, lastly, the Sino-South African educational cooperation or aid puzzle. The chapter speaks to the issue of people to people as the author raises pertinent questions such as whether China has fulfilled its commitment to place education at the heart of its Sino-Africa cooperation. Is the education exchange between China and Africa about cooperation or aid? The author highlights how many allegations demonstrate that Chinese projects in Africa 'are all Chinese-designed, carried out by Chinese, with a poor record of skill transfers to the continent'.

Chapter Six also speaks to education development, but with the focus on scientific knowledge transfer. The chapter provides a detailed analysis of the state of science and technology (S&T) on the continent. The authors argue that the African continent is currently marginalised from the digital community and the fast pace of development, and that the threat posed by the minimal investment in S&T by the African Union (AU) has now become more of an economic development tragedy than a technological matter affecting regional integration. The lack of policy implementation is cited as the major challenge in promoting key technological functions, such as e-governance. One of the solutions proposed for the continental technology challenge is that of strategic collaboration between China and South Africa. The authors maintain that both South Africa and China could contribute immensely through the AU as an institution by partnering in strategic ways that could fast-track technological growth on the continent, as both countries are already contributing actively towards science and technology production from both a domestic and a global perspective.

The last two chapters focus on China in Africa from economic and military perspectives. In Chapter Seven, the author discusses opportunities for Sino-Africa trade growth. Ambassador Shu Zhan maintains that there are opportunities for Africa to strongly enter into the manufacturing and labour-intensive sectors, to which both South Africa

and China could contribute. The chapter focuses more on the China angle, however, as he discusses China's move into more sophisticated product markets, which would in turn clear market space for African countries to enter the more labour-intensive industries. The author offers finance development as another option for Sino-Africa relations and argues how China has a growing role, through institutions like Exim-Import Bank of China, in financing development in Africa, which is the region facing the greatest constraints in terms of access to finance.²⁵

South-south cooperation is the third focus area that the author discusses as a tool for Sino-Africa relations. The author asserts that there are high expectations that south-south cooperation could bring many benefits. Adapting policies from one context to another, however, calls for much experience, planning, knowledge of the foreign context, and dialogue based on mutual expectations. More importantly, the author maintains how it is vital for the parties to share a common vision. South-south cooperation would serve not only the mutual interests of the southern hemisphere, but also those of the global economy at large. Finally, the author proposes a tripartite structure of South Africa-China-Africa cooperation endorsed by the continent. This proposition is premised on the financial impact that both countries have on the continent. One example of South Africa's impact and influence is the approval by the South African Reserve Bank of nearly 1 000 large investments in 36 African countries.

Chapter Eight assesses China's military presence in Africa, particularly its participation in UN peacekeeping operations on the continent. The author focuses on China's participation in UN peacekeeping through the deployment of troops and other military personnel in regard to national interests. The author argues that this strengthened commitment to UN peace operations is clearly consistent with China's rising power status.²⁶ And it is in line with its grand strategic objective of being a responsible major power, and with the 'new historic missions' outlined in a presidential decree in 2008. The author goes further to demonstrate how China's economic and peacekeeping decision-making tracks operate 'separately', and how tensions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the military and the economic actors ensure that 'there is no overall strategic approach to peacekeeping.'²⁷ The author also emphasises that China's peacekeeping in Africa is relatively separate from its economic calculation, which can therefore be attributed to its relative success. This is one of the main chapters that analyses China's peacekeeping objectives in line with the CCP's Africa policy, which outlines the country's aim to maintain world peace and propel common development.

Chapter Nine concludes by emphasising that the South Africa-China relationship remains dynamic on many fronts. This book promotes various strategies, such as South Africa-China partnerships to advance a new global order, economic partnerships to address mining challenges, and tripartite relationships between the two countries and the continent, based on their joint commitment to changing Africa's political landscape. On the domestic front, relations between the two countries are set to grow, as both South Africa and China have the aspiration and commitment to adopt innovative ways to boost trade, investment, poverty reduction, infrastructure building, capacity building, human resources development, food security and hi-tech industries on the continent. The New Comprehensive Strategic Partnership document has become essential in strengthening the national interests of both countries from the fronts. The agreements range from political dialogue, trade, investment, mineral exploration and agriculture to joint efforts in the global arena, such as in the United Nations and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.

Continued economic and political growth would be a major foreign policy coup that promotes the national interests of both countries. Economic growth is bound to result in a positive spill-over into the socio-political arena. The fact is, in the current political climate, economic strength has become a key measurement of state power in the global arena. From a South African perspective, China is a dream market, given its population of over one billion citizens. From a political perspective, China is a staunch ally that has demonstrated strong commitment in addressing Africa's developmental impasse. From a Chinese economic perspective, South Africa is currently China's largest trading partner on the continent. South Africa is also at the forefront of driving Africa's regional integration through free trade agreements and infrastructure plans. Politically, South Africa is a key player in Africa and actively involved in shaping the political terrain. With the new BRICS grouping, the relations between South Africa and China have entered a new era where they could strategically shape the domestic, regional and global interests of these two countries.

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Chapter 2

China and South Africa - Common Interests and Global Objectives

Garth Shelton

INTRODUCTION - CHINA AND AFRICA

South Africa-China relations have seen a dramatic strengthening in the fifteen years since formal diplomatic recognition in 1998. Currently, China is South Africa's largest bilateral trade partner (South Africa's trade with the European union is bigger than trade with China), while many observers suggest that in future China could be South Africa's biggest investor.¹ Moreover, China and South Africa share a range of common interests, most importantly a desire to restructure the Bretton Woods system and develop a more equitable, fair, balanced and stable global financial system. The range of South Africa-China common interests and objectives has manifested itself in the conclusion of a Sino-South African 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement', which confirms a joint intention to broaden and deepen both economic and political collaboration over a wide spectrum of bilateral and multilateral activities. The positive and friendly South Africa-China association is grounded in the China-Africa historical relationship, as well as the common interests and objectives that both countries share. This chapter investigates South Africa-China relations in the context of the broader China-Africa partnership, as well as shared national interests and foreign policy objectives.

The China-Africa friendship has a long history, which may be divided into six different phases. The Chinese explorer Zheng He visited Africa long before European traders did, but the focus of his mission was interest, curiosity and exchange, rather than colonisation. As Henry Kissinger has observed, 'Zheng He's voyages displayed no territorial ambition and therefore he did not obtain actual colonies and resources. He just expanded China's appeal and showcased China's soft power.'² The vast distance between China and Africa precluded a close commercial or political relationship, until China's liberation in 1949. The second phase of the China-Africa relationship was shaped by Chairman Mao Tse-tung's active support for Africa's liberation. This period was characterised by friendship aid, political support and solidarity as the African continent struggled to free itself from colonial control. Support for Africa's liberation was grounded in China's own struggle against

imperialism and external control. In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly voted to bring China into the organisation, driven largely by wide African support. Under Deng Xiaoping (the third phase), China-Africa relations were based on post-liberation solidarity and growing friendship.

In 1996, China's President, Jiang Zemin, embarked on a groundbreaking visit to Africa, marking a change in China's Africa policy and a turning point, constituting the fourth phase in relations, with China shifting from a focus on political solidarity to a more commercial engagement. Strong growth in the Chinese economy opened the opportunity for increased African commodity exports and the building of a comprehensive economic relationship. Under President Hu Jintao, the China-Africa trade and investment relationship was consolidated, while senior Chinese officials made numerous visits to Africa with a view to consolidating and strengthening high-level political friendships. The sixth and current phase of China-Africa relations is guided by President Xi Jinping's promotion of the 'China dream' intended to further uplift the Chinese people and transform China into a prosperous nation.³ Africa can also share in China's dream, as making the dream come true will require a continued win-win China-Africa partnership.⁴ China is now Africa's biggest trade partner and two-way trade is likely to exceed US\$300 billion by 2018. Complementarity of commercial engagement, with Africa supplying raw materials and China expanding manufacturing and industrialisation, underpins an expected broadening and strengthening of China-Africa commercial relations.

Since President Jiang's notable visit to the African continent in 1996, China has given pre-eminence to Africa as a political strategic partner (in terms of South-South co-operation) and an economic partner (African support for China's industrialisation). At the same time, China has sought to take advantage of Africa's rapidly growing consumer market. The China-Africa trade profile has expanded considerably since 1996 and China has stepped up both development assistance and investment in a wide range of areas across the continent. Today, the China-Africa partnership includes over US\$40 billion invested in Africa by Chinese corporations and more than 2 000 Chinese enterprises active in 50 African countries. The FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Co-operation) process has expedited the construction of more than 30 hospitals and 50 schools in Africa, while over 30 000 Africans have been trained in China and 50 agricultural technology teams have visited the continent. In the coming decades, Africa's development process is expected to be substantially impacted by China's increasing and positive commercial interaction. Moreover, China's expanding global geopolitical presence and accelerating diplomatic interaction with Africa are likely to contribute significantly to the continent's political and economic evolution.

China's engagement with Africa has produced a broadly win-win outcome, with benefits for both Chinese and African consumers. Moreover, the depth of commercial engage-

ment and the complementarity of the Chinese and African economies bodes well for the future. Ongoing and possibly expanded African raw material exports to China are mutually beneficial.⁵ According to detailed International Monetary Fund (IMF) studies, Africa's recent expanding economic growth rate is partly attributed to the accelerated raw materials and hydrocarbon demand from China.⁶ A number of independent studies have concluded that the outcome of expanded trade with China, along with new Chinese corporate and state owned enterprise (SOE) investment in Africa has had a significantly positive overall impact on Africa.⁷ For example, Raphael Kaplinsky's study on China-Africa two-way trade concludes that China is propelling the international demand for oil, gas and a range of primary products, many of which are sourced in Africa, which in turn has a significantly beneficial overall impact on resource-rich African countries.⁸

As a consequence of a growing Chinese middle class, fuelled by continued healthy economic growth, Africa has an opportunity to expand exports to China and to move away from over-reliance on raw material supplies. Significant new commercial opportunities for African exporters are expected as Chinese consumers increase their disposable income.⁹ The spectacular growth of the Chinese market, along with its overall size (over 1,3 billion consumers), increasingly offer exporters all over the world new opportunities and prospects for mutually beneficial economic expansion.¹⁰ More recently, President Xi Jinping's new commitment to promoting the 'China Dream,' with a view to further strengthening Chinese standards of living, suggests fresh options for future mutually beneficial commercial engagement. At the same time, success in the highly competitive Chinese market will be decided by the skill, commitment and dedication of African exporters.¹¹

Comprehensive World Bank investigations have corroborated claims that China's expanding trade with Africa has contributed significantly to growth and poverty reduction. A further increase in trade, as China's economy continues to grow at a healthy seven per cent per annum, offers a positive win-win outcome for both China and Africa. Numerous studies have documented that Chinese investments in Africa have benefited local economies and expanded consumer markets. Lower-cost Chinese manufactured products are increasingly available to poorer African communities. At the same time, improving the overall investment impact and attracting more investment is the responsibility of African local authorities and national governments. A more positive and business-friendly African investment environment would attract more Chinese (and other) investors. Both the World Bank and IMF have acknowledged that China's investments in hydrocarbons, mining, infrastructure and telecommunications are playing a very important role in Africa's ongoing development.¹² In time, Chinese investments are expected to promote the establishment of small, job-creating, enterprises in Africa. Given the urgent demand for youth-employment across the continent, this would be a very positive and welcome development.¹³ Africa's current growth rate is around five to six per cent, largely due to a significant and recent

increase in Chinese trade, aid and investment. Local economies have benefited from new commercial activity and prospects for the expansion of links with China are widely welcomed across Africa.

Increased Chinese exports of lower-cost manufactured items to Africa have benefited consumers who for the first time have been able to afford a range of new products. Criticisms that Chinese imports have undermined local manufacturing are largely under-researched and overstated. With the exception of foot ware and textiles, there is little evidence that Chinese imports have significantly weakened African manufacturing capacity.¹⁴ At the same time, it is increasingly clear that the main challenge to Africa's small, but growing, industrial capacity is from the broader negative impact of globalisation, rather than from China itself. For example, the challenge to Africa's textile markets come not only from China, but from a number of Asian countries, including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia.¹⁵

Chinese construction companies are increasingly winning contracts in Africa, closing the gap left by Western banks which have lost interest in what they consider to be low-profit, high-risk projects. However, China's identification of value in African infrastructure is having a positive international impact with European and Japanese banks reconsidering specific projects. As sustainable development is critical for Africa's longer term growth, China's contribution to expanding infrastructure is widely welcomed as a major positive contribution to the continent's development agenda. Chinese road and rail construction is building a concrete foundation for future development and offers new opportunities to local communities on the continent. Across Africa, China is now widely implementing its own suggestion that 'if you want prosperity, first build a road'. Africa's food security is being enhanced through Chinese agricultural and technical assistance. China has established agricultural demonstration centres in 15 African countries where they are contributing to increased production and the application of advanced, scientific farming techniques. Moreover, China is managing to feed 25 per cent of the world's population on less than 10 per cent of the world's arable land, thus offering an inspirational model for Africa.

With over 50 per cent of China's total overseas development assistance going to Africa, the continent is benefiting significantly from Beijing's generosity. Moreover, China's aid programmes are free of complex conditionalities and are ideal for strengthening Africa's development prospects. China's aid to Africa is opening the door for new construction projects and related commercial opportunities. The difficulties associated with the West's aid to Africa are being avoided by a more pragmatic and outcome-orientated Chinese approach. Africa's leaders have responded well to China's practical and less-complex process, opening the door for positive outcomes. Grounded on a policy of non-interference in domestic affairs, peaceful coexistence and common development, China's approach is

embraced across the African continent. The patronising, imperial sentiment has been replaced with a friendly, constructive approach grounded on equality and a sharing of common challenges.¹⁶ Furthermore, China's engagement with the African market provides another diplomatic option for Africa's leadership, besides the former colonial powers, and offers new occasions to exercise strategic leverage for economic gain.¹⁷

SOUTH AFRICA AND CHINA - DIPLOMATIC LINKS

The historical record shows that China was a strong supporter of Africa's anti-colonial campaigns, including South Africa's national liberation struggle. On occasion, Chairman Mao Tse-tung gave guidance to African National Congress (ANC) cadres and he provided support and encouragement for the political liberation of Africa as a whole. In 1963, ANC President Oliver Tambo visited China for discussions with the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese leadership. In addition, the South African Communist Party (SACP) established a close and friendly working relationship with the CPC, which continues to this day.¹⁸ Sino-Soviet ideological differences frustrated the ANC's links with the Communist world and the former-USSR became the ANC-SACP's main external ally. At the same time, China's broad support and encouragement for South Africa's liberation forces remained firm.¹⁹ The CPC's on-going engagement with the SACP via a party-to-party structure has provided a solid foundation for friendly and constructive relations between Pretoria and Beijing. A positive party-to-party relationship has facilitated better understanding, broader exchanges and a stronger friendship between South Africa and China. The official state-to-state diplomatic relationship has been enhanced and augmented by congenial party-to-party links. CPC-ANC/SACP interaction and exchange underpins and reinforces conventional diplomatic processes to the long-term benefit of both China and South Africa.²⁰

Late in 1996, South Africa withdrew diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China (ROC - Taiwan), in favour of opening an embassy in Beijing. The decision to switch diplomatic recognition was based on a number of factors. Firstly, a democratic South Africa wanted to play a greater role in global affairs and was being constrained by a lack of interaction with China. Secondly, China's support for Africa's and South Africa's liberation struggles needed to be acknowledged. Thirdly, the 'one-China' principle (no diplomatic recognition of Taiwan) was almost universally accepted. Lastly, the very significant potential for an expansion in trade and investment with Mainland China confirmed that diplomatic recognition of Beijing would be in South Africa's best long-term interest.²¹ China offered a diplomatic compromise by agreeing to formal relations with South Africa, while encouraging on-going economic links with the ROC. Thus, accepting China's interpreta-

tion of the 'one-China' principle, gave South Africa full political and economic relations with Beijing, while not harming well-established commercial relations with Taipei.

Early in 1998, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki visited China to formally open diplomatic relations and to suggest a framework for longer term co-operation. Meetings with the Chinese leadership emphasised trade and investment options, while a common effort to transform the global economic and political system was discussed. The shared interest in establishing a fair, just and equitable international system, free of a dominant global power, was included on the bilateral agenda. Chinese Vice-President, Hu Jintao, visited South Africa the following year to consolidate diplomatic links and open consulates in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban. Hu emphasised the potential for two-way trade and outlined China's growing interest in expanding investments in Africa and South Africa.²²

SACP General Secretary, Blade Nzimande, visited China in November 1998 at the invitation of China's leadership. President Jiang Zemin referred to Nzimande as a comrade of the Chinese people and a good friend of China. Jiang also expressed his appreciation to the SACP for its role in building the South Africa-China friendship and making a positive contribution to establishing formal diplomatic links. A regular CPC-SACP consultation process was established, through which issues of mutual interest and concern could be discussed. Regular meetings continue, which act to strengthen and enhance the overall South Africa-China relationship. Moreover, party-to-party links strengthen personal friendships, improve mutual understanding and offer solutions to diplomatic difficulties, or delays at the state-to-state level.²³ President Nelson Mandela visited Beijing early in 1999, to express South Africa's gratitude for China's contribution to the liberation struggle and to further consolidate the process of developing a win-win South Africa-China partnership.²⁴ The expansion of trade and investment was listed as the short-term priority, while strengthening high-level bilateral interaction was also identified.²⁵

President Jiang Zemin visited South Africa in early 2000 to sign the 'Pretoria Declaration on the Partnership Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa'. The declaration commits China and South Africa to a political partnership, based on regular dialogue, consultation and high-level co-operation. Moreover, the declaration committed both countries to the common objective of transforming the global international system through both bilateral and multilateral interaction.²⁶ The Pretoria Declaration heralded the setting up of the South Africa-China Bi-National Commission (BNC), which is intended to facilitate regular and detailed state-to-state dialogue on trade, investment and broader issues of common concern.²⁷ Importantly, the Pretoria Declaration pledged joint China-South African co-operation to promote peace and stability on the African continent and to assist in advancing Africa's economic development.²⁸

In addition to the Pretoria Declaration, a number of other agreements have been signed, covering a wide range of activity. Since then, dozens of South Africa-China agreements

have been concluded to strengthen mutual friendship, diplomatic co-operation and commercial engagement. President Mbeki suggested that the South Africa-China relationship served as a model of South-South co-operation and he admonished the developing world to step-up co-operation with a view to reforming the United Nations (UN) and global financial institutions. President Jiang alluded to a South Africa-China common interest to this end, while he confirmed a united effort to advance global peace, poverty reduction and development.²⁹ The Mbeki-Jiang summit, held in 2000, thus initiated a new form of South-South co-operation and foreign policy synchronisation with a view to developing a new more just and equal global system. A major step forward in this process occurred in April 2011, when South Africa joined the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), which has as one of its long-term goals the transformation of the global political and financial system.

Late in 2001, Mbeki paid a second visit to Beijing, this time as President of the Republic of South Africa, at which time he formally launched the South Africa-China Bi-National Commission, setting the agenda for longer term South Africa-China co-operation and commercial expansion. Ministerial-level discussions covered a wide range of topics, confirming both countries' intention to develop a broad and comprehensive relationship.³⁰ Four key ministerial-level committees were formed within the BNC framework, focussing on international relations, trade and investment, science and technology, security and defence. Flowing from the BNC process, a range of government departments in both China and South Africa have set-up dialogue procedures to advance specific agreements and undertakings.³¹ The BNC process underpins the South Africa-China bilateral relationship and advances an evolving agenda of activities and diplomatic agreements, strengthening and augmenting the bilateral relationship. Regular high-level meetings complement the BNC system and offer strategic opportunity for political co-operation to advance long-term common objectives. President Mbeki interpreted the establishment of the South Africa-China BNC as a historical opportunity to broaden and deepen relations, to synchronise policy on global issues and to build commonality for co-operation in multinational institutions.³² Regular dialogue through the BNC has escalated South Africa-China co-operation and resulted in the conclusion of over fifty bilateral agreements covering a wide range of issues.³³ The range and depth of bilateral agreements provides a complex tapestry of co-operation and augers well for long-term diplomatic collaboration.³⁴

In response to growing unemployment in South Africa, in 2006 President Mbeki and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao concluded a unique agreement to shield South Africa's producers from lower-cost Chinese textile and clothing imports. China made a major concession to South Africa, with a view to protecting jobs and assisting with skills enhancement. Given the challenge of globalisation in the context of the international textile industry, China offered solidarity in advancing a South-South solution to South Africa's dilemma.

The agreement was intended to offer an opportunity for South African manufacturers to upgrade production technology and re-skill workers with a view to them becoming more competitive in the global textile industry. Unfortunately, the agreement had only a limited impact, as retailers switched to other low-cost suppliers in Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia.

The textile agreement was followed by another Chinese concession in the form of the South Africa-China 'Partnership for Growth and Development' (PGD) agreement concluded late in 2006. The PGD was intended to address South Africa's concerns that bilateral trade appeared to be shifting in China's favour. The agreement is intended to advance a long-term South Africa-China trade balance, which will help stabilise markets and employment in South Africa. Balanced trade is to be advanced through mineral beneficiation (and job-creation) in South Africa before export to China. The value added to minerals would help to off-set growing Chinese exports to South Africa. Moreover, measures were instituted to facilitate the increased export of manufactured and processed agricultural items to the Chinese market. While the PGD obliges China to advance beneficiation in South Africa, with a view to balancing two-way trade, the key to success of this agreement depends on South African exporters increasing their footprint in the Chinese market, especially among the growing and more affluent middle-class consumers. The rapid development of South Africa-China relations culminated in the 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement', signed by President Jacob Zuma and President Hu Jintao on 24 August 2010. The nine-page Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement covers a very wide range of both bilateral and multilateral areas of collaboration and co-operation. The document confirms the rapid growth of relations, a consolidated friendship and a comprehensive vision for future long-term political and economic solidarity.

SOUTH AFRICA AND CHINA - COMMON NATIONAL INTERESTS

The rapid growth of the South Africa-China friendship and the broad range of strategic collaboration since formal diplomatic recognition in 1998, suggests strong commonality in national interests. Donald Nuechterlin's conceptualisation of the national interest provides a useful instrument for foreign policy analysis, as well as for categorising and identifying national interests. He defines national interests as the 'perceived need and desires of one sovereign state in relation to the sovereign states comprising its external environment'.³⁵ The national interest relates to the external environment, while the 'public interest' best describes government policy making and interaction with the domestic environment. The national interest implies the interests of the nation as a whole, not just the interests of separate interest groups (or individual policy makers),

bureaucratic entities, or political organisations within the state. The objective of promoting the national interest is to advance the well-being and long-term prosperity of all citizens.

Policy makers are guided in their decisions about international relations by basic values (usually outlined in a national constitution) that they and their people hold to be important to their national well-being. At the same time, states have more than one interest and differing interests compete for state resources and attention. The foreign policy decision making system must balance resources, capacity and time in advancing competing national interests to produce a desired outcome. According to Nuechterlin, all the interests of a nation may be subsumed under four basic groups of interest:

- **Defence interests** - this implies shielding the nation and its citizens against a threat or actual attack from another state, or non-state actor. If the existence or physical integrity of the state is at risk, defence interests would receive urgent priority in foreign policy decision making.
- **Economic interests** – this implies the strengthening of the nation's economic capacity (GDP growth) and the promotion of national economic development through interaction (trade and investment) with other sovereign states.
- **World order interests** - this would encompass the continuation or encouragement of both international and regional systems of global political and economic governance to facilitate security and constructive international commercial engagement.
- **Ideological interests** – this would include the preservation and promotion of values (such as good governance, democracy and human rights), which are considered virtuous and appropriate.

DEFENCE INTERESTS

In the post-1994 period, South Africa has faced no external threat of any significance, thus defence interests have not required urgent attention in the foreign policy process. Accordingly, defence budgets have been contained and South Africa's military capacity has been prepared for largely border defence and peacekeeping activities. While China faces 'no clear and present danger', its defence budgets have increased in accordance with its status as a growing superpower. At the same time, China's support for peacekeeping, particularly in Africa, has grown significantly, suggesting that within the context of defence and military affairs, South Africa and China have a common interest in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping, to advance international peace and stability.³⁶ China's increasing support for UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations in Africa is widely

welcomed and constitutes a specific focus of common interest and co-operation, as both China and South Africa seek a more stable, peaceful and prosperous Africa. Closer co-operation in this area could make a major positive contribution to improving the investment environment in Africa and promoting economic growth. In addition, South Africa-China collaboration in stemming the flow of small arms to Africa would make a major contribution to peace and stability. It is well documented that the widespread availability of small arms in Africa fuels and prolongs conflict, while making post-conflict peace building more dangerous and complicated.³⁷

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

In terms of economic interests, South Africa's former Finance Minister, Pravin Gordon, advanced a 'national interest' to pursue a seven per cent GDP growth rate for the next twenty years, as the solution to addressing South Africa's poverty and unemployment problems. According to Gordon, the country's official unemployment rate stands at over 25 per cent, income inequality has widened and there are serious health, education and infrastructural deficits. Millions of young people between the ages of 15 and 25 have little or no short-term job prospects. The government's 'New Growth Path' incorporates a range of fresh policy plans to advance economic growth, including: improving the investment environment; boosting international business relations; and increasing exports.³⁸ A clear economic plan linked to expanding international commercial interaction, framed in terms of a core 'national interest', has been widely welcomed. As South Africa's biggest trade partner and potentially its biggest investor, China is expected to play a key role in the country's future economic development.

The establishment of Chinese SEZs (special economic zones) in South Africa, based on the success of the Chinese development model, could be the key to attracting major Chinese investment to South Africa. In addition to increasing exports to China and encouraging Chinese investment in South Africa, President Zuma's regional agenda should include mobilising China's support for the building of an extended and augmented Southern African Development Community (SADC) road and rail network as a foundation for accelerated regional integration. An economically stronger and more connected SADC region could be the accelerator for economic growth and job creation in South Africa. China's African experience, willingness and easy access to financing makes it an ideal partner in building regional infrastructure, which is critical to advancing intra-regional SADC trade and investment. China's major construction projects across the continent are providing essential infrastructure for the continent's economic development at both national and regional levels. China's African experience and capacity makes it a key partner for South Af-

rica in promoting SADC's integration process and in advancing regional economic growth and prosperity.

WORLD ORDER INTERESTS

The key component of South Africa's post-1998 (President Mbeki) foreign policy has been to advance world order interests, intended to ameliorate South Africa's external environment and thereby advance the nation's long-term objectives. Guided by a pan-African, South-South and anti-imperialist perspective, South Africa has sought to restructure Africa (African Renaissance, regional integration and NEPAD), while democratising global institutions (UN Security Council, IMF, World Bank, WTO, G7 to G20). Multilateral engagements (NAM, Group of 77 + China, NAASP, IBSA, BRICS) have been the instruments through which like-minded states are mobilised to advance a common global reform agenda.

The driver of this process is the belief that a multipolar international system of competing great powers, rather than a unipolar system, along with restructuring of the post-World war political (UN) and economic (Bretton Woods) economic systems, would benefit South Africa, Africa and the Global South. The general perception is that 'South Africa punches above its weight' in the context of building a new global order. South Africa is widely viewed as an emerging middle power and a bridge to Africa. This has afforded access to high-level global exchanges, where South Africa has been able to use smart power to shape and influence agendas. It is clear that South Africa has achieved significant success on issues such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and climate change. South Africa's participation in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has raised enormous expectation and hope for the promotion of Africa within a new South-South process.³⁹ In this heavy weight contest, South Africa's leaders have won prestige and acknowledgement, but the concrete results for South Africa as a whole are still to be determined.

Global restructuring features as a key foreign policy objective of both China and South Africa, outlined initially in 2001 and consolidated in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2010. South Africa expects China's support for broadening the UN Security Council (UNSC) to include permanent seats for African countries, including a seat for South Africa.⁴⁰ A more representative UNSC would go a long way to addressing key global concerns, especially poverty alleviation and economic progress in the developing world. An additional agenda priority calls for comprehensive reform of the global trading system, which currently favours the wealthy nations, to the disadvantage of emerging and developing economies.⁴¹ Moreover, fair market access to the European Union (EU) and

North America would be a major positive development for Africa and other developing countries. South Africa looks to China, within the BRICS framework and bilaterally, for support in advancing market access as a key world order interest. China and South Africa could work together in multilateral forums to promote restructuring of the global financial system in a way that levels the playing field and provides fair opportunity for developing economies.

IDEOLOGICAL INTERESTS

South Africa-China shared ideological interests encompass a South-South solidarity, underpinned by the philosophical constructs of the 1955 Bandung Conference's vision-or co-operation to counter global injustice.⁴² The New Africa-Asia Strategic Partnership (NAASP) has furthered this process and identified an agenda for action to advance the common interests of developing countries towards a more equitable global order.⁴³ Moreover, China and South Africa have a common interest in an agreement on climate change, which advances economic progress in the developing world without penalising economic progress.⁴⁴ The BASIC group of nations (Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, India and China) constitute a core of developing countries with a common vision for a fair and equitable climate change agreement. South Africa looks to China as a key partner in advancing the regeneration of Africa (investment, financing and infrastructure) and many observers have identified China as Africa's key development partner.⁴⁵ It is also hoped that South-South co-operation will translate into reform of the United Nations Security Council, opening the way for greater permanent representation for the African continent and democratisation of decision making on global political issues. Both China and South Africa promote a revisionist approach and a new global vision for the United Nations.

CONCLUSION - THE NEXT FIFTEEN YEARS

The past fifteen years of South Africa-China co-operation have seen very positive progress in a wide area of activity. Grounded in the friendly and mutually beneficial historical Sino-African relationship, South Africa-China relations have shown remarkable progress over the last decade. Common national interests and a shared global vision underpin the South Africa-China relationship, creating expectations for future close collaboration and co-operation in a wide range of areas. Based on the historical record, the next fifteen years of South Africa-China co-operation is expected to be characterised by:

- Increased trade, but with greater balance, suggesting that South African companies should work harder to compete in Chinese markets.
- A significant increase in Chinese investment in South Africa, but this is largely dependent on improved investment conditions and greater labour stability in South Africa.
- Increased Chinese involvement in SADC's transnational rail and road networks could open the way for significant economic growth in the region and expand China's African export market.
- Greater South Africa-China co-operation in stabilising Africa, through peace-keeping and post-conflict peace building, could make a major contribution to economic growth on the continent.
- Through BRICS, the G20 and bilateral engagement, China and South Africa could help to promote a new global order that reflects common goals and objectives.
- Enhanced South-South co-operation and a strengthened South Africa-China linkage is expected to form the foundation for a China-Africa development partnership and a stronger mutually beneficial economic relationship.

The 'China-South Africa Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement' encapsulates the common aims and objectives, as well as the long-term concerns, of both China and South Africa. The ideal measurable outcomes over the next fifteen years would include: South Africa-China balanced trade; significant Chinese job-creating investment in South Africa; a more stable and peaceful Africa; a reformed global financial system to better reflect the interests of the developing countries and a new UN Security Council that represents the views and aspirations of the majority of UN members. The China Dream aims to uplift the Chinese people and build a wealthy Chinese nation. South Africa supports this endeavour, while pursuing a similar objective to create jobs and opportunity for South Africans, whose dreams of a better world and prosperity mirrors that of China. Expanded South Africa-China co-operation and commercial interaction are expected to help achieve both Chinese and African dreams in the next fifteen years.

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Fifteen Years of South Africa-China Relations and Beyond

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INTRODUCTION

The normalisation of diplomatic relations between China and South Africa did not happen as expected when the new South Africa was born in 1994 – relations went through some zigzags, mainly due to the historical legacy of the Taiwan issue that was inherited from the apartheid regime. Prior to the fall of apartheid in South Africa, relations between the two countries were officially non-existent and unofficially antagonistic. The South African Air Force fought on the side of the United Nations against the Chinese People's Liberation Army in the Korean War, and enjoyed a strong relationship with Taiwan.¹ But the dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s opened up the possibility of official relations being established between the PRC and South Africa. After many years of strong lobbying, and engagement with President Mandela in November 1996, the South African government announced that it would switch recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in January 1997.²

The two countries finally reached an agreement on establishing formal ties starting from the first day of 1998. Like a jumbo jet that had been delayed for some time on the runway, once it took off, diplomatic relations between the two countries roared over the sky, flying high and far. Two years after the inauguration of diplomatic relations, the two countries established a partnership, which was upgraded to a strategic partnership based on equality, mutual benefit and common development in 2004 and further elevated to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2010.³ This roaring relationship can be demonstrated with the various interactions that have taken place over time.

At the end of December 1997, the Chinese Vice-Premier and its Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, were invited to visit South Africa, where, together with South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo, they signed a joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In April 1998, South African Vice-President Thabo Mbeki visited China. In September of the same year, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan was invited to South Africa to attend the 12th Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit as an observer. In October, Speaker of the South African National Assembly Frene Ginwala

paid a visit to China. In February 1999, Chinese Vice-President Hu Jintao visited South Africa. South African President Nelson Mandela paid a state visit to China in May 1999. In June the same year, Chinese Vice-Premier Qian Qichen, as the special envoy of President Jiang Zemin, was invited to South Africa to attend the inaugural ceremony of former President Thabo Mbeki.

From 24 to 27 April 2000, former President Jiang paid a state visit to South Africa at the invitation of South African President Mbeki. During the visit, Jiang held formal talks with Mbeki. The two presidents conducted an in-depth exchange of views on bilateral ties and international and regional issues, and reached extensive consensus. Jiang stated that China and South Africa were both developing countries with significant influences in their own regions, highlighting that maintaining the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries and promoting the establishment of a just and reasonable new international order were common goals for both countries. Jiang also said that the continuing expansion and deepening of bilateral friendly co-operation between China and South Africa not only conformed to the two countries' long-term and fundamental interests, but also contributed to world peace and development. Mbeki expressed his thanks to the Chinese government and people for their long-term support of South Africa's struggle against apartheid. He indicated that South Africa attached great importance to its co-operation with China. Mbeki also added that the establishment of bilateral strategic relations between China and South Africa would benefit not only both countries' co-operation in some concrete fields, but also bilateral co-operation on a series of issues such as globalisation, world trade, financial systems, debt, and how developing countries could play a role in the establishment of a new international order.⁴

Moving forward, in September 2007, then South African Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka visited Beijing and met with Chinese President Hu Jintao, after which she gave a speech at Tsinghua University on building Sino-South African relations. Sino-South African relations expanded significantly in 2010, following a number of high-level official visits and exchanges by officials from both countries. In late March 2010, CPPCC Chairman Jia Qinglin visited South Africa and met with South Africa's President Jacob Zuma, before signing contracts worth more than US\$300 million.⁵ In August 2010, President Jacob Zuma led a South African delegation of 17 cabinet members and 300 business people to China. According to the International Relations and Co-operation Department (DIRCO),⁶ Zuma's visit to China was considered an opportunity to consolidate ties with African countries, to which China is increasingly turning for resources, markets and diplomatic support. 'This state visit took place within the context of strengthening South-South co-operation, with the objective of deepening and broadening current bilateral relations to a new comprehensive strategic partnership between South Africa and China.'⁷

During the visit, Zuma and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed the Beijing Declaration

on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, which was to be the first such agreement concluded by China with any country.⁸ The declaration covers many facets of the South Africa-China bilateral relationship. In the declaration, the two sides expressed the desire to further strengthen and deepen friendly exchange and co-operation between the two nations in terms of both political and regional affairs, by establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership based on equality, mutual benefit and common development. A key element of this expanded partnership is the Partnership for Growth and Development, which focuses on key issues such as beneficiation and value addition to resources, infrastructure, market access and trade with the SADC region and Africa as a whole. The declaration outlined 38 bilateral co-operation agreements, ranging from political dialogue, trade, investment, mineral exploration and agriculture to joint efforts in the global arena, such as in the United Nations and the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation.

President Zuma's visit was followed by a visit by Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping in November 2010, when he travelled to South Africa to meet with South African Vice-President Motlanthe and signed bilateral co-operation agreements covering energy, trade statistics, banking regulations and other areas.⁹ In late September 2011, South African Vice-President Motlanthe led a trade delegation to Beijing at the invitation of Chinese Vice-President Xi. During the visit, the China Development Bank and the Development Bank of South Africa signed a US\$2,5 billion agreement. The two countries also signed a Memorandum of Understanding on geological exploration and mineral resources.¹⁰ Then, on 17 July 2012, President Zuma led a South African delegation, which included International Relations Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Minister in the Presidency Collins Chabane and Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies, to the fifth Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) in Beijing.

Finally, at the invitation of His Excellency President Jacob Zuma of the Republic of South Africa, His Excellency President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China paid a state visit to the Republic of South Africa from 25 to 26 March 2013. The two leaders exchanged views on the recently established Joint Working Group. They agreed to make full use of the Joint Working Group to monitor implementation of co-operative projects in the areas of trade, investment, infrastructure, energy, communication, agriculture and human resource development, and to resolve any obstacles that might occur during implementation of projects. Of specific interest to this publication are the three positions highlighted below:

1. They pointed out that the international situation was undergoing profound and complex changes: the trend towards a multi-polar world was deepening the capability of emerging markets and developing countries to strengthen their position, and the reform of global economic governance was under way. The two sides appealed to countries all over the world to establish a more equal and balanced

- global partnership for development, and to address global challenges through unity and co-operation for mutual benefit. The two sides agreed to: further strengthen their co-ordination and co-operation in international affairs, as well as in the UN, G20, BRICS, and BASIC Group; accommodate each other's concerns and aspirations; uphold the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries; make the international order and system fairer and more equitable; and help build a harmonious world of lasting peace and shared prosperity.
2. Both leaders agreed that since the dawn of the new century, the situation in Africa had improved significantly. Economic growth, acceleration of the continental integration process and a steady rise in its international profile had been noted. On the other hand, the cause of peace and development in Africa still faced many challenges. The two sides called on the international community to pay more attention and provide greater support to Africa, respect African countries' efforts to solve regional issues on their own, and help African countries to enhance their capability for self-generated development.
 3. Both leaders agreed that the comprehensive development in China-Africa relations and the continuous deepening of practical co-operation in various fields, driven by the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), not only benefited the two sides, but also contributed positively to the stability and development of the rest of the world. They emphasised priority areas in support of African development. As co-chairs of FOCAC over the next three years, the two sides would further strengthen bilateral co-operation in FOCAC affairs and implement the Beijing Declaration and the Beijing Action Plan (2013–2015) of the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC, thereby injecting new impetus into the development of China-Africa relations and elevating the New Type of China-Africa Strategic Partnership to a higher level.¹¹

Needless to say, many other critical diplomatic interactions have taken place and cannot be listed in this document. Along with these interactions, there have been many people-to-people activities that are too numerous to list in this document. However, it is important to note that all these interactions have been crucial in establishing the great strides that have been taken in the past 15 years.

GREAT STRIDES IN 15 YEARS

The past 15 years have witnessed rapid and comprehensive development in all areas of bilateral relations between South Africa and China, and multi-faceted co-operation has kept ongoing momentum to the satisfaction of both sides. The two countries have a lot to be proud of – there are quite a few remarkable achievements and unique features worthy of notice. However, given the limited space available here, this chapter will focus on trade and cultural relations.

A) THE TRADE ASPECT

South Africa is China's biggest trade partner and its number one destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. The two countries' bilateral trade volume reached US\$60 billion in 2012 – 40 times higher than before 1998 and constituting 30 per cent of China's total trade with Africa. And during the first seven months of this year, trade between the two countries almost hit US\$40 billion, reflecting 15,8 per cent growth compared with the same period last year. China's FDI in South Africa stood at US\$4 billion by the end of last year, while South Africa invested over US\$600 million in China. Both China and South Africa benefit from the ever-strengthening economic co-operation.

A bright spot in the South Africa-China relationship is the ever-expanding economic co-operation, and particularly booming trade. But at the same time both countries have to face squarely a formidable decade-long problem: the undesirable trade structure between them. On the one hand, there is a great difference in their calculation of volumes of exports and imports. For instance, according to China's customs, of the total volume of US\$59,9 billion of bilateral trade in 2012, China's exports to South Africa amounted to US\$15,3 billion, while its imports from the latter were US\$44,6 billion, adding up to a substantial amount of almost US\$30 billion in South Africa's favour. But according to the South African side, the total bilateral trade that year was only half of China's figure and imbalanced against South Africa. A joint working group has been investigating the discrepancies and is expected to submit a report on this.

It is indisputable that China mainly imports minerals and raw materials from South Africa, while its exports consist chiefly of finished goods. The South African side has repeatedly raised its concern over the issue. President Zuma hinted in the fifth FOCAC conference that this kind of trade could not be sustained. While recognising that the nature of the existing trade structure between South Africa and China is not unique to these two countries, and it is mainly the responsibility of South Africa to restructure and diversify

its economy so as to offer more competitive commodities, there will come a time when the Chinese side will have to rationally think over the situation and try to work together with the South African government and business to mitigate and cope with the real challenges. As mutual investment grows, there is great potential for speeding up the process. The major concerns of Chinese business about the investment environment in South Africa are focused on social security and strong labour. While their information on crime statistics may not always be accurate, their concerns about the strict labour laws and frequent industrial action are partly due to insufficient knowledge and partly to a hesitancy to face the more complicated labour market.

As to investments by South African businesses in China, there are a number of successful cases, such as SAB-Miller Breweries, Naspers and Anglo-American subsidiaries, as well as a failed case – SASOL. SASOL lost the opportunity to establish a joint venture involving billions of US dollars with Chinese coal giant Shenhua, chiefly due to the conservative business attitude of the South African chemical company. South African companies need to be more aggressive and dynamic in exploring China's growing market to get their reasonable share. There is much the two governments could do to encourage and facilitate more investment in each other's countries by addressing practical hindrances on the way.

As the biggest economies in Asia and Africa respectively and fellow members of G20 and BRICS, China and South Africa have a lot of common interests in, and broad consensus on, both domestic development and international issues. The two countries feel obliged to co-ordinate their positions and work together to represent and advance the interests of developing countries in the United Nations, WTO and other international organisations on issues, such as development and poverty reduction, South-South co-operation, regional conflict resolution and environmental protection. They have committed themselves to jointly promote the formulation of a fair and balanced multilateral trade agreement through dialogue, and to build a just and equal world order.

B) THE CULTURAL ASPECT

Chinese Vice-Premier Liu Yandong remarked on 21 November 2013 at the US Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington that non-governmental exchanges were central to the construction of a growing relationship between countries. 'State-to-state relations, in the final analysis, are about relations between the peoples. Amity between peoples holds the key to friendships between states.'¹² South Africa ranks first in Africa in terms of having the biggest number of Chinese cultural activities, students, tourists, Confucius institutions and sister cities, and it is also home to the largest Chinese community,

consisting of generations of Chinese families. From a South Africa-China perspective, during his March 2013 state visit, President Xi Jinping promised to set up a Chinese cultural centre in South Africa, push for more higher education co-operation and educate the coming generations about carrying on the China-South Africa friendship. Concerted efforts are to be made to ensure the success of a national year programme to be hosted by the two countries in rotation in 2014 and 2015 respectively to increase people-to-people relations.

However, various scholars have questioned the impact of cultural relations between the two countries. Sven Grimm maintains that interpersonal relations between Chinese and African people are still superficial and that more work needs to be done to create knowledge about each other, in African countries as well as in China. Grimm argues that the average African person still knows little about the difficulties of life in China, and is often misled by glitzy Beijing or Shanghai façades. In China itself, Yiwu and Guangzhou cities in particular are hubs for African migration, and places like Wuhan or Chongqing have sizeable communities of African students, who all have their own stories of encounters with China.¹³

Tu T. Huynh, in an in-depth analysis of cultural relations between China and South Africa, emphasised that, until recently, little in-depth research existed on human relationships at an individual or community level, and even less research exists on China-Africa engagement in terms of culture or the visual arts. Instead, there has been more focus on China's FOCAC commitments to political and economic co-operation with African countries and less on the inclusion of the objective to strengthen cultural exchange as an area for co-operation. That said, some progress was made when China acknowledged the relevance of people-to-people and cultural exchange with Africa at the second FOCAC conference in Addis Ababa in 2003, suggesting that a focus on politics and economics alone was insufficient in the development of China-Africa relations.¹⁴

Early ideas on how to achieve this end included training African professionals, expanding tourism, and hosting an African arts festival as well as a China-Africa youth festival in China. At the 2006 FOCAC meeting in Beijing, the activities included: sending Chinese agricultural experts and volunteers to Africa; setting up agricultural centres, hospitals and rural schools; and increasing the number of Chinese government scholarships for African students to study in China. By the fourth FOCAC meeting, held in 2009 in El Sheikh, a proposal was introduced to create a joint research and exchange programme to provide a platform for African and Chinese scholars as well as analysts of think tanks to have more exchanges and collaborate in formulating better co-operation policies. As part of this initiative, from 28–29 March 2011, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) facilitated a meeting with representatives of African and Chinese academic institutions, think tanks, and policy makers in Nairobi, Kenya.

Notwithstanding the theme of understanding China-Africa relations, the conference concluded with a general consensus that more knowledge about China was necessary, rather than with a research programme to strengthen participation by African people.¹⁵ These positions, taken under FOCAC, are critical for the relations between China and South Africa, because the ordinary people in both countries still lack mutual understanding of and necessary knowledge about each other.

That said, there have been numerous cultural weeks, arts festivals and shows that have been equally influential in shaping views about particular cultures and peoples in South Africa and China. Among them, the 'African Culture in Focus' event in 2008, sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Culture, was significant. A *China Daily* article reports that it consisted of exhibitions, dance performances, and conferences about African art from 29 African countries, as well as hosting African artists in Shenzhen to teach painting. Of similar importance is the 'Chinese Culture in Focus' event that took place in 2009 in 20 African countries. The creation of a platform for Chinese and African performance ensembles, as well as different genres and scales of art exhibitions, and the training of artists and performers does indeed encourage cultural engagement among the artists and between the artists and spectators. Huynh argues that the scale and scope of cultural exchanges should ideally attract more attention and analysis, especially regarding the meanings of China and Africa or Chinese-ness and African-ness that are being produced.¹⁶

Of more significance regarding the people-to-people relations is the issue of the Western media, which broadly situates China as a foe or friend.¹⁷ There is no denying that the media in South Africa is for the most part negative in its reporting on China. In China, media coverage on South Africa is often not adequate and sometimes selective. The public's knowledge about South Africa is also fragmented. Even some of the countries' scholars and researchers could not be independent of the influences of the West when they view each other.

In the final analysis, despite the cultural challenges and constraints, both countries treat their relations with each other as a foreign policy priority and are determined to build their ties as a model for all-round co-operation between large developing countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, which include constructive people-to-people relations.

THE WAY FORWARD: A VERSION 2.0

Like a 15-year-old teenager, the Sino-South African relationship has laid down solid foundations and is full of vigour and vitality. Given another 15 years, this tie will definitely be more mature and fruitful, upgrading to a new stage – a version 2.0 – by further

substantiating and enriching the content of a comprehensive strategic relationship. The world we live in is undergoing profound and complicated changes. The prevailing international order is not in favour of developing countries. China and South Africa, as the two major emerging economies, share common foes and woes. To keep up with the times, they have every reason to design, fine-tune and conduct their co-operative relationship in the following 15 years or so accordingly from a wider regional and global angle and strategic perspectives. The existing consultation and meeting mechanisms should be brought into full play as effective platforms for the two sides to exchange ideas and co-ordinate their positions on various international issues of common concern and bilateral co-operation.

Recently, Ambassador TIAN Xuejun used a simple term, 'triple jump', to describe the evolving escalation of the South Africa-China relationship over the past 15 years. What he was referring to was the great leaps forward from 'partnership' in 2000, to 'strategic partnership' in 2004 and 'comprehensive strategic partnership' in 2010. What is meant by defining the relationship between China and South Africa as the 'comprehensive strategic partnership' is that the character of their relations is a long-term, forward-looking and strategic one, instead of a short-term and businesslike type of state-to-state tie. Thus their relationship goes far beyond the limits of bilateral connotations.

South Africa's foreign policy is principle-based and makes Africa its priority. The country has done a lot in promoting African unity and the African Renaissance. It has played a pivotal role in Africa's peace and development, and in the resolution of regional conflicts, particularly in SADC countries. In this regard, China has always supported South Africa's efforts bilaterally and multilaterally. The two countries have frequent consultations, co-ordinating their positions opportunely, and have worked together closely on issues relating to Zimbabwe, Sudan and Libya.

While China and South Africa may not hold identical views on all international and regional issues, the two countries do have many common values, a similar philosophy and shared aspirations in this regard, and they can easily reach consensus and join hands to make things different on the basis of equality, mutual respect and accommodation. The international communities expect China to play a more active and resolute role in Africa's peace and security issues. In this context, China could well rely on South Africa's knowledge, influence and devotion to fulfil her commitment.

South Africa is an adamant champion and enthusiastic co-ordinator of transcontinental projects to support African unity. It is necessary for the country to work more closely with China for an earlier realisation of this noble ambition. There is a lot the two countries could collaborate on with regard to Africa's South-North corridor, the Inga Hydro Power Complex and other large-scale projects. It requires stakeholder countries such as South Africa to take the lead in the common endeavour for better co-ordination, scientific

planning, careful balancing of all partners' interests, and enhancing capacity for delivery. China can certainly extend a helping hand with financing and technology in this regard.

In South Africa, there has long been the voice of 'looking East' and much debate on the topic. While China is not keen on exporting her 'module of development' or 'Beijing Consensus', she remains ready to share her experiences in rural development, poverty reduction, SMEs, SEZs and job creation, on the basis of not appearing to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries. China and South Africa have been discussing this theme for a number of years through party-to-party and government-to-government channels. But there is a need to be more candid and open and to get more civilians on board, so as to make it a mutual learning process between both countries. Convergence has to be shaped on the specifics of practices that have proved to be successful in one country, and whether these practices are actually adaptable in the other. South Africa will be hosting the 6th FO-CAC conference in 2015, which is expected to be the largest one ever held outside China, and the two countries will certainly take advantage of this opportunity to do more for Africa and Sino-African co-operation in their capacity as comprehensive strategic partners.

So, too, on the economic front, there is room for greater expansion and deepening of co-operation between China and South Africa. The countries can co-ordinate their development priorities and be proactive in their support of each other's strategic goals. For instance, China could encourage private business to invest more in the areas of mining, renewable energy, agriculture, infrastructure, telecommunication, manufacturing and finance, as recommended by the South African side. What is even more important, though, is that the two countries should try to align all of their major co-operative projects with their national plans, that is, China's economic stabilisation and restructuring strategy, and South Africa's 'New Development Path' and its related plans. Furthermore, it is of vital importance to develop consensus or convergence to gain public support among the two peoples, particularly from business, labour and political elites, in order to make the countries' relationship sustainable and ever prosperous.

To consolidate and expand public support for a stronger relationship calls for intensive people-to-people interaction. While this is sure to happen in the next 15 years or so, there are two areas worthy of more attention, namely joint academic research by scholars and experts on social sciences, and closer co-operation on education. Joint research and greater communication between the two countries' relevant institutions could enhance South Africa's discourse on its own affairs and political landscape.

In China there are hundreds of universities or secondary colleges and schools that are jointly run with foreign countries, all of which are the products of co-operative projects between universities from China and western countries. Zhejiang Normal University in East China, where the author works at present, has made great effort to set up a joint China-Africa business school with a South African university, aimed at educating Chinese youth

about Africa, and African students about China, in order to promote decent business and mutual understanding among the youngsters who will decide the future of the South Africa-China relationship. If this materialised, it would be the first of its kind in South Africa-China co-operation on higher education. But it appears to be an uneasy endeavour and needs further support from both governments. All in all, there is much confidence that Sino-South African relations will go from strength to strength and will contribute positively to the welfare of the people of both of these countries, as well as the rest of the world.

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Prospective Mining Industrialization Partnerships between South Africa and China

Yazini April

INTRODUCTION

South Africa's strategic engagement with China is located within South Africa's key foreign policy priorities, which are shaped by those of its domestic priorities focused on areas such as poverty alleviation, the equitable distribution of wealth, and mineral beneficiation.¹ In 2009, China became South Africa's single largest trade partner, overtaking the US. In 2007, according to figures from the South African Department of Trade and Industry (**the dti**), South African exports to China came to about R24,5 billion, rising sharply to about R34,5 billion in 2008 and jumping again to some R48,7 billion in 2009.² For the period January to July 2011, the figure was about R32,1 billion. Exports for July alone came to around R5,6 billion.³ Regarding imports from China, again according to **the dti** figures, these came to about R60,3 billion in 2011, surging to R82,4 billion in 2012, declining somewhat to around R70,8 billion in 2012, and reaching R45,8 billion in 2012.⁴ South Africa's main exports to China consist of raw materials – this country is China's main African source of iron ore, chrome, copper, manganese and diamonds – with very little beneficiation, as well as some manufactured goods and financial services. The main imports from China are manufactured goods such as clothing, electronics, durable goods and some capital goods. Base metals and mineral products account for over 70 per cent of South Africa's exports to China.

It is hardly surprising that South Africa and China are engaged in trade relations premised on mineral resources. South Africa has the world's largest in situ non-energy mineral resource base. South Africa holds an estimated US\$2,5 trillion (R23 trillion) of mineral resources, making it the world's richest country in this regard, according to a 2010 report commissioned by US banking group Citigroup.⁵ The country has 87 per cent of the world's platinum group metals and 80 per cent of its high-grade manganese. South Africa also has over 70 per cent of the chromium ever identified on the planet and 40 per cent of its vermiculite, as well as a third of the vanadium. The country still possesses almost 15 per cent of known gold reserves and, even in this day and age, prospecting for gold continues

within the borders of South Africa.⁶

However, despite its major mining record, many challenges have confronted South Africa's mining industry recently. In 2008, the global market crashed, sending the price of commodities plummeting. The average price of platinum alone dipped from US\$2 048 an ounce in May of 2008 to US\$834 by December.⁷ As the world's leading producer of platinum group elements (PGE), the reduction in the commodity's overall value considerably damaged the South African economy.⁸ Couple this with the growth of secondary and tertiary industries, and the overall contribution by mining to the country's public-private partnership (PPP) dwindled.⁹ Furthermore, mineworker strikes have portrayed the harsh working conditions and minimal salaries that low level mining employees are exposed to.¹⁰ On 16 August 2012, the international community watched how striking mineworkers who wanted to change their current working conditions clashed with police outside the Lonmin Marikana platinum mine. After claiming to feel threatened, the police force fired upon the crowd, leaving 34 dead and 78 injured.¹¹ The workers were seeking a raise from ZAR4 000 (US\$440) per month to ZAR12 500 (US\$1 380).¹²

The Marikana massacre exposed the harsh conditions endured by the average mine-worker in South Africa. Needless to say, the 2012 mining strike not only put South Africa on the map as having an unstable labour movement in the mining sector, but also pinned the country as having a Gordian knot-type situation between unions and government. The 2012 Marikana incident also underpins the challenges regarding implementation of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of June 2002 (the MPRDA or 'the Act') in promoting industrial growth and transformation in South Africa.

South Africa's first democratic government in post-1994 established a new mineral regulatory framework to dismantle the apartheid government's past exclusionary practices against black South Africans, which were effected across all sectors of the economy – not least the mining industry, with its terrible history of migrant labour, unsafe working conditions, labour repression and economic exclusion.¹³ The objective of this Act was to ensure that the mining industry successfully benefits its people, that industrial growth and sustainable development should succeed through mineral beneficiation, and that the minerals mined should be integrated into the rest of the economy through further processing before they are exported.¹⁴ Needless to say, the governance of natural resources remains a challenge that continues to cripple consolidated democracy in South Africa.

China, on the other hand, due to its demand for a number of strategic minerals – including chromium, cobalt, copper, iron ore, manganese, nickel, petroleum, platinum group metals and potash – which largely outstrips its domestic supply, has changed the mineral industrial complex on the continent, including in South Africa. Most of the trade agreements between the two countries have been established to promote economic growth and industrial development in the country. Recently, China acquired a 45 per cent stake in We-

sizwe Platinum Bakubeng mine and provided a 650 million dollar loan in the process. The Wesizwe mining agreement is supposed to promote partnerships with local investors and local expertise and skills. Meanwhile, in 2012, a memorandum of agreement (MoU) was signed by representatives of the China Coal Technology and Engineering Group (CCTEG), Limpopo's Corridor Mining Resources parastatal and the Universities of Limpopo and Venda to transform South Africa's coal industry from less than five major global players, and to increase economic opportunities for local people. More importantly, China has also signed mineral agreements that incorporate the mineral beneficiation Act, as was the case with the ASA Metals mining agreement.

Given the nature of the mining trade agreements between South Africa and China, the objective of this chapter is to determine if South Africa can use this bilateral relationship to resolve some of its current mining challenges, thereby industrialising its economy and promoting consolidated democracy. ASA Metals will be used as a case study to assess how the mineral industrial complex between South Africa and China can be used to promote mineral industrialisation in the country.

BACKGROUND: SOUTH AFRICAN MINING AND THE MPRDA ACT

Mining in South Africa can be traced to over a thousand years ago, when the gold trade established a link to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.¹⁵ However, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century, when the British descended on the country that the gold trade began in earnest.¹⁶ In the late 1800s, the combination of the discovery of the Witwatersrand Goldfields and the 21-carat Eureka diamond propelled a massive influx of fortune seekers and the exploitation of valuable minerals on an enormous scale, which would catapult South Africa to the threshold of global mining prominence.¹⁷ The discovery of gold followed by diamonds led to immediate infrastructure growth and development, which contributed to the overall industrialisation of the country, making South Africa by far the most developed country in sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁸

However, a discussion of the South African mining industry cannot be exhaustive if it does not examine the political history of the mining sector, and the subsequent power relationships between mining corporations, government and communities. According to Mbendi, in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the political history of the sector, we have to assess the history of migration in the mining industry.¹⁹ Schoofs argues that the scale of mining at that period explains why the draconian system of migrant labour was imposed and in turn paved the way for apartheid. To maintain profitability, the mining industry depended on a cheap workforce and consequently looked outside its borders.²⁰ Schoofs maintains that white labourers who were imported for their mining skills

and experience, shortly after the discovery of gold in 1886, viewed blacks as a threat to their relatively high wages. To combat this threat, the white unions, among other things, forced the industry and then the government to adopt the 'colour bar', banning blacks from skilled jobs and preventing black workers and their families from settling permanently in mining towns.²¹

Moreover, the structure of mineral law in South Africa has always been complicated and heavily influenced by the racial injustices of apartheid.²² Historically, the rights to minerals in South Africa fell under the ambit of property law, which supported the common law principle that the landowner owned everything above and below the surface. The idea of minerals vesting in the state became evident as early as 1871, when the right to move precious metals and stones was required by the state.²³ Many black-owned communities who lived on mineral-rich land did not even have a basic claim to minerals, since they could not be owners of the land under apartheid, as can be evidenced through the Land Act no. 27 of 1913 and the Trust and Land Act no. 18 of 1936, which deprived black people of land wealth. Furthermore, the Mining Act no. 20 of 1967 separated different categories of land by which mineral and surface rights were acquired: private land, state land, alienated land, proclaimed land, and tribal land in trust.²⁴ The independent homelands were empowered to adopt their own laws in respect of minerals and land. This resulted in many conflicting mineral systems within the country.²⁵

These policies entrenched the apartheid system, and their continuing influence on mining communities has been identified as a major cause of minor economic development in these communities. In essence, due to historical circumstances and, as already indicated earlier, despite the new political dispensation of 1994 that produced the MPRDA Act, these extenuating circumstances still thrive in the mining communities. Most mining communities in South Africa are still identified by poor social and economic conditions, such as poverty, unemployment, bad housing (including overcrowded single-sex male hostels) and infrastructure, prostitution, ill health and a high influx of documented and non-documented single migrant labourers.²⁶

The MPRDA has become essential in influencing South African history along with the Minerals Act. The Minerals Act was the biggest step towards a system of exclusive private mineral rights ownership in the history of South Africa and attempted to achieve uniform regulation of minerals.²⁷ It came into operation on 1 January 1991, repealing the Precious Stones Act no. 73 of 1964 and large parts of the Mining Rights Act of 1967.²⁸ The Mining Rights Amendment Act no. 12 of 1991 repealed all obvious discriminatory provisions against black and coloured people.²⁹ The MPRDA, approved by parliament in 2002 and put into operation in 2004, has changed the common law practice of acquisition and use of mineral rights, acceding more power to the state when it comes to natural resources. However, though designed as recompense for past exclusionary policies against black

workers, it has been criticised for being too vague and ambiguous, coupled with minimal legislative implementation by the government.

THE MINERAL BENEFICIATION CONCEPT

According to the Department of Minerals and Energy, mineral beneficiation involves the transformation of raw materials, utilizing finance and labour, to produce a finished product that has a value higher than that of the raw mineral. The full value chain, which includes beneficiation, also consists of both upstream and downstream value additions. Upstream value addition refers to inputs into the mining sector, while downstream value addition involves large-scale capital-intensive activities such as smelting and refining, as well as labour-intensive activities such as craft jewellery and metal fabrication.³⁰

Beneficiation is also considered critical for governments that desire to significantly increase their economic benefit. In South Africa's case, most of its minerals are still exported in their raw form. Consequently, since high level beneficiation takes place at the recipient country, it is the receiving countries that maximize the economic benefits of producing the higher-value product, while South Africa receives the lower economic returns associated with the lower-value product. For purposes of this chapter, the beneficiation concept will be applied from an impact assessment level that will be based on the indicators in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Mineral beneficiation concept stages

Level one	Level two	Level three	Level four
Underground drilling and blasting	Processing and crushing	Refining of minerals	Industrial construction of value added or finished goods

Source: Yazini April, AISA, 20 October 2013

THE ASA METALS CASE STUDY

A fieldwork case study was undertaken to assess whether ASA Metals was applying the MPRDA Act as agreed by China and South Africa.

Although ASA Metals was established in 1997, its captive chromite mine, Dikolong

Chrome Mine, was founded some 30 years ago and operated as a government training mine. Dikolong consists of a mine where chrome is mined by underground methods. When ASA Metals was established, it obtained the full shareholding of Dikolong Chrome Mine. This mine is relevant as a case study because, during the 2010 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation, China reached an agreement with South Africa on a chrome ore mining project in Steelport whereby mineral beneficiation would be implemented. A joint venture was established between South Africa's Limpopo Province Development Corporation (LIMDEV), which retained 40 per cent of the ASA Metals mine, and Sino-Steel, a Chinese state mining company, which acquired 60 per cent.³¹

The chromium industry comprises chromite ore, chromium chemicals and metal, ferrochromium, stainless steel, and chromite refractory producers. Ninety per cent of ferrochrome is utilised in the stainless steel industry. In order to produce one ton of ferrochrome, 2,5 tons of chrome ore are consumed, while one ton of ferrochrome is needed to produce four tons of stainless steel.³² Due to the development of the world's steel industry during the twentieth century, chromium has assumed considerable importance as an alloy element. According to the management at ASA Metals, the company's chromite ore run-of-mine production capacity was 420 000 tons per year (t/yr) and ferrochromium production capacity was 120 000 t/yr. ASA also planned to increase its chromite ore production capacity to 650 000 t/yr by adding new mines, and another 600 000 to 700 000 t/yr of chromite ore production capacity was planned by 2011.³³

In a meeting with mine management during a fieldwork visit, the company indicated the level of beneficiation chrome by stating how it was beneficiated in the furnaces on the smelters. Basically, at the smelter, charge chrome is produced through a single-stage process by smelting a mix of chromite, reductant and fluxes at temperatures in excess of 2 000° Celsius. Electrical energy, required for the chemical reactions to occur, is supplied to the submerged furnaces through Soderberg electrodes. The molten waste slag and metallic charge chrome are continually drained from the smelting furnaces and separated in skimmers. The metal ingots are allowed to cool down before a final crushing and screening beneficiation step is performed, which allows for the production of sized charged chrome. The stockpiled charged chrome is then supplied to international stainless steel manufacturers.³⁴ All of these aforementioned activities happen at level two, which is identified in Table 4.1.

The company further explained that beneficiation takes place with run-of-mine ore through various steps that allow for the efficient separation and removal of pyroxenite waste from the chromite. Foundry sand, produced during the on-surface beneficiation stage, is stockpiled separately for supply to international customers, while lumpy chromite and metallurgical concentrates are transported to the on-site smelter for further beneficiation.³⁵ These activities are an aspect of level three, portrayed in the beneficiation model.

In essence, the ASA Metals beneficiation strategy demonstrated a huge gap that ought to be filled to benefit the Dikolong community.

It was clear from the discussion that most of the beneficiation happened at levels two and three, which is at best minimal and at a low-grade level. For example, management referred to brick-making for the community, which was supposed to be implemented at some point in the near future, as most of their other beneficiation activities were yet to be established. The impact of this brick-making endeavour that would emanate from level two did not feature any significant impact that would create better living conditions that are sustainable. In countries such as Botswana, the housing communities in mining areas contain high-quality middle-class and upper-middle-class structures that attract and promote sustainable development programmes, thriving businesses, good schools and the like. The ASA Metals case demonstrates that although the MPRDA was only promulgated as recently as a decade ago, there is lack of clarity and confidence regarding the ability of the legislation to achieve its goals and objectives of equity and poverty alleviation.

The fact of the matter is that the MPRDA provides a changed paradigm for the activities of mining enterprises, to the extent that they must deepen their commitment to local development.³⁶ What the MPRDA has accomplished with the mining charter is to place matters of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainable community development in the hands of the mining industry at national level; but what it has not done is to spell out what this means in practical terms.³⁷ The participation of indigenous communities, particularly in the allocation and use of the revenue in the form of compensation, should be subjected to the guardianship of the government.³⁸ The MPRDA can be seen as the framework legislation, aimed at defining over-arching and generic principles in terms of sectoral-specific legislation on secondary industries.

There is a need for codes and regulations that require the necessary steps of environmental impact assessment, development of environmental management plans, mine closure planning, and environmental monitoring during operation and after closure.³⁹ Monitoring and evaluation should be established through a specialised state agency, possibly under the Ministries of Mineral Resources, and Environmental Affairs. In South Africa, the matter regarding environmental damage resulting from mining is particularly serious. It requires urgent attention by the government, particularly the Minister of Mineral Resources and the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.⁴⁰ This can be addressed through research, technology development and training that promotes South Africa's minerals backward cluster and mitigates environmental damage to the absolute minimum. Moreover, it is also suggested that the MPRDA be amended to ensure that non-compliance with the provisions of both the Charter and the Act is severely penalised, which would in turn make the mining legislation more relevant.⁴¹

ASA Metals serves as an excellent case study, because it demonstrates not only what

could be done to promote mineral industrialisation between the two countries, but that both countries are in a position to effect changes in this process. South Africa-China relations are unlike South Africa's relations with the West, as the Chinese government is willing to meet most African countries at some level of industrial development in particular. The challenge is implementation. If South Africa is to reach the maturity stage of modernisation, which would make it more globally competitive, it will have to ensure that more investments take place with the necessary ingredients of technological development, human capital and industrialisation, which would in turn enable the country to move beyond the limited scope of beneficiation and progress to a global economic stage of maturity.

THE WAY FORWARD: ARE SOUTH AFRICA-CHINA MINING PARTNERSHIPS THE SOLUTION?

The mining sector in any country has an advantage, through beneficiation of its resources, to help reduce poverty, accelerate human development and economic growth, and support progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. Mining generates economic growth in emerging countries: directly through the employment of workers as well as through taxes, rent, royalty payments and social responsibility programmes; and indirectly through the demand from mine operations for local goods and services. Taxes, resource rent and royalties paid by mining companies can provide much-needed capital for developing countries to invest in social development. Investment in mining can attract other social benefits as well, such as improvements in knowledge production, infrastructure development, accomplishing Millennium Development Goals such as health.

However, as already established, despite its MPRDA plan, South Africa has not managed to grow its mining assets to drive sustained growth and development. Instead, South Africa seems to be falling into the trap of what is termed the 'resource curse', where countries with large mining sectors, non-diversified economies, and poor governance have performed worse in development terms than comparable countries with little or no mining activity. The literature assessing the link between natural resource wealth and economic growth shows that the presence of natural resources is not always associated with higher per capita income growth or human development indicators. Countries that do achieve net benefits from mining often fall short of their potential in terms of sustainable regional development, local economic development, and skills development and transfer.⁴²

This chapter proposes that the mining agreements that have taken place between South Africa and China consider focusing on key areas to make the industrial relationship work: energy, skills, and knowledge transfer.

ENERGY PARTNERSHIP

More than a decade of limited investment in energy infrastructure has critically impacted the security of energy supply in South Africa. In 2008, rolling blackouts and interruptions brought energy efficiency and captive power generation to the top of many corporate agendas.⁴³ The importance of energy in mining is evidenced from the three inter-related perspectives of security of supply, cost and environmental impact – which are directly linked to the government's strategic themes of growth, performance and compliance. Managing the relations between industry trends and strategic themes calls for an integrated approach that is suited to this complex operating environment.⁴⁴

A partnership with China in the energy sector could benefit South Africa's mining sector, as China is now the second-biggest energy producer in the world and it has a relatively strong foundation for energy production and supply. By the end of 2000, China's total installed capacity reached about 320 GW. This was expected to grow to about 400 GW by 2005, about 500 GW by 2010, and between 850 GW and 950 GW by 2020.⁴⁵ But electricity consumption has jumped by much higher rates annually than are implicit in the above 2000 to 2005 estimate, with power shortages first affecting the provinces responsible for the country's export boom (Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shanghai) along the eastern sea-board. In 2004, 19 of the 31 provinces had to ration electricity. Reliability of the power supply system – particularly the transmission grid – has also become an issue.⁴⁶ The government forecasts a power shortage of 10 per cent to 15 per cent in the key manufacturing areas, estimating that about \$108 billion of new generation capacity will be needed in the coming five years to close the gap.⁴⁷

Moreover, it is important to note that despite progress in power sector reform, the sector has experienced systemic problems, such as: a piecemeal approach to restructuring; slow development of a regulatory framework, leading to inefficiencies and abuses of monopoly/monopsony power; a mismatch between loan maturities and the economic lives of power projects; inadequate wholesale electricity and transmission pricing regimes; and low efficiency of electricity supply and use.

To increase its energy supply capacity, however, China is already implementing a number of measures that South Africa should consider. To start with, China plans to increase supply capacity, optimise the energy mix, ensure coal-mining safety, reduce environmental pollution, increase resource utilisation efficiency and build a new coal industry system, so as to guarantee the development of the national economy. Through mergers and re-organisation of enterprises, China also plans to bring into being some large coal-mining conglomerates, each with a total annual production capability of 100 million tons.⁴⁸

The country is also pushing forward the development and integration of coal resources by renovating medium and small-sized coal mines and closing down, in accordance with

the law, small ones that do not conform to industrial policies, have poor safety conditions, waste resources and harm the environment - so as to further optimise the structure of the coal industry.⁴⁹ It will promote the co-ordinated development of related industries, and encourage coal-electricity joint operation or coal-electricity-transport-integrated management, so as to extend the coal industry chain. It will further mechanise coal mines and enhance overall mechanisation in coal mining, promote the clean production and utilisation of coal, encourage research and development and the spreading of clean coal technologies, and quicken the research into and demonstration of substitute liquid fuels.⁵⁰

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

China is fast becoming a world leader in mining technology. China is already a world leader in certain areas, such as rare earth elements. Technological solutions were initially concentrated on achieving massive low-cost production, but increasing emphasis has been placed on environmental and safety issues, in part reflecting greater concern in China with environmental issues. What is interesting is how China used foreign direct investment (FDI) to transfer technology, which is something South Africa could consider. In the early 1980s, foreign companies began transferring technology by licensing agreements and the sale of equipment. Then the same multinational corporations started transferring technology by entering into joint ventures with Chinese companies in order to expand in China.⁵¹ By the 1990s, China had introduced increasingly sophisticated regulations governing foreign investment, by which access to the Chinese market was traded for technology transfer.

In a sense, the foreign research and development (R&D) has served as a model and encouragement for indigenous companies and created skilled communities from which labour and knowledge can easily flow to indigenous companies. In 2010 there were 1 200 R&D centres, and 400 out of the Fortune 500 corporations had created such centres. China is now ranked first when multinational corporations are asked in which nation future R&D centres are most likely to be located.⁵²

Besides the use of multinational corporations, China has begun to invest significantly in knowledge production. Between 2000 and 2008, gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) rose by an average of 22,8 per cent annually, which increased the share of GERD to GDP from 0,9 per cent to 1,54 per cent. China aims to increase this to 2,5 per cent by 2020.⁵³ In 2008, 82,76 per cent went to experimental development, 12,46 per cent to applied research, and 4,78 per cent to basic research. Business enterprises contributed 59,95 per cent of GERD in 2000 and 73,26 per cent in 2008. Spending by enterprises is predominantly on experimental development. China aims to

increase the basic research share to 15 per cent by 2020.⁵⁴ South Africa's Department of Science and Technology and China's Department of Science and Technology could be used as major contributors to knowledge production in the mining industry.

In the case of ASA Metals, for example, South Africa's mining think tanks could collaborate with their Chinese equivalents. Sino-Steel, unlike its counterpart, the Limpopo Development Association, is a large multinational enterprise with clearly defined core businesses that integrate resources development, trade and logistics, engineering projects, science and technology, equipment manufacturing and specialised services, and so provide comprehensive auxiliary services for the steel industry, especially steel mills.⁵⁵ More importantly, the scientific and technological companies under Sino-Steel have a solid research foundation and strength in the fields of geological exploration, beneficiation, heat engineering, environmental protection, refractory materials, metal products and engineering design, to name a few. Sino-Steel currently accommodates ten state-level research centres and is qualified to provide education at a masters and doctorate level. As a result of the industrialisation of research findings, dozens of production lines have been established with products prevailing in domestic and international markets.⁵⁶ The South African government could encourage its mineral researchers to become involved with Sino-Steel researchers at some level, in order that they can both produce constructive work.

SKILLS DEVELOPMENT

The South African mining industry needs to rethink strategies regarding skills development, and promote a strategy of human capital development that focuses on competency and skills, rather than qualifications. According to the CEO of the South African Graduates Development Association (Sagda), Thamsanqa Maqubela, human capital development remains a challenge in the mining sector. He argues that, 'Unemployed graduates in South Africa remains a problem, as the current programme of skills development in the mining industry is not working, as numerous graduates are unemployed. Moreover, many of [those who] have metallurgical qualifications have had limited success, as a high level of education is a small component of skills development'.⁵⁷ The other challenge is that there are many academies in the mining sector, but there is a lack of quantity as well as quality staff, compared with the training personnel of the past.⁵⁸

According to the Department of Mineral Resources' *A Beneficiation Strategy for the Minerals Industry of South Africa* report, published in July 2011, South Africa's beneficiation strategy is associated with a national industrialisation programme that aims to increase the quantity and quality of exports, as well as the promotion of job creation and the diversification of the economy. The human capital development strategy is a pipeline

approach that requires awareness of the mining sector. Sagda aims to establish this at high school level to change the perception that mining work is limited to underground physical labour. The plan is to inform young people of potential career choices early during their schooling and have those who want to enter the mining industry include subjects necessary for the industry, such as Mathematics and Science.⁵⁹ Owing to the lack of skilled personnel in South Africa, mining companies are importing specialists from around the world. This is not sustainable and will not assist South Africa in reaching its beneficiation targets.

South Africa's challenge of unemployable graduates is not unique. Globally, enterprises are encountering a lack of trained and qualified workers. The introduction of new technology to sustain the growth of enterprises requires ever-higher skill levels. Workers are trained and retrained to produce more value-added products and services in a globalising economy. The Chinese government is redesigning its national skills development strategy in order to: reduce the skills mismatch, which is also problematic amongst university graduates; promote entrepreneurship for young people; and mobilise different ways of learning to cope with the need for highly skilled workers. South Africa could also partner with China at this level. Needless to say, South Africa will need to dig deep into its educational systems.

Chinese international experts can also assist with innovation. The economic slowdown is creating a favourable environment to source people from abroad for skills development and to invest in human capital development, as the industry focus is no longer on commodities, but on adding value. In the final analysis, South Africa needs to go beyond being a commodity-producing economy to adding more value to the mining industry. This will need more than just mining engineers, safety officers, drillers or mining ventilators.

China has become one of the world's biggest sources of research and development personnel. Between 2000 and 2008, its number of engineers and scientists more than doubled to 1,59 million.⁶⁰ Relative to population size, this is still low compared to major developed nations like the United States and Japan, but the gap is closing rapidly. The number of doctorate awards in science and engineering has increased tenfold since the early 1990s. The number of students in general at universities increased from 1 million to 5,4 million during the 1998 to 2007 period.⁶¹ In 2009 alone, China produced over 10 000 PhD engineering graduates and as many as 500 000 BSc graduates in Engineering, Mathematics, Information Technology, and Computer Science – more than any other country.⁶²

FACILITATING STEEL PRODUCTION AS A TOOL OF BENEFICIATION

The ASA Metals case demonstrates how South Africa is basically benefiting at levels two and three. Needless to say, through South Africa's steel, China is benefiting from high-intensity beneficiation by its people, by producing value-added stainless steel products. South Africa should use its mines as leverage to promote much-needed skills development and industrial development assistance from the Chinese.⁶³ The ASA Metals case serves as an example of how South Africa and China can partner in the steel industry, particularly since China is now the world's leading producer of steel. ASA Metals is not an exception, as South Africa is generally struggling to make inroads in the steel industry, domestically and internationally.

This is not to say that no progress is being made, though. The Department of Trade and Industry states that various financiers are willing to help implement a new joint venture steel mill in South Africa. The Department has emphasised that any resultant agreement would consist of 'strong conditions' to ensure the government oversees the project, avoiding the shortcomings identified with the unbundling of state-run Iscor more than 10 years ago. The Industrial Development Corporation is set to buy Anglo American's 74 per cent stake in Scaw Metals for R3,4bn, among other steel assets.⁶⁴ This is part of government's efforts to promote competition in South Africa's steel industry and enforce a 'developmental' pricing model to promote its infrastructure plans. Meanwhile, a small private steel plant is nearing completion in the Coega industrial development zone near Port Elizabeth. At the same time, though, construction group Murray and Roberts recently struggled to sell its mothballed Cape Town Iron and Steel Works mini-mill, eventually landing a Turkish buyer.⁶⁵

According to Dave Cousins from the Industrial Development Corporation, there is still room for additional steel production capacity in South Africa, and emphasis should be on developing low-cost steel production methods and technologies. Cousins also maintains that South Africa currently has a theoretical steel production capacity of over 11 million tons a year, but that actual capacity is closer to 9 million tons a year.⁶⁶

South Africa needs a strong, competitive and growing iron and steel industry, across all four steps of the iron and steel value chains (exploration and extraction; mining beneficiation; metallurgical beneficiation, shaping and conversion/fabrication; and manufacturing/end-user industries). Currently, South Africa has 10,3 to 11,6 mt of steelmaking capacity, of which approximately 50 per cent is not needed domestically. South Africa is unable to export all of this excess steel capacity, given that its costs are 30 per cent to 35 per cent higher than those of its competitors; even iron ore for free would not close this gap.⁶⁷ Forming a strategic partnership (preferably equity-based) to, for example, set up a 100 per cent guaranteed slab off-take, could make a slab mill viable. Without a partner,

slab plants are not viable, though, as the demand for slab is notoriously volatile, and at the bottom of the steel price and demand cycle it is difficult to sell slab. Should global slab markets fail or the off-take partner default, the plant would need to have a competitive cost position to remain in operation.⁶⁸

Brazil demonstrates the perfect example of partnership through its company, Vale. Vale, in partnership with key customers, is already constructing slab mills in Brazil in order to export slab to Asian countries such as South Korea. This means that Brazil will be able to increase domestic Brazilian steel production capacity and beneficiation. The fact is, South Africa might be able to provide the Far East with slab products at a similar landed cost to the slab produced in Brazil, because of the fact that South Africa is approximately 8 000 km closer to the Far East.⁶⁹ A new slab plant would require approximately three years to build and would create about 3 000 direct jobs. A slab plant would also provide South Africa with an option to forward-integrate by building downstream rolling mills, when there is sufficient local demand for final products. A new slab partnership would also create additional steel capacity, possibly allowing a new entrant and/or enhanced competition in South Africa.⁷⁰ Finally, a new steel partnership of this nature would promote economic growth through increased industrial contribution to the country's GDP.

The steel industry in China has developed over several decades into the world's biggest. China accounted for 36,4 per cent of the world's steel production in 2007,⁷¹ driven by the rapid modernisation of its economy, infrastructure, and construction and manufacturing industries. Steel was viewed as the cornerstone or 'key link' of both the Great Leap Forward and the Four Modernisations programmes. Part of the overall strategy of the Four Modernisations programmes was to redirect science and technology toward economic progress. Research institutes had to compete for contracts from various industries and operate on a fee-for-service basis. The emphasis was on co-operation between factories, universities, and other institutes.⁷²

Recently, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology asked a number of iron and steel mills to slash capacity. In fact, in a move designed to combat over-capacity in the steel sector, China will be relocating some factories and encouraging more companies to invest in overseas projects, according to an official at the country's top planning agency. Given the relationship between the two countries, South Africa should consider boosting its mineral industry by taking advantage of this endeavour.⁷³

CONCLUSION

Mining plays a critical role as a foundation for economic growth and development. It remains one of the few industries that can provide the critical mass for the development

of infrastructure, financial systems, capital markets and education systems.⁷⁴ South Africa's mining industry area can contribute to the region's economy in a number of further important respects that would promote the necessary take-off to industrialisation. However, the rapid decline of the mining industry – once the economic giant of South Africa – remains a challenge.⁷⁵ The industry currently represents only between 5 per cent and 8 per cent of GDP, when at one point it represented over 20 per cent.⁷⁶ Needless to say, while the ASA Metals case demonstrates a lack of government capacity, there is no denying that steps must be taken to hold mining companies accountable for their actions. In the final analysis, the government must walk a fine line between generating profits for the state and curbing the mounting poverty that has become rampant throughout the black population, and the mining industry is vital to at least maintaining the status quo, as its departure would see already high unemployment numbers soaring even higher.

Despite the current ongoing challenges, there is still an opportunity for South Africa to achieve all five stages of modernisation developed by Walt Rostow as a strategy of facilitating economic development.⁷⁷ There are several methods of partnership discussed in this chapter that South Africa and China could focus on to help promote South Africa's mining industry. Both Sino-Steel, the Chinese government mining company, and LimDev, the equivalent South African stakeholder, could collaborate on the research findings to help establish dozens of production lines with products in demand in domestic and international markets.⁷⁸ South Africa could use the mines as leverage to promote much needed skills development and industrial development assistance from the Chinese. Not being able to override China at producing an advanced and cheaper DVD player, South Africa should aim to structure its niches, its strengths and its competitive advantages, so that the best possible benefit is derived from them.⁷⁹

From an MPRDA perspective, the efforts from the mining industry in terms of beneficiation should be comprehensive both in amount and distribution. Government should therefore spell out the conditions and modalities for the establishment and implementation of such development programmes. There should be measurable indicators to assess compliance, and the standards and indicators should be set by all stakeholders and not by the mine companies alone. Given all the continental lessons out there on the resource curse, one would also expect South Africa to have by now considered the fact that no country or continent has ever been developed from revenues from natural resources.⁸⁰ South Africa could also learn from countries such as Brazil, which controls the exploitation of resources and benefits from them.

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Educational Co-operation or Educational Aid? China, Africa and South Africa

Ke Yu

INTRODUCTION

Is Sino-African (and South African) educational engagement a co-operation or aid project? To answer this question, one would first need to examine the detailed engagement modalities. Traditional literature, however, tends to apply only a pan-African and a China-centric lens, potentially rendering a limited and inaccurate conclusion. This applies particularly to a discussion of the Sino-South Africa relationship because of the great difference between South Africa and many of its African neighbours. Although both China and South Africa have asserted the importance of pan-Africanism in their African agendas, the discussion on South Africa within an overarching pan-African framework naturally obscures South Africa's uniqueness and therefore renders the discussion specious at best. On the other hand, the China-centric perspective, where China's offers and actions remain the main focus, also does not provide a holistic and accurate view from the African soil, where China is one amongst many foreign players, one that is sometimes strategically used to counterbalance the agendas of other foreign donors.

This chapter addresses the resulting gaps by highlighting the uniqueness of the Sino-South Africa case, after framing it within the traditional Sino-African discourse. This chapter is mainly framed by two questions: What does Sino-South African (or African) educational engagement look like?; Is the Sino-South African (or African) educational engagement a co-operation or aid project? The chapter addresses these questions in three sections: Sino-African educational engagement; Sino-South African educational engagement (within South Africa's overall human resource challenges and experiences); and, lastly, the Sino-South African educational co-operation or aid puzzle.

WHY DONORS HAVE PURSUED EDUCATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Although by no means definitive or exclusive, one conventional approach to developing human resources has been to adopt a deliberate focus on education. China has long believed in education being the fundamental element in state building and social development.¹ Le Pere and Garth specifically point out that China's placing of education in a strategic position in its development process is the most critical lesson to be learned from that country.² 'Human resource development is identified as one of the major prerequisites for development in Africa... the fundamental backbone of a functioning state and continent',³ states Monyae, too, as he opens his discussion about Africa's developmental challenges and the implication of Sino-Africa relations in this regard.

China is not the only country that has placed great importance on educational engagement, sometimes using it strategically as a means of explicit or implicit soft power, however. Samoff and Carrol analysed the history of external assistance in the higher education sector in Africa, they specifically pinpointed one main reason for early large US scholarship programmes as being instruments for 'socializing and influencing Africa's future leaders'.⁴ The UK's prestigious Chevening Scholarship is similarly intended 'for students with demonstrable potential to become future leaders, decision-makers and opinion formers'.⁵ In addition, large private philanthropic organisations, such as the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, which are major educational donors to higher education in Africa, have also strategically supported programmes that reflect and propel their beliefs.

Educated and socialized overseas, African university academic staff brought home not only new skills and understandings but also strong views on the appropriate mission, domain and methodology for higher education in Africa. Thus external supports to Africa's universities and various forms of institutional co-operation have tended to reinforce particular perspectives and orientations and to disparage and devalue others... bearing values and ideas born and nurtured [in these donor countries].⁶

Elaborating on South Africa's experience in the reform of its further education and training college system in the early 1990s, McGrath notes that it was greatly influenced by Britain through 'returnees... bolstered by a large number of study tours sponsored by the British Council'.⁷ More specifically,

at the heart of the success here was clearly having the right people in place, most importantly a British-educated, black South African at the heart of the network... it [the British Council] partnered the South African government and a leading

business-funded agency as a broker of ideas... eighty-eight college middle managers were taken to Britain for three-month placement at colleges.⁸

The application of its domestic experience and lessons about its foreign engagement – something that is particularly evident in China's engagement with Africa – leads one to expect that educational exchange and co-operation will be a key element in any Sino-Africa co-operation.⁹ 'Chinese scholars and policymakers consistently emphasise education co-operation in publications and public statements,' King confirmed in his seminal work on education and training co-operation between China and Africa.¹⁰ Intentions aside, however, has China fulfilled its commitment to place education at the heart of its Sino-African co-operation? Does it matter whether the education exchange between China and Africa is about co-operation or aid?

This chapter originates from an interest in teasing out the facts from the perceptions – the same reason that prompted King's seminal book-length publication entitled, *China's Aid and Soft Power in Africa: The Case of Education and Training*.¹¹ But this chapter also takes a particular interest in South Africa, which has not been examined in the literature in much detail. What exactly educational co-operation entails, particularly in the Sino-Africa educational co-operation context, will be explained and investigated in depth. The chapter discusses the broad Sino-African educational engagement and the specific Sino-South African engagement. It concludes by attempting the educational co-operation or aid puzzle.

SINO-AFRICAN EDUCATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Scholars have generally agreed on a three-phased historical chronology of the Sino-African educational engagement: the 1950s–1980s; the 1990s; and the post-2000 period.¹² The 1950–1980 period was mainly characterised by small-scale student exchanges, visits from educational delegations and teacher sending. In the 1990s, student exchange visibly increased, with forms of engagement expanded to the donation of educational materials, research co-operation, and aid construction of selected disciplines and laboratories, all driven by China, however. Tables 5.1 and 5.2, together with Figure 5.1, quantify the main educational engagement modalities during these two periods.

Table 5.1: The growth in African students studying in China

Year	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Number of students	24	164	648	2245	5569

Source: China-Africa Education Co-operation


Table 5.2: The growth in Chinese teachers in Africa

Year	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Number of teachers	3	14	115	123	238

Source: China-Africa Education Co-operation, 2006

Figure 5.1: High-level educational exchange delegations

(This figure comes from a Chinese publication, hence: 'outgoing' means from China to Africa; while 'incoming' means from Africa to China.)



Source: China-Africa Education Co-operation

The start of the third phase was marked by the first Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) ministerial conference in 2000, when the collaboration modalities further diversified and expanded on a much more remarkable scale. This third phase has also witnessed a number of other notable educational events outside the famous FOCAC educational pledges, e.g.: the establishment of the African Human Resources

Development Foundation in 2002; the Sino-African Ministers of Education Forum in 2005; the Principals Seminar on Asian-African Vocational Education in 2005; and the China-Africa Forum of University Presidents in 2006.

FOCAC educational pledges remain one of the most important elements in this post-2000 period, however. The famous target setting (for example, short courses to 10 000 personnel) first appeared in the second FOCAC in 2003 and was expanded on in 2006. In the FOCACs of 2009 and 2012, the educational pledge was further increased and diversified. Without providing an exhaustive list of all the educational pledges that China offered, Table 5.3 gives a glimpse of this trend.

Table 5.3: Educational pledges offered by China

	2006 Pledge	2009 Pledge	2013–2015 Action plan
Scholarships	4 000*3=12 000	5 500*3=16 500	18 000
Short-term training	15 000	20 000	30 000
Youth volunteers	300	-----	'More'
School	100	50	-----
Post-doctoral scholarships	-----	100	-----
Others	-----	100 joint research and demonstration projects 20+20 (university) 200 MPA	Sponsor 100 programmes 100+100 (cultural institutions) 10+10 (think tanks)

Source: China-Africa Economic and Trade Co-operation and Government White Papers

Besides the items listed in Table 5.3, another two important items that scholars have frequently mentioned are Chinese language teaching (mainly through Confucius Institutes (CIs)) and institutions of African studies within China. CIs are not limited to African soil, but are intended to 'gradually develop into important platforms for cultural exchange between China and African nations'.¹³ They offer separate scholarships and other bursaries for short-term training or visits to China, thereby further adding to the targeted number of trainings outlined in the table. The institutions of African studies within China are intended to assist in enhancing China's knowledge of African nations, but they have also been assigned by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Commerce (the latter being the main co-ordination body for China's aid policy for Africa) to hold the various planned training courses (both short-term training and degrees courses) outlined in Table 5.3.¹⁴ The short-term training courses cover a large variety of fields, including education, computers, medical treatment and public health, medical plants, economy, agriculture, diplomacy, news, public policy, energy and environmental protection,¹⁵ and are co-organised by no less than 10 other ministries besides the two ministries mentioned above, and educational institutions.¹⁶ Similarly, the degree-related scholarships are also offered in a wide range of disciplines and subjects.

THE RANGE OF EDUCATIONAL PLEDGES WITHIN FOCAC

All items in Table 3 are housed in the sections of human resource development and cultural and people-to-people exchanges in FOCAC. But these are not the only sections where training and personal exchanges are mentioned. For example, in the most recent 2013 FOCAC action plan, training items made their appearance in all of the following sections:

- **Human resource development:** Long/Short-term training (5.2.1), science and technology (including forums, research, demonstration projects and post-doctoral fellowships) (5.3), poverty reduction (5.4), medical care and public health (5.5), and climate change and environmental protection.
- **Cultural and people-to-people exchange:** Culture (including Chinese culture centres (6.1), education (including 20+20, Confucius institutes, \$2 million contribution to the UNESCO fund, and educational and training facilities (6.2), media and press (6.3), academia and think tanks (6.4), and people-to-people, youth and women exchanges (6.5).
- **Political affairs, and regional peace and security:** Law (2.4.4 on action plan 2013–2015), and peace and security and conflict prevention (2.6.3).

- **Economic co-operation:** Agriculture (including teachers for agriculture vocational education systems, and agriculture technology demonstration centres) (4.1.4), entrepreneurship (4.2.6, 4.2.7), energy and resources (4.6.2), information and communication (4.7), and tourism investment, safety and quality (4.9.2).

This cross-sectoral approach is important in understanding the overall Sino-African educational engagement, as pointed out by King on different occasions.¹⁷ Similarly, according to Gu, ‘the integrated cross-sectoral approach of co-operation is both practical and strategic in that it makes educational endeavors relevant to other development goals and in that it makes educational co-operation sustainable under a structure’.¹⁸

What is also apparent from all of the above is that China’s educational engagement with Africa is primarily government-driven, with limited inter-institutional engagement and participation by non-state stakeholders such as NGOs, private foundations and trusts.¹⁹

BEYOND FOCAC

The scope of educational engagement between Africa and China reaches beyond FOCAC initiatives. Although this has received less attention in the literature, Brautigam cautions that Chinese commercial engagement on the continent must be factored in to understand the bigger picture of the impact China has on capacity in Africa.²⁰ ‘Most of China’s major investments in Africa have an HRD component... many of the largest Chinese investments in Africa have a crucially important capacity building element,’ echoes King, highlighting the uniqueness of the Chinese approach, which departs from the common practice among traditional donors to deliberately break the link between aid and trade.²¹

The sheer scale and diversity of the Chinese business presence in Africa may well mean that in terms of numbers, the in-plant, on-the-job training of Africans, formally or informally, in Chinese firms on the continent dramatically outweighs the numbers of those who are being trained in China, whether as long-term students, or as short-term trainees.²²

One concrete example Brautigam provides is that of an Eximbank-funded project in the DRC, which specified that 0.5 per cent of total funds had to be allocated to skills training. It is not clear, however, whether or not this is a mandatory requirement for

all projects funded by Eximbank; and if it is, if a similar percentage applies.²³ Other notable examples of such enterprise-based training are to be found in the case of the two Chinese telecommunication giants in Africa – Huawei and ZTE. ZTE has specifically outlined technology transfer as an important objective on its website.²⁴ It has established training centres for its employees, and a communications institute as part of its Ethiopian project to train 3 000 telecommunication engineers.²⁵ As part of its corporate social responsibility programme, it has also offered open access to its training laboratories to college students in Kenya, established five regional research and development centres, and initiated a mobile phone donation programme in Uganda.²⁶ In similar fashion, Huawei's training centres sprawl across Angola, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Tunisia and Kenya. Furthermore, in 2011 it donated \$100 million of office equipment to Ethiopia's Education Ministry for installation in the best-performing schools.²⁷

In addition to these examples, other enterprise-based scholarships, local government scholarships and university scholarships are apparently in operation too. For example, the China Scholarship Council's annual report for 2010 mentions a scholarship offered by China National Electronics and the China Kingho Group (without mentioning any concrete numbers or amounts, however).²⁸ According to OECD, the China Development Bank also offers enterprise scholarships.²⁹ Examining one of the earliest Sino-Africa projects – TAZARA – King cites the Monson 2008 assessment that states that the workers on the railway 'constantly refer to the acquisition of new skills and new trades'.³⁰ King has recorded other innovative programmes in his seminal book, one involving an Ethiopian who imports Chinese workmen in exchange for training: according to the agreement, for every one immigrant, 10 Ethiopians are trained.³¹

One caution is needed here, however. A project is an investment, and the main aim of any investment is to make a profit. Together with the 'competition on profit margins, productivity, and speed of completion',³² innate difficulties in knowledge and skill transfer might hinder genuine capacity development.³³

THE VALUE OF SINO-AFRICAN EXCHANGE

How much do the educational engagement modalities outlined above amount to? It is generally agreed (and should be intuitively true too) that most of China's ODA in Africa is spent infrastructure projects.³⁴ Further attempts to locate or provide more quantifiable evidence for a more meaningful comparison, for example to a 9 per cent ratio Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) spends on education in its total official development assistance,³⁵ or the amount of \$17.2 billion Development


Assistance Committee (DAC) provided in 2008 in terms of technical cooperation³⁶, have proven to be futile.

Chinese reports routinely 'exclude the full costs for foreign students studying in China', Grimm et al. note in their analysis of China's aids data transparency and their comparison of the differences in the reporting structures of China and the DAC.³⁷ King notes too that apart from CIs, there is little publicly available information on the short-term and long-term programmes, or the schools. Total aid figures to Africa were available only for a few selected years: for example, in the aid data provided by the State Council, the only year for which an African aid figure was tied to one single year was 2007. For other years, only a lump sum figure was given for Chinese foreign aid to all countries.³⁸ There are isolated references by authors such as He, who cites an annual budget of RMB10 million for joint scientific research with Africa into higher education, with no further figures to give an indication of the proportion of this to the overall educational engagement budget.³⁹ China's AidData website is another potential source for 'detailed project compilation of systematic scanning of reporting [which includes education co-operation]... [However, the data] does not usually attribute a monetary value to projects'.⁴⁰

All this means that the only way to judge the extent of Sino-African educational engagement is to do an item-to-item comparison with provisions made by other countries. The section below provides a comparison for the most notable educational modalities: scholarships, short-term training, school building and volunteer programmes.

SCHOLARSHIPS

Scholarships are on the agenda of many traditional donors, and this is 'frequently one of the largest and earliest HRD items offered by new or re-emerging development actors'.⁴¹ King observes that most western donors have shifted away from scholarships, however. For example, USAID's scholarships dropped from 9 128 in 1990 to 1 212 in 2000.⁴² The UK has also declined its scholarship offers significantly, with 2 300 Chevening scholarships currently being on offer annually.⁴³ The exception is Germany, which runs the largest scholarship programme worldwide (Germany gives a total of 57 000 scholarships annually to all international students; a breakdown for African students could not be found).⁴⁴ Figure 5.2 illustrates China's offering of African scholarships. According to the 2010 annual report of the China Scholarship Council, 5 710 African students were in China under Chinese government scholarships in that year, accounting for 25.5 per cent of total Chinese government scholarships awarded in 2010 (22 390).

Figure 5.2: The number of Chinese government scholarships offered to African nations

Source: OECD, 2011

China's figure of close to 5 710 scholarships is comparable to France's offering of 4 500 scholarships to African students in 2009 and much larger than India's 2011 figure of 1 500 government scholarships for African students.⁴⁵

SHORT-TERM TRAINING

Short-term training courses are another important educational engagement modality between China and Africa, according to China's White Paper on African aid.⁴⁶ It amounted to 5 000 in the 2006 FOCAC pledge and 10 000 in the 2013 FOCAC action plan. Similar to scholarships, Germany together with Japan 'continue[s] to pay very serious attention to short-term training, where others [western donors] such as the UK have cut back on this element'.⁴⁷ No figure could be found for Germany. Japan's bilateral training programme figure stands at about 8 000.⁴⁸

SCHOOL BUILDING AND VOLUNTEER PROGRAMME

China's school-building project in Africa (100 in the 2006 FOCAC pledge and 50 in the 2009 pledge) is small compared to that of Japan, which built 2 600 schools in Africa between 2007 and 2012, 'probably by far the largest provider of school buildings'.⁴⁹ Similarly, China's volunteer programme (300 in the 2006 pledge) is also small,

compared with more mature overseas volunteer schemes like the Peace Corps, or even South Korea's 1 000 aid volunteers in Africa in 2009.⁵⁰

THE IMPACT OF SINO-AFRICAN EXCHANGE

Besides public records on delivery of the pledged targets and some commentary by individual Chinese universities that are responsible for certain training courses, there is little public evaluation of these programmes, especially in terms of impact. In *China-Africa Education Co-operation*, a publication compiled by Chinese Ministry of Education (in Chinese), some statistics on the positions of notable alumni's are given.⁵¹ Little is known beyond these statistics, prompting Li and April to propose greater attention paid in this regard.⁵²

African students in China are 'expected to become important players of the future of Sino-African relations', suggests Ferdjani.⁵³ However, studies examining, recording and exploring African students' experiences in China also remain limited.

SOUTH AFRICA'S STRATEGIC POSITION IN SINO-AFRICAN EDUCATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

South Africa is situated on the African continent, but is notably different from many other African countries. It is the only African country that has substantive investments in China, with large FDI projects such as SAB Miller, Naspers, and Sasol⁵⁴. It is one of the few African countries that hosted Chinese immigrants long ago in history, with early Chinese immigrants arriving around 1870.⁵⁵ Although the two countries only established a formal diplomatic relationship in 1998, South Africa boasts the largest Chinese migrant population on the continent, mostly from the most recent wave of migration since the late 1990s. China's presence in South Africa is vastly different from that in many of its African neighbours: China is not responsible for any massive stadia or highways, for instance, as in many other African countries. Nor is the purchase by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China of a 20 per cent share of The Standard Bank of South Africa for about US\$5.5 billion – one of the largest instances of Chinese FDI on the continent – particularly visible to ordinary South Africans.⁵⁶ However, increasingly encounters with the 'Made in China' label and the common sight of enormous Chinese migrant populations operating Chinese shops in cities, towns and villages have meant

that the level of anxiety among South Africans over China's presence is becoming equally significant to that among people in other African countries.

In terms of the educational arena, external aid agencies have always played more of a facilitative role rather than a determinative one in South Africa, because South Africa does not rely on external direct budget support, as do many other African countries. For example, 'The largest ODA intervention in the sector [of further education and training], by Danida [a Danish development agency] ... was dwarfed by the state-financed recapitalisation scheme'.⁵⁷

In the Sino-South Africa engagement, although South Africa neither features in the Sino-Africa joint scientific research projects launched by the Chinese Ministry of Education in 2005,⁵⁸ nor appears on the 2010 list of the China Scholarship Council (CSC) of organisations co-operating with the CSC, South Africa enjoys a strategic position in China's African educational engagement scheme.⁵⁹

[Among the] over 50 co-operation agreements in nuclear energy, science and technology, as well as in culture, education and tourism, the importance of scientific co-operation is signaled by the presence of a Science and Technology Counselor [in South Africa], the only one in the whole of Africa, apart from Egypt [one of the countries China has the longest diplomatic relationship in Africa with] ... South Africa also has one of the only Education Counselors in the whole continent, again apart from Egypt.⁶⁰

It needs to be noted, however, that the presence of the education counselor in South Africa is not to facilitate educational co-operation between the two countries, but to facilitate the process for Chinese students who wish to study in South Africa. In fact, the 'educational co-operation' section on the website of the Chinese embassy in South Africa only appears in its Chinese version, not in its English version. According to informal discussions with the Education Counselor at the Chinese embassy in South Africa, about 3 000 to 3 500 Chinese students are currently studying in South Africa for various degrees – about 98 per cent of them self-financed. There are about 400 South African students in China, the majority of whom are self-financed.⁶¹

South Africa also hosts the only active Chinese research centre on the continent – the Chinese Study Centre in Stellenbosch. Since its establishment in 2004, the Centre has consistently increased its China-focused outlays, from *China Briefing* and *China Monitor* to *China Africa Network*, *China Africa Business Weekly* and *China Africa Focus*.

HISTORY OF HRD ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

A shortage of skills is a well-known constraint for South Africa's development. Research by Adcorp Holdings of South Africa indicates that there were 829 800 unfilled positions for high-skilled workers in 2012.⁶² This was partly caused by the so-called 'brain drain' that South Africa has been experiencing for some time, some scholars argue. By 2001, some 1.6 million people in skilled, professional and managerial professions had already left the country,⁶³ amounting to about one-fifth of South Africans with a tertiary education living abroad. The unemployment rate in South Africa is alarmingly high at 25 per cent, with youth unemployment almost double that at 51 per cent.⁶⁴ The unemployment rate halves for those with a degree or certificate,⁶⁵ however – pointing to the significance of and need for human resource development.

South Africa's experience with educational donors is similar to that of many of its African neighbours, i.e. Europe 'is the partner we know best and who knows us best'.⁶⁶ Samoff and Carrol, in their analysis of historical external support to higher education in Africa, list Britain (British Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas), France, national agencies from the US (USAID) and the Soviet Union, together with four major private philanthropic organisations (Ford, Rockefeller, Kellogg and Carnegie), as the main players.⁶⁷ These donors have operated in Africa since the 1950s. Up to the 1990s, China was never mentioned, for example, in an educational aid donor index compiled by King.⁶⁸ Similarly, in an evaluation of ODA to capacity building in South Africa (published in 2000), all donors listed are from the OECD: EU, DFID, USAID, AusAid, Cida, Danida, GTZ, Jica, Nethland, Norad and Sida.⁶⁹

Foundations and trusts have been particularly active in South Africa, both before and after 1994. These are again mostly western in origin.⁷⁰ Scholars have noted the historical role played by non-state institutions in bridging foreign donor and domestic policy designs in South Africa too. For example, South Africa's outcome-based education policy in the late 1980s⁷¹ was greatly influenced by Australia through COSATU (the Congress of South African Trade Unions). Similarly, the main point of entry into South African society for USAID, one of the largest bilateral education donors to South Africa, has also been through the support of NGOs.⁷²

The 1990s also witnessed a global trend of many western donors shifting their technical educational support from higher and vocational training to basic education. By the 1990s, the number of donors with expertise in labour skills had shrunk dramatically.⁷³ Except for Germany and France, which still 'allocate a considerable amount of their education aid (over 70 per cent) to higher education... others such as the USA, UK, Netherlands, Canada and Sweden allocate to basic education over 69 per cent of their total aid to education'.⁷⁴ Similarly, aid originally directed towards staff training and institutional develop-

ment in the early days has also dwindled and become more narrowly linked to particular projects.⁷⁵ Donors other than GTZ, Irish Aid and JICA completely phased out their support for vocational education and training in Southern Africa.⁷⁶ Looking at international assistance for the labour skills sector (particularly in Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET)) in South Africa, Carton and King make the following observation:

In the 1960s and 1970s, support to different forms of technical and vocational education and training was commonplace... the actual presence of donor staff with expertise on labor skills had shrunk dramatically by the mid- to late 1990s. Sida had only one vocational in-house expert left by the end of the decade, and DFID had none, meanwhile the once very large staff of technical educators in the Bank [the World Bank] had disappeared. CIDA too had no in-house professional capacity left. The only agency with significant in-house expertise was Germany's GTZ. Danida and Irish Aid, which were both to play more important roles in relation to South Africa, drew more on the experience of Danish consulting firms and of FAS international Consulting (the commercial subsidiary of Ireland's Training and Employment Authority) than on their own staff.⁷⁷

China does not feature in any available discussions of South Africa's experience of foreign aid in education.

SINO-SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

Compared to the discussions on Sino-African educational engagement, there is an even greater paucity of details on Sino-South African educational engagement. Even in King's seminal book, for which 90 interviews within South Africa were reported to have been conducted, reference to South Africa remains far less comprehensive and concrete than reference to countries such as Kenya and Cameroon.⁷⁸ The only specific training opportunity mentioned was a short course in aquaculture linked to the Gariep Dam in the Free State, with no further information provided on what the course entails.⁷⁹ In another passage, King mentions one South African student's experience in terms of China's influence on his attitude towards time management.

All Sino-African educational engagement modalities are apparently applicable to South Africa too, but details of the scale and impact thereof are close to non-existent. Available accounts on Sino-South African educational engagement similarly remain sketchy at best. Many only point to plans, events, memorandums of agreement (MOUs) or co-operation principles. For example, in *Bilateral Relations Between People's Republic of China and the Republic of South Africa*⁸⁰ a number of instances were mentioned, including the establishment of a joint scientific and technological co-operation commission in 1999; the

signing of a cultural co-operation agreement in 2000; the signing of a joint agricultural co-operation agreement in 2003; and the signing of a number of memorandums of co-operation on health and traditional medicine, sports, procurators, public administration, human resource development and tourism. Le Pere and Shelton point out that scientific and technological co-operation featured in a number of the many MOUs signed between South Africa and China during the Vice-President's visit to South Africa in 2004.⁸¹ A publication by the dti, *China Country Briefing*, notes broad commitment between the two countries to co-operation in terms of human resources development to support South Africa, as well as capacity-building co-operation in fields such as agriculture, water, public service and administration, traditional medicine, environmental protection, and poverty alleviation through technology and development.⁸² Similarly, a joint communique published subsequent to a meeting between the leaders of the Republic of South Africa and the PRC, held before the 2013 BRICS meeting, outlines their commitment to further strengthen bilateral co-operation in human resources without much further information.⁸³

One particular instance that has been referred to by a number of scholars, however, is the RMB250 million development grant made during the Chinese president's visit to South Africa in 2007. The grant was originally aimed at skills building in the South African textile industry,⁸⁴ but since 'the offer of assistance comes from a partner that is not dictating what its money should be spent on, and when there is a receiving partner that could be characterized as not aid-dependent, and which has had a tradition of looking critically at all offers of development aid, especially in the field of education, the result was that [the] project moved from the request for a new technical college to the renovation of several established colleges'.⁸⁵ To complicate the matter further, South Africa 'wanted to be sure that, to the extent possible, the materials and the human resources deployed on the project would be sourced within South Africa. The outcome, however, has been that a full three years after the offer of assistance, there has been very little action on the moneys offered'.⁸⁶

A search for information on other concrete projects or figures bears no fruit at all. Similarly, no impact studies or experiences related by South African students could be located, except the example from King's 2013 book mentioned above. A search of China's educational ODA projects in South Africa on the AidData database yields the following result, without any monetary value attached.

Table 5.4: Educational ODA projects implemented by China in South Africa

Title	Year	Description
Agreement on Education Co-operation	2004	In 2004, China and South Africa signed an agreement on co-operation in the realm of education. It is unclear what the terms of the agreement are or how it was implemented.
Artisan training for South African Students	2007	On 21 May 2007, 200 South African students began artisan training at the Tshwane University of Technology. This training was facilitated by China's Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa and the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition.
Centre for Chinese Studies	2004	In 2004, China confirmed the establishment of the Centre for Chinese Studies at the University of Stellenbosch, following a Bi-National Commission meeting. It appears that the facility may have had a commitment year before 2000. The project is unclear.
China-Africa Exchange Programme	2009	In March 2010, more than 100 scholars from Africa and China gathered in Beijing for the launch of the 'China-Africa Research and Academic Exchange Programme', a new mechanism announced by the Chinese government at the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation in Egypt in November 2009. The programme is intended to enable scholars and think tanks from Africa and China to increase exchange and co-operation, share development experience, and provide intellectual support for improving co-operation policies, according to Lu Shaye, Secretary-General of the Chinese Follow-Up Committee of the FOCAC.
China Increase Number of Scholarships Offered to South African Students	2007	In 2007, China and South Africa agreed to utilise the China-Africa Development Fund to increase the number of scholarships offered to South African students.

Establishment of Confucius Institute	2007	In 2007, China agreed to establish a new Confucius Institute for Business on the campus of the Tshwane University of Technology in South Africa. The centre will be geared toward promoting a greater understanding of the Chinese language and business culture. The centre was founded in June 2007.
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Source: <http://china.aiddata.org/projects>

search term combination of: *Scopes (official Finance & Filters: Sector (education) & search (South Africa)*

Compared with the proclaimed strategic position that South Africa holds in China's African agenda, this paucity of data and implied lack of interest from scholars makes the Sino-South African educational engagement scenario not only elusive, but also intriguing, and calls for an explanation.

EDUCATIONAL CO-OPERATION OR EDUCATIONAL AID?

Bearing in mind the potential difference between Sino-South African and Sino-African educational engagement, should the engagement modalities illustrated above be defined as co-operation, or as aid? This co-operation versus aid debate has attracted the attention of scholars as well as politicians, because the distinction has a direct bearing on the essence of the Sino-Africa relationship.

South Africa's uniqueness is again worthy of mention here. With South Africa's strong scientific and tertiary institutions and capacity (their attractiveness to Chinese students is testament to this), the Sino-South African educational engagement has the potential for a much more symmetrical relationship. In the longer term, this more symmetrical relationship is expected to be the ideal scenario of where other Sino-Africa relationships should be heading towards. In this sense, the examination and discussion of Sino-South Africa relationships is important, as it may provide early experiments and lessons for others to learn from.

According to King, 'the majority of HRS items of educational assistance from China would fall into the OECD DAC definitions of official development assistance'.⁸⁷ The source of funding also suggests this.⁸⁸ However, as many have pointed out, China 'is not at ease with the discourse of aid'⁸⁹ and 'has traditionally avoided presenting itself as a donor'.⁹⁰ Unlike in the instance of other traditional donors, issues such as 'joint actions' and 'positioning itself as development partner and long-term friend', with two-sided engagements

and mutual, win-win co-operation, have been stressed repeatedly. FOCAC action plans have always started with the common phrases of 'the two sides noted' (or 'agreed', 'welcomed', 'reaffirmed', 'recognised' or 'decided').⁹¹

However, King notes too that 'when it came to the specific pledges, the language changed significantly'.⁹² The various pledges, promises and targets all 'gave it more of an aid flavor',⁹³ since the responsibility for these deliveries unequivocally falls on the shoulders of the Chinese, and theirs alone. The student 'exchanges' are considerably asymmetric too. Compared to the number of African students studying in China under Chinese scholarships, the number of Chinese students studying in Africa under African scholarships is low.⁹⁴ Kenya has only offered one government scholarship to China so far.⁹⁵ Between 2005 and 2007, the Chinese offered 100 scholarships to Tanzania each year, while Tanzania only offered China five in 2006 and four in 2007, although Tanzania has made a commitment to increase its offering to 10.⁹⁶ In addition, 'as China seldom sends its students and scholars abroad to study and do research, there are even fewer African scholars travelling to give lectures in China'.⁹⁷

Some scholars have suggested different ways to tackle this co-operation versus aid question. 'Reciprocity should not be equated with exact symmetry',⁹⁸ King suggests, because China has always preferred a more 'integrated cross-sectional approach to co-operation', instead of pursuing various programmes separately.⁹⁹

There is therefore no direct symmetry within the human resources silo, as almost all the awards, scholarships, volunteers and experts are one way, with China providing them to Africa. But across the pledges as a whole, there is certainly reciprocity and mutual benefit... win-win economic, cultural or educational co-operation does not depend on precisely equal activities within the education sector but rather on a shared appreciation that the other party is an equal, and that there is mutuality across the range of both economic and social co-operation.¹⁰⁰

Gu similarly suggests that the emerging pattern of China's educational aid to Africa could be seen as 'aid through co-operation, co-operation for mutual development'.¹⁰¹

But does it really matter? On its own, educational co-operation is almost never financially viable¹⁰², so sometimes it is deliberately pursued to serve only the purpose of a public relations exercise. Reciprocity can occur indirectly too. For example, in the case of TAZARA, although 'there was no direct material benefit to China from the TAZARA project...within one year of construction [having] started on the railway in 1970, China had regained its seat in the UN, thanks particularly to the votes of African member states'.¹⁰³ Another potential logic for the great investment in the various educational engagement modalities might not lie in technology or skills transfer per se, but in terms of providing exposure, especially in terms of attitudes and business practice.¹⁰⁴ Applying this logic, the question of whether it should be labeled as co-operation or aid might lose its relevance

entirely. Instead, the question that should be asked is: Is it beneficial overall? Or is it better than the alternative?

CONCLUSION

This chapter applies both a pan-African and a bilateral lens to examine Sino-South African educational engagement. It also places related discussions within the broader context of South Africa's human resource challenges and its overall experience in human resource assistance. It reveals that Sino-African educational engagement comprises multi-faceted modalities ranging from traditional training and exchanges to training outside educational institutions. Mainly due to the challenge of a lack of data, however, the actual value and impact of such engagement cannot be well established.

The chapter highlights South Africa's strategic position in China's overall Sino-African educational engagement framework. However, the history of educational assistance in South Africa reveals that China's involvement in South Africa's human resource development has been recent and also relatively minor. Furthermore, although Sino-African educational engagement modalities are apparently applicable to South Africa, details of the scale and impact of Sino-African bilateral interactions are sparse, scattered and nominal, pointing to an evident deficit in the existing knowledge base and therefore a need for further examination.

The chapter concludes by asking the question: Is Sino-(South) African educational engagement a co-operation or aid project? It highlights the preferred rhetoric by the Chinese and its 'contradiction'. To resolve this 'contradiction', the discussion problematised the anticipation of a clear-cut answer to this question.

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Rethinking Africa's Development Through Science and Technology: A Partnership Opportunity for South Africa and China

John Forje and Yazini April

Africa has missed the major milestones of changes humankind has gone through. Africa is locked in the era of agrarian civilization, while the rest of the world has gone on to the era of information technology. Africa has become the Third World's Third World.

Global Coalition for Africa, June 1995.

INTRODUCTION: FACING REALITIES

Africa is under-developed, partly as a result of its failure to develop science and technology, and partly due to its undemocratic governance system. By accident or design, technical education and indigenous knowledge were relegated to the background by the colonial powers. The new custodians of power are not doing better either. Due to the current neglect of home-grown scientific methods, the continent is rapidly losing track of its indigenous knowledge. The African continent is now marginalised from the digital community and the fast pace of development. The fact remains, science and technology (S&T), research and development (R&D) and innovation are all critical to the process of sustainable development. The challenge for the African Union (AU) is to formulate effective means of developing and advancing the continent's low level of technology use, and of catching up rapidly with the global community.

Both South Africa and China can contribute immensely to the AU challenge by partnering in strategic ways that could fast-track technological growth on the continent. Moreover, both countries are already contributing actively towards science and technology production. South Africa currently undertakes about 0,5 per cent of global research and has led and funded a significant number of S&T bilateral collaborative research projects on the continent.¹ South Africa has also improved its international publications ranking by two positions, gaining a ranking of 33rd in the world. Figures for the 10-year period from

2000 and 2010 show that the country has more than doubled its paper publication numbers: from 3 617 in 2000, to 7 468 in 2010.² Furthermore, programmes such as the Square Kilometre Array radio telescope, which was recently jointly awarded to South Africa and Australia, as well as the Southern African Large Telescope in Sutherland, are both multi-national projects where local research talent has had a strong presence.

China, on the other hand, has been buttressing rapid economic development by investing significantly in knowledge production. After WWII, China adopted a development strategy that included deliberate insulation from the world economy, industrialisation and the economic dominance of the state. Between 2000 and 2008 its gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) rose by an average of 22.8 per cent annually, which increased the share of GERD to GDP from 0.9 per cent to 1.54 per cent. China aims to increase this to 2.5 per cent by 2020.³ In 2008, 82.76 per cent went to experimental development, 12.46 per cent to applied research, and 4.78 per cent to basic research. Business enterprises contributed 59.95 per cent of GERD in 2000 and 73.26 per cent in 2008.⁴ Spending by enterprises is predominantly on experimental development. China aims to increase the share that basic research receives to 15 per cent by 2020.⁵ Both China and South Africa have the potential to influence science and technology, particularly information and communication technology (ICTs), on the continent.

South Africa-China collaboration could be developed against the backdrop of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Due to the FOCAC IV, which was held in Egypt on November 2009, a platform was established for Sino-African collaboration between think tanks. At that forum, Premier Wen Jiabao proposed the launch of a China-Africa joint research and exchange programme, which would encourage researchers and institutions to increase exchange and co-operation, share development experiences, and promote academic support for formulating improved co-operation policies between the two sides. South-South research initiatives, such as the FOCAC think tank exchange programme are a growing phenomenon that can provide shared opportunities for capacity building and knowledge production on the continent.⁶

The benefits of information and communication technologies and genetic engineering have added new dynamics to the 'chase game' of development. An obvious example is how the Asian 'Tigers' have managed to grow their economies without ownership of land saturated with mineral wealth. China is one example of a country that has not allowed a lack of mineral resources to hinder it from becoming an economic giant, due to its outstanding abilities in the field of technology. Indeed, it is one of the world's most technologically advanced countries.

On the other hand, 50 to 60 years ago, African countries had an opportunity to dominate the global market, as they were further ahead economically than some of the Asian Tigers of today. A case in point is Nigeria and Cameroon, who, at that stage, were the

leading producers of palm fruit oil, as opposed to Malaysia, which is the leading producer today. It was from Cameroon, or to be precise from the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC), that Malaysia obtained seedlings and bacteria to improve its oil palm sector. Currently, Cameroon lags dismally far behind Malaysia in palm oil production.⁷

The difference is that, as stated earlier, the Asian Tigers took advantage of ICTs, which have now become key drivers of economic and social opportunity. ICTs have changed the face of community development, which is now defined as 'a global, dynamic, and interactive process of change that constitutes the source of significant and measurable improvement in various aspects of life'.⁸

The views of Prime Minister Mamohan Singh of India are relevant in this context. He states:

Development today is no longer a function of domestic resources and national policies alone. It is a process that is integrally linked to the international economic environment. We need to find innovative sources of functioning and access to technologies that are necessary to assist those who are on the margin of globalisation. Just as prosperity cannot be sustained by being walled in, poverty cannot be banished to some invisible periphery.⁹

The application of ICT for economic and social development has not been limited to Asia or the West: Latin America is another region where countries such as Costa Rica and El Salvador, although lacking in natural resources compared with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria and the like, have managed to devise strong measures that have ensured some level of economic sustainability in the global market. The thriving developments in the aforementioned regions establish one key factor, namely that developing the use of ICTs for the common good of the society is essential.

Unfortunately, even as the people of South-East Asia continue to demonstrate strong economic indicators, African countries seem to consistently compare unfavourably with the international community. Most African elites continue to barter their resources under corruptive measures and continue, unashamedly, to keep reaching out for financial and technical aid without demonstrating the capacity to deliver. 'Good governance' and 'capacity building' have become buzzwords that some African governments have started declaiming loudly, without any intention of practising them. In practice, most of these governments have not yet even begun to pick up the pieces of their battered countries and implement effective good governance strategies. More appalling is that, despite international exposure to effective public service delivery and democratic best practices through e-governance, African governments continue to ignore the good principles they have ratified. They continue to export raw materials and import more poverty, thereby crippling the

emergence of an 'African Lion', or 'Elephant', to quick-start the scientific, technological, innovative and industrial transformation of the continent. The selfish mentality of the elite continues to ruin any prospects of good governance. Most of them have travelled all over the world and witnessed how e-governance facilitates quality health and other services, and yet do little to minimise the digital divide.

Moreover, there is increasing evidence that despite institutions such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) that were established in the last decade, the current attitudes and policy frameworks of the majority of African governments show that they continue to significantly underestimate the importance of science and technology. As a result, development policies have not led to expected and sustainable outcomes, nor have they improved the quality of living of the most marginalised portions of the population.

The threat posed by the minimal investment in S&T by the AU has now become more of an economic development tragedy than a technological matter. Despite the implications that the digital divide has for the AU's inability to deploy, harness and exploit the developmental opportunities of the ongoing digital information technological revolution, the countries of the AU do not seem prepared to advance the process of their socio-economic development.¹⁰ The AU faces several challenges for regional integration to succeed. Some of them are:

- Poor policy frameworks, leading to the fragmentation of government S&T and failure to link this to strategic national development plans;
- Poor or inadequate development of human resources in activities related to R&D and S&T;
- An ageing and shrinking scientifically qualified population;
- Absence of links between universities, research institutes and the private sector, so that research results gather dust in the drawers of researchers and are not 'translated' into consumer goods by the private sector;
- Failure by the private sector to invest in activities related to S&T and R&D;
- Poor or inadequate participation of females in activities related to S&T and R&D;
- Poor female enrolment in tertiary education and especially in S&T subjects such as Mathematics, Physics and Engineering;
- Lack of an enabling environment for S&T and R&D to flourish;
- Absence of a conducive environment, which breeds the 'brain drain' syndrome, and how to convert this into a 'brain gain' phenomenon remains a challenge;
- Absence of political will and poor leadership, depriving the people of the possibility of benefiting from the abundance of their countries' natural resources; and

- Failure by African governments to accept the role of social science in S&T and R&D, which means that indigenous knowledge is not fully developed and related to the development process.

Given the above list of factors that are hampering the AU's socio-economic progress, this chapter presents fundamental strategies that the AU *should* implement in order to engage successfully in the knowledge economy driven that is by ICTs. Various strategies for development through S&T via the effective implementation of ICT policies and the application of indigenous knowledge are examined.

METHODOLOGY

This discussion utilises Walter Rostow's theories of development to examine the possibilities of bridging the digital divide between Africa and the rest of the global community by implementing stages of modernisation. According to Rostow, nations proceed through five stages of development:

1. the traditional society,
2. preconditioning,
3. take-off,
4. maturity, and
5. high-mass consumption.

This chapter will focus on the preconditioning, take-off and maturity stages. Rostow's theories are an excellent starting point, as they can be used to measure the continent's stages of development and application in achieving the desirable results (listed in Table 6.1) of high internal and external production, accelerated by high technological output, knowledge production and the necessary human and capital investment.

Table 6.1: Modernisation concepts applicable to eradicate the digital divide

Theoretical Stage	Transition	Result
Pre-conditioning	Research, development and various forms of investment such as finance and communications	High commerce and production output

Take-off	Heavy investment in technological development, human capital & industrialization	Revolutionary changes, commercialization and productivity
Maturity	Diversification of the nation's production through technology	Technological and entrepreneurial skills, affording flexibility in production

Source: Walter, 1960

While there has been some debate as to the relevance of Rostow's theories for Africa, this chapter argues that they are useful in demonstrating the role of technology in facilitating take-off in a country such as China, thereby creating maturity and leading to mass production at a faster pace. It must also be emphasised that knowledge production is the basis for the competitive capacity development and industrial development that takes place during the transitional period. Moreover, through knowledge production, the continuity of the pre-conditioning, take-off and maturity stages is ensured, thereby establishing necessary elements, such as the effective implementation of technological policies, national prestige and economic growth.

The *pre-conditioning stage* is critical and necessary for joint collaboration by the entire society to ensure that the national prestige and economy of the country are boosted to a higher level. China is an example that fits well into this category, as it has undergone rapid growth over the last decade, due to its focus on creating growth pools associated with the fastest-growing industries. The *take-off stage* is key in sustaining industrial development, which is made possible through investment in areas such as the growth of indigenous knowledge. Once the continent is able to demonstrate economies that have the technological and entrepreneurial skills to choose their mode of production, *maturity* will have set in. That said, African countries, while collaborating with both South Africa and China, in this process need to ensure that this conceptual framework is designed to promote technological home-grown models.

IMPLEMENTING EFFECTIVE TECHNOLOGY POLICIES

The implementation of effective technology policies is one of the ways in which knowledge production could be facilitated, leading to successful take-off. The ongoing ICT revolution, combined with the forces of globalisation, has roused the hopes and fears

of countries at all levels of development, which long to leapfrog to the new economy through legislation that promotes the use of technology.¹¹ In the Western and Asian hemispheres, most countries have local, national and regional technology policies that have not only been formulated, but also implemented. The European Union long ago initiated an Information Society Project Office,¹² which has been issuing a stream of reports. High-level groups of experts have been put together on the social and societal aspects of the information society.

African countries have also started formulating and implementing technology policies. However, most of them have failed to give due weight to the importance of S&T, innovation and ICTs in the process of transforming the continent. Hanna argues that in many developing countries, technology policies have actually been implemented for the wrong reasons. He maintains that, over the years, a growing number of developing countries, inspired by the success stories of fast-growing exports of ICT services from countries such as China and South Korea, have chosen to formulate national ICT policies and strategies.¹³ In South Korea, for example, a comprehensive ICT strategy has been the key economic driver leading to the growth of the ICT industry's contribution to GDP from a mere 4.5 per cent in 1990 to an astounding 50.5 per cent in 2000.¹⁴ However, given the lack of rigorous implementation of ICT policies, one questions the actual commitment of AU member states in this regard, to the detriment of their societies. One key factor that has led to the largely dismal technological take-off in the AU appears to be a lack of political will to implement ICT policies.

According to a study released by the Economic Commission for Africa, not all African countries have effectively begun to implement ICT policies and strategies. (See Annexure 1 for an update on countries that have done so).¹⁵ The number of countries effectively implementing ICT policies is currently dismal for a continent that needs all the proper mechanisms to be put in place in order to position itself advantageously with the rest of the global village. The objective of introducing policies and strategies is specifically to assist countries to deploy, harness and exploit ICT for socio-economic development.

The implementation of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), without incorporating the impact of S&T as part of any country's self-assessment, is another example of the low priority being given to policy implementation. On 9 September 1999, African Heads of State and the Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) issued a declaration (the Sirte Declaration) calling for the establishment of an African Union to accelerate the process of economic, social and political integration in Africa. Subsequently, the OAU's science and technology agenda was adopted by the AU. The AU is the political powerhouse, while NEPAD is its economic tool, which reports to the AU. As part of its economic agenda, NEPAD has acknowledged S&T as the engine of Africa's economic transformation and sustainable development. In an effort to improve the quality of governance

in Africa, the AU adopted the APRM as a self-monitoring mechanism that is voluntarily acceded to by member states, with the aim of fostering the adoption of policies, standards and practices that will lead to political stability, sustainable development and regional integration.¹⁶ The APRM's self-assessment document is a NEPAD project that requires the citizens of the various countries undergoing assessments to examine various issues, such as corporate governance, socio-economic indicators, democracy, good governance and so forth.

However, the recent APRM review document that has been implemented in some African countries has no special section dedicated to examining measures of e-governance for socio-economic development. Neither is there any reference to a technological assessment under the 'socio-economic indicators' section, which deals with, *inter alia*, poverty eradication, health and sustainable development. Omitting technology, the most critical component of economic and political growth, which accelerates the modernisation process, as demonstrated by Rostow's theories, shows an obvious lack of high commitment. The fact that several member states subjected themselves to peer review should have stimulated the AU to ensure that science, technology and innovation are prioritised.

Granted, NEPAD has made some substantial efforts towards the implementation of ICT, as witnessed by the e-school initiative that seeks to provide ICTs at selected schools; but little real progress has been made, as the continent still lags behind other regions of the world. Planning for the implementation of projects such as Design of Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators, The African Biosciences Initiative and the Science and Technology Consolidated Plan is still under way.¹⁷ Prince Mashele states that an overall assessment of implementation reveals that most NEPAD projects have not yet gone beyond a feasibility study and, in most cases, NEPAD is still trying to secure funding for such feasibility studies.¹⁸ AU member states need to shoulder more responsibility for the fact that the continent has still not made the strides necessary for 21st-century technological survival. It is critical that a shared understanding of the responsibilities of the NEPAD Secretariat and the AU member states develops¹⁹ to ensure that the demands and expectations for economic growth and development are met.

The AU should emphasise that its members need to become dominant players in ensuring that policy development is effective. African governments should not formulate policies and then not facilitate their implementation. They should recognise the fact that policy making requires both leadership and the involvement of communities. As Geldof argues, governments should not expect ICT people within government to drive agendas, nor should they simply import ICT investment policies from another country, such as China,²⁰ as these policies may not be applicable to African situations. Ideally, ICT should be driven by a government in a favourable way; for example, there should be a clear ICT policy that will fight the 'war against poverty'. Moreover, once the policy has been developed,

there needs to be high-level political ownership.

Vietnam serves as a perfect case study of government obstruction to effective policy implementation: the government's role in accepting an e-commerce policy was contradictory, due to its simultaneous efforts to control or manage everything, rather than create a conducive and supportive environment.²¹ Some of the reasons identified for the failure of policy implementation in Vietnam are worth examining, as a way of assessing the lack of policy implementation by most African countries. The reasons include the following:

1. The regulatory system in Vietnam lacked a framework and an appropriate policy to guide regulatory management.
2. The legal framework was weak in areas such as human development.
3. The government did not assume a pioneering role in facilitating implementation of the e-governance policy. Moreover, there were no close linkages between policies and policy-making bodies, making the system fragmented and thereby creating inappropriate policies that were sometimes contradictory or ineffective in accomplishing their purpose.²²

The implementation of policies can succeed only through management and monitoring of the legislative process, strong human capacity and collaboration in order to avert contradictions, bureaucratic mishaps and projects that become white elephants. As Florence Etta states: 'Policy making involves agenda setting, policy formulation and policy implementation, and in each of these stages there are winners and potential losers.'²³ The lack of political will by governments to go beyond ratifying treaties and agreements by effectively implementing them is depriving African citizens of the opportunity to experience the revolutionary effects of ICT.

The Rwandan ICT policy-making process is often touted as being among the best on the continent. According to Florence Etta, the reasons for its success are the following:

1. The process is based on a clear and simple vision, which was constructed around the lived history and realistic aspirations of the community.
2. The ICT policy has been constructed around the National 2020 Vision, which is solidly entrenched in the country's history and current status.
3. The government of Rwanda, including the President, has personally invested in the ICT process by engaging with communities on an individual basis.²⁴

The measures implemented by Rwanda demonstrate the political will and drive necessary to ensure that the ICT policies work and do not collect dust on shelves. They work

because they engage with the community and because a standard has been adopted that the citizens can relate to.

In the final analysis, African countries that adopt an inactive or reactive posture, rather than an adaptive and proactive one, are likely to lose out on windows of opportunity to leapfrog to the new economy, or are likely to fail to exploit a structural change to gain or maintain competitive advantage in many of their industries and services. AU member states have to incorporate all the variables, which will require political will, community involvement and investment, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

IMPLEMENTING INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE FOR SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT

Given that Africa is a continent that produces and exports raw materials, technological development – be it modern or indigenous (traditional) – can help to increase economic yields and to address nutritional deficiencies and the chronic famine that has plagued the continent. For centuries, local communities have relied on their indigenous knowledge and expertise to cope with the challenges posed by harsh environments, extended droughts, flash floods, epidemic pests and infertile soils.²⁵ The fact that the Green Revolution bypassed Africa is attributed to poor R&D and S&T-related activities and policies, and other inherent impediments in Africa. Various scientists argue that improving indigenous knowledge through ICT will have a significant impact on poverty alleviation. ‘Indigenous knowledge’ is defined as local knowledge that is unique to a culture or society. It is also defined as folk knowledge, people’s knowledge, traditional wisdom or traditional science. This knowledge is passed on from generation to generation, usually by word of mouth and through cultural rituals, and has been the basis for agriculture, food preparation, health care, education, conservation and a wide range of other activities that have sustained societies and their environments in many parts of the world for many centuries.²⁶

The application of indigenous knowledge would accelerate the stages in Rostow’s modernisation theory from take-off to maturity. However, it is critical to note that establishing knowledge production through effective ICT policies is the first essential step towards take-off. Indigenous knowledge cannot be incorporated into ICT without regulatory mechanisms in place. This discussion on indigenous knowledge will focus on how ICT can be used to promote good governance from a medical perspective, and on strategies for addressing obstacles to the development of indigenous knowledge.

The challenges involved in the implementation of indigenous knowledge are two-pronged: there are historical factors emanating from colonisation and there is also exploitation through international legislation. These challenges have obstructed the successful in-

tegration of indigenous knowledge in Africa with ICT. During the decades of colonisation, indigenous knowledge in Africa remained clouded and obscured in a Western-schooled society, which often regarded such knowledge as backward and barbaric. People were forced to change their traditions for Western models, so that indigenous knowledge took a back seat. Traditional medical practitioners were even perceived as witches, while indigenous people became dependent on the dominant knowledge system of the West.

However, despite these challenges, Africans continue to subscribe to indigenous practices. More than 80 per cent of the population of Africa continuously rely on medicinal plants for health care.²⁷ In essence, for a significant number of the rural population in developing countries, medicinal plants are a precious resource. This continued dependence on traditional medicines is due to meagre revenue and the lack of modern health infrastructure, making traditional customs and medicinal plants a major asset. More significantly, the practice of consulting is now done transparently, with both the rich and the poor subscribing to the practice of traditional medicine, and at times combining it with Western medicine.

The colonisation period was followed by the decolonisation era, which was premised on donor dependency. Donor dependency promoted a top-down approach, whereby aid programmes played a major role in the adoption of the health development models that were implemented in African countries. For the most part, donors concentrated their money on a single intervention, for example immunisation. Weeks maintains that this top-down and fragmented approach used vertical systems and gave highly selective assistance.²⁸ Furthermore, although short-term and measurable results were achieved, they were not sustainable, for there was no community involvement, as there had been in the success stories of China. Given that the programmes were donor-driven, quick and visible results were the desired objectives,²⁹ making the incorporation of indigenous knowledge unlikely.

The need of many African countries to find an affordable cure for HIV/Aids has created a lot of controversy, in that it has attracted a global market for indigenous knowledge. Scientists and the pharmaceutical industry are now grudgingly more open about the fact that indigenous knowledge is an immeasurable resource for the industry. It is estimated that 25 per cent of the medications produced and marketed throughout the world are derived from plants. The issue is whether or not African countries will start consulting with local researchers and provide them with a platform to export indigenous knowledge to the medical industry.

Given the competitive nature of the medical and pharmaceutical industries, the AU will have to reassess its stand regarding the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). TRIPS imposes minimum standards in seven areas of intellectual property, including patents, computer programming, pharmaceuticals and transgenic crops.³⁰ Gupta argues that one challenge that has been under-appreciated in studies of

indigenous knowledge is the overlap between the community and private domains of knowledge.³¹ This challenge is reflected in TRIPS's operational mechanisms.

TRIPS ignores the profound differences in economic and technological capabilities between the Northern and Southern hemispheres, and is considered an instrument of 'technological protectionism', as its policies maintain that the North keeps generating knowledge in medical health and other areas, while the South remains a market for the resulting products and services.³² Patents are an example of this dominance: 97 per cent of all patents worldwide are concentrated in a handful of countries; no more than 20 countries account for 84 per cent of global R&D; and more than 80 per cent of all patents that have been granted in the South belong to residents of industrial countries.³³ These statistics spell out the need for the AU to lobby for home-based medical research through ICT. Failure to address these imbalances and the continued export of indigenous knowledge will continue to affect the growth of human security and good governance.

The use of ICT is critical in advancing the practice of indigenous knowledge and alleviating one of the key contributors to poverty on the continent, namely a lack of adequate health facilities. Revolutionary changes in indigenous productivity are a necessary condition, for the successful take-off of modernisation of a society radically increases its bill for agricultural products. If these changes take place, in a decade or two, both the basic structure of the economy and the social and political structure of the society are transformed in such a way that a steady rate of growth can be regularly sustained thereafter.³⁴

Indigenous knowledge and modern science can complement one another in many ways. A strategic partnership must be forged between the two. Just as scientific systems accommodate the use of local knowledge in refining scientific principles, so local knowledge systems can also use scientific principles to achieve similar goals.³⁵

Dipping into our indigenous knowledge with the help of modern science and technology could lead to many discoveries and innovative activities for the betterment of humanity. Asia provides several case studies demonstrating the significance of indigenous knowledge in promoting medical best practices. For example, China's contribution to public health through its indigenous practices consists of the 'barefoot doctor' model, which is based on community-led health initiatives and the integration of traditional Chinese health systems into healthcare. This barefoot doctor model has been successful in eradicating diseases such as schistosomiasis.³⁶

The integration of indigenous knowledge with ICT is one of the criteria for the take-off to maturity as, according to Rostow, the commercialisation of agricultural products leads to a growth in productivity due to the demand emanating from expanding urban centres for products such as tablets and injections. Currently, the key challenges in the global community for getting indigenous knowledge and ICT to develop simultaneously are the lack of policies by African governments designed to protect themselves, the lack of

international agreements such as TRIPS, and the lack of research to find solutions to stop preventable diseases from flourishing.

African countries should implement policies that protect and regulate their indigenous knowledge and related practices, which are currently faced with threats. such as the loss of vital information through a lack of documentation and the piracy orchestrated by some foreign researchers. Other developing regions have already started implementing measures to protect their own indigenous knowledge. For example, in 2001, shamans from 20 indigenous groups in Brazil gathered to denounce bio-piracy and demand equal status for indigenous knowledge. The Brazilian government estimates that 97 per cent of the 4 000 patents on natural products registered in the country between 1995 and 2000 were taken out by foreigners.³⁷ The formulation of protective policies would avert the loss of local knowledge and traditional practices due to the adoption of Western values, which erode traditional practices.

Chinese scientists and African-based scientists should also work much more closely, if not directly, with local communities, in order that the communities' concerns and aspirations can help to shape the research. As demonstrated through the aforementioned case studies, Africans could benefit greatly from local knowledge. Even though not all research can be done within local communities, when research is largely laboratory-based, the scientists should keep in close touch with the communities, and be responsive and sensitive to people's concerns.

Knowledge production is the key to facilitating indigenous knowledge. Despite three decades of capacity building, there is limited research on sustainable health of the poor. Moreover, the substance of country-focused research and learning initiatives should be influenced by national priority-setting processes, covering a wide range of interests, such as defeating the scourge of HIV/Aids. Success will be measured by the ability of African countries to apply global and indigenous knowledge to local problems. In turn, country-specific health research would contribute to global knowledge through innovation, adaptation and, occasionally, new discoveries.³⁸ The AU has reached a milestone in recognising the importance of indigenous knowledge to the continent's health sector. In line with this declaration, a number of traditional healers' associations were formed in various African countries. However, besides applying ICT to technological matters, AU member states still need to become more assertive and rigorous in promoting indigenous knowledge and scientific development.

CONCLUSION: THE CONTEXT OF THE FUTURE

The arrival of the information age makes it necessary for the African continent to rethink its development priorities and strategies, because information technology (IT) is the core of the current process of economic globalisation. If you are not on the bandwagon of ICTs, count yourself out of the evolving twenty-first century and even beyond. Without the institutionalisation of a democratic governance system and good leadership, and without quality management and service delivery facilitated by science and technology, Africa will remain in the doldrums of under-development, exploitation, marginalisation and poverty. Since everything cannot be achieved at once, it is imperative that a start be made as soon as possible since, as the Chinese say, 'The journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step'.

The first step within the context of the AU will be to cultivate, institutionalise and actively practise a democratic governance system that enshrines the virtues of the rule of law, accountability, transparency, openness and quality management. A key component of this democratic governance system should be the implementation of national e-strategies and plans for communication infrastructure. AU member states should focus on taking concrete measures, which should include developing sound regulatory frameworks and building human resource capacity.

The second step is a demonstration by AU member states of strong political will to ensure that ICT policies are not only implemented but also utilised to promote much-needed output, such as knowledge production and the documentation and protection of indigenous knowledge. Political will is essential in reversing the backward status the continent as a whole continues to have with regard to R&D. Political will could be demonstrated through measures such as making sure that independent science and scientists are encouraged, not driven to extinction. As technological development continues to accelerate at unimaginable speed, thereby becoming extremely powerful in our daily lives, Africa needs more scientists who can solve its existing problems, export new research models and help create a sustainable region.

Thirdly, the failure of African countries to become world-class producers of knowledge cannot be heaped on past 'ills' such as decolonisation and imperialism. Issues have to be tackled head-on by giving greater impetus and meaning to Nkrumah's slogan, 'Seek ye the political kingdom' and by relating the political kingdom to the 'belly kingdom of all in society'. The political kingdom must be related to development, and development itself needs input from science, technology and innovation.

Finally, collaboration that is strongly supported by South Africa-China collaboration could significantly alter the impact of science and technology development on the continent. There is no denying that since the 1970s and 1980s, scientific collaboration between

regions has become common practice, particularly between the North and the South, which have actually tended to benefit the South. It is on that basis that South-South research initiatives, such as the FOCAC think tank exchange programme, should also be buttressed by South Africa's National Research Foundation, which can in turn provide shared opportunities for capacity building and knowledge production on the continent.

ANNEXURE

National Information and Communications Infrastructure (NICI) strategies

Country	Existence of National Strategy	Implementation
Angola	A plan known as 'Strategy for the Development of Information Technology 2000–2010' has been formulated.	The government of Angola created a National Commission for Information Technology by Decree No. 6/2002 of 4 April 2002.
Benin	The Communication and Information Infrastructure Development Plan of Benin: 2000–2004 was approved in 2000. In August 2002, the Ministry of Communications and Promotion of New Technologies published the National Information Policy and Strategy document: 'Benin 2025: <i>une société de l'information solidaire, épanouie et ouverte</i> '. The document envisions an open and interdependent information society in Benin by 2025.	A new ministry, the Ministry of Communications and Promotion of New Technologies, has been established to co-ordinate ICT activities in the country.
Botswana	The Science and Technology Policy for Botswana was initially approved by the Parliament of Botswana in 1998. Botswana undertook a review of their existing STI policy during 2011.	A new Research, Science, Technology and Innovation Policy has been approved by Cabinet and is scheduled to be presented to Parliament in the current Parliamentary session (Q1 2013).

Burkina Faso	The Information and Communication Infrastructure Development Plan of Burkina Faso: 2000–2004 was approved in October 2000.	Implementation has started. Several sectoral implementation strategies are being developed. Inter-ministerial committees were created for follow-up.
Burundi	The Department of Scientific Research, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research compiled an Inventory of the Scientific and Electronic Potential in Burundi in 2009.	The National Policy for the Development of New Information and Communication Technologies was ratified by the Government of Burundi in February 2007 and it is effective from 2007 to date.
Cape Verde	The NICI plan development process was finalised in October 2000.	A National Information and Communication Technologies Infrastructure Development Plan was the product of the process.
Cameroon	The National Policy for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies for Cameroon was published by the National Agency for Information and Communication Technologies in September 2007.	The government has announced the creation of a High Authority in charge of ICT issues in Cameroon.
Central African Republic	The process of elaboration of the National Strategy was started in January 2002. A baseline study was undertaken in June/July 2002.	Due to political instability, the process is currently stalled.
Cote d'Ivoire	The NICI Plan was approved by the Council of Ministers in July 2000.	A Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies was created to implement the NICI Plan. Priority projects were identified for implementation; however, due to political instability, the process has stalled.

Djibouti	The Djibouti National ICT Strategy and its accompanying Action Plan were adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Government of Djibouti in April 2003.	More than 30 projects have been detailed in the Action Plan for implementation.
Rwanda	The ICT 2020 Policy was enacted by the Government of Rwanda in February 2000.	The first NICI Plan (2001–2005) focused on supporting the development of an economic base and environment for accelerated growth and development towards transforming Rwanda into an information-rich knowledge-based society and economy. The current NICI Plan (2006 - 2010) is focused on strengthening the economic base and improving the economic environment to accelerate development and growth towards achieving an information-rich knowledge-based society.
Ethiopia	The Draft National ICT Policy document has been adopted by the Council of Ministers.	The government has already embarked on a number of IT projects focusing on public administration, revitalising education and enhancing the infrastructure.
Gambia	A draft National Policy on Information and Communication was prepared in 1999. A committee was set up in 2003 to continue the policy-development process.	The telecoms sector has grown considerably. An e-government strategy is being developed.
Ghana	The NICI development process was revived in 2002 and is still underway. The policy document was submitted to the government in July 2003.	The government has been putting in place mid-term and long-term strategies for ICT development.

Guinea	A NICI plan – Plan développement l'infrastructure nationale d'information et de communication de la République de Guinée 2001–2004 – was finalised in 2001 and officially published in March 2002.	A national commission, comprising five members from the Finance, Planning and Communication ministries, has been co-ordinating the NICI activity.
Kenya	The National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy and Strategy was published by the Ministry of Science and Technology in March 2008.	Implementation is underway.
Lesotho	The Ministry of Communications, Science and Technology published the ICT Policy for Lesotho in March 2005.	The Lesotho Science and Technology Policy 2006–2011 was prepared and published by UNESCO.
Malawi	The process of developing a National Strategy started in 2002.	The policy document was submitted to the government in July 2003.
Mauritius	The Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunications published the National ICT Policy for Mauritius for the period 2011–2014.	The National ICT Strategic Plan launched a number of projects on policy information, ICT awareness, human resources development, government computerisation and standard setting. It has also provided an appropriate legal environment for electronic transactions, electronic contracts, and standards to combat forgery and fraud in electronic business.
Morocco	In 1999 the government formulated a National IT Policy: 1999–2003 for implementation.	Several implementation strategies, programmes and projects have been put in place.

Mozambique	A National Strategy was developed and adopted in July 2002.	The eGovernment Interoperability Framework for Mozambique was published by UTICT in October 2010.
Namibia	The Information and Communication Technology Policy for the Republic of Namibia was adopted in June 2003.	The Ministry of ICT published the Information Technology Policy for the Republic of Namibia in September 2008.
Nigeria	The Nigerian Information and Communication Technology Agency (NICTA) formulated a Nigerian National Policy for Information Technology (IT) after consultation with stakeholders in 2000.	NICTA has been undertaking a series of activities within the framework of sensitisation and training of high-level decision-makers, including Permanent Secretaries and Directors-General of government departments.
Rwanda	The Cabinet and the Parliament adopted the NICI plan in 2002.	The Cabinet officially launched the NICI plan, NICI 2005, in January 2002. A proposed implementation structure has been created. It consists of the NICI Working Group and the Rwandan Information Technology Authority (RITA). Implementation of the NICI plan has started.
Senegal	A National ICT Plan was adopted in 2000.	The government has put in place, under the Office of the President, the regulatory and administrative tools necessary for the promotion of competition.
Seychelles	A National Strategy has been put in place.	Implementation has started in many sectors linked to trade and capacity building.

South Africa	The South Africa IT Strategy project (SAITIS) was developed by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Communication, in consultation with the private sector and other stakeholders.	The ICT R&D Strategy for South Africa was finalised in 2007. The Department of Science and Technology published the Ten-Year Innovation Plan in 2007.
Swaziland	The first national workshop on ICT policy, organised by the UNDP, UNESCO, ECA and the Swaziland National Association of Journalists (SNAJ), took place in November 2000.	Implementation is underway.
Tanzania	Cabinet approved the first Tanzanian National ICT Policy in March 2003.	Tanzania is currently revising the 2003 ICT policy through the TANZICT project to ensure it is properly aligned with current national priorities focused on supporting poverty alleviation.
Tunisia	There has been a National ICT Policy and Implementation Strategy since 1997.	Implementation has started and the regulatory and institutional tools have been put in place to promote ICT for development.
Uganda	The National Information and Communication Technology Policy had been prepared by July 2002. It was subsequently approved by Cabinet and published in October 2003.	The National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy was prepared by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development in May 2007 and approved by Cabinet in September 2009.
Zambia	Consultations to develop a national policy started in 2001.	The new government has started re-engineering the NICI development process.

Source: IST Africa

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Chapter 7

China and Africa: The Chinese and the African Dream

Shu Zhan

INTRODUCTION

In June 2013, during a public debate on South-South co-operation in Kigali, one Rwandan undergraduate came to me with a question. Although BRICS had had its summit in Africa for the first time a few months before, China was still the thumb, so how could Africans benefit from the group? My answer was, you cannot only use your thumb for most work – you need to use your whole hand. The BRICS partners should unite like a hand.

We are now in a fast-evolving multilateral world in which some developing countries are emerging as economic powers and others are working to attain their potential. During this century, a burst of convergence occurred, as developing countries grew faster than developed countries and emerging economies became the new growth poles.

RISE OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH AND CHINA

China itself is still at the stage of new industrialisation, therefore its economic co-operation with developing nations from Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America still has room to grow substantially. The emerging economies have chosen to accept and integrate into the existing world system, the rational choice for them being to work within the system toward the top.

Professor Justin Yifu Lin, former Chief Economist and Vice President of the World Bank, on his return to Beijing University wrote that, ‘All developing countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa, can grow at eight per cent or more continuously for several decades in an increasingly globalised world, significantly reduce poverty, and become middle- or even high-income countries in the span of one or two generations, provided that their governments have the right policy framework to facilitate the private sector’s development along the line of its comparative advantage, and tap into the latecomer advantage’.¹

There is a major structural transformation going on globally: rising real wages and cur-

rent appreciation in China will result in at least significant parts of its manufacturing base moving elsewhere. A substantial part of it could move to Africa. If that were to happen, it would provide a significant boost to growth and employment. It would reverse the pattern of de-industrialisation that began with the structural adjustment programmes foisted on Africa in earlier decades. And it would enhance the chances of creating the kind of learning society and economy that are often associated with the transition from agriculture to manufacturing.²

As China moves into more sophisticated product markets, it will clear market space for other developing countries to enter the more labour-intensive industries at home. China has an estimated 85 million workers in manufacturing, most of them in labour-intensive sectors. Their reallocation to more sophisticated products and tasks with a higher value-add will open great opportunities for other developing countries to break in and go up the global value-added chain and attract investment into the production of the labour-intensive manufactured goods that China leaves behind.

In Professor Lin's view, Africa is the obvious choice. 'Africa has about one billion people and a very young labour force. It is just like China in the 1980s. There is substantial room in Africa to accommodate China's labour-intensive manufacturing.'³ These benefits are already there, and more are emerging. China's phenomenal growth offers opportunities to boost development in African countries. Sino-Africa trade increased from \$10 billion in 2000 to almost US\$200 billion in 2012. The proportion of China-Africa trade volume as part of Africa's total foreign trade volume increased from 3,82 per cent to 16,13 per cent; and the proportion contributed by Africa's exports to China is up from 3,76 per cent to 18,07 per cent.⁴

China also has a growing role in financing development in Africa, which is the region facing the greatest constraints in terms of access to finance. China's accumulative direct investment in Africa jumped from less than \$0.5 billion in 2003 to more than \$21 billion - with at least 70 per cent in manufacturing, construction, processing and service industries.⁵ In addition, the Export-Import Bank of China has funded a wide range of 300 development projects in Africa through concessional and other loans.

More important than the trade and financial flows, however, are the opportunities for industrialisation in some African countries, presented by the dynamic nature of the new growth poles. China-Africa co-operation has evolved far beyond its original forms, encompassing financial and monetary co-operation, the sharing of knowledge and experience, and technology transfer, as we have seen the establishment of stronger institutional mechanisms for promoting partnerships and peer learning throughout the Global South.

Africa and China have long played a pivotal role in pioneering and promoting South-South co-operation. Therefore, we find ourselves with fine hosts and on fertile ground to carry on dialogues among Global South partners, as we still see China-Africa co-operation

within the framework of South-South co-operation. This co-operation is not a one-way flow. Developing countries, as a group, now have a broad range of modern technical competencies, with centres of excellence across these countries.

All countries, big or small, have something to offer. Many developing countries, for example, are now transferring technology and solutions to emerging economies. Trade, investment and development co-operation that benefits all partners has stood the test of time, and boosted the scale and depth of South-South co-operation. Closer co-operation, in turn, has fostered strategic collaboration in global affairs. The level and nature of China's co-operation and investment in Africa have rapidly expanded in the last 15 years. However, China's recent involvement in Africa is preceded by a long history and experience of diplomatic and technical co-operation linkages from the 1950s, when South-South co-operation was still the subject of deliberations.

Nowadays, South-South exchanges continue to increase, heralding significant transformation in international relations and global governance. The rise of the Global South, both regionally and globally, has important implications for international negotiations and multilateral agenda setting, and has led to more South-South engagements over a wider spectrum, from technical exchanges to economic integration and, increasingly, political integration and conflict resolution. Countries such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa have not only emerged as the leading drivers of global economic growth and recovery, but have also improved the economic fortunes of other developing countries, owing, in part, to the rising demand from emerging economies for goods and services, which accounts for the current surge in South-South trade and investment.

There are high expectations that South-South co-operation could bring many benefits. Adapting policies from one context to another, however, calls for much experience, planning, knowledge of the foreign context, and dialogue based on mutual expectations. High-level politicians may have the vision of ensuring that all countries are better placed in the global arena, but line departments or institutions and some industries still lag behind.

For developing countries everywhere, the ability to benefit from the opportunities provided by China and other emerging countries depends on quickly formulating and implementing credible economic development strategies consistent with their comparative advantage. Both African countries and China need to strengthen their domestic policies and harmonise their regional policies to improve their bargaining position and the benefits to both sides, to ensure that Africa-China relations contribute to common development and poverty reduction. Systematic capacity development takes time. The existing institutional arrangements in the Global South are inadequate to sustain effective and timely co-operation with new partners.

To benefit from co-operation is a two-way process. This means learning not only from

emerging economies but also from other developing ones. Such an approach opens new possibilities for learning, beyond intraregional experiences. There is now more exchange than ever before between Africa and Asia, and between Asia and Latin America. This process of learning about other countries in the Global South is crucial.

The subject of co-operation in the Global South will have to develop its own body of knowledge, including the design, implementation and evaluation of co-operation programmes. Scholars from the South need to set their own research priorities, and accelerate programme implementation.

For example, China is very much Chinese, just as South Africa is very South African and Rwanda very Rwandan. While each country should celebrate its own culture and national identity, there is a fundamental need to relate to the experiences of others; not only to transmit one's own experience, but also to learn.

SOUTH-SOUTH CO-OPERATION

South-South co-operation has an established record of accomplishment as a valuable complement to traditional development strategies. The past 50 years, especially the last decade, have witnessed the resurgence of South-South co-operation. New contours are emerging. The approach and platform for South-South co-operation have diversified increasingly. Guided by common principles, we as development partners embrace a wide range of approaches, reflecting our different development paths, priorities and unique strengths. This resurgence of South-South co-operation coincides with the global economic recession, and the world's focus on Africa as the last frontier for development and investment in infrastructure, industries and agriculture.

The global financial crisis of 2008 had a severe impact on Africa, albeit with Africa's trade and investment with Asia cushioning the immediate impact of the US recession and the Euro-zone crisis. This partnership helped Africa fight its way upstream against the current, with six of the world's ten fastest-growing economies emerging in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade. It also opened up African economies to rapid investment, due to their industrial and agro-industrial potential. China believes that South-South co-operation should be based on non-interference, with no preconditions being attached to aid, and with a strong commitment to social inclusion and the eradication of poverty.

Mutual respect is a basic principle for this new mould. We live in a world of rich diversity. Africa and China may differ in their social systems, histories and cultures, yet intertwined interests and a shared destiny connect them, making mutual respect all the more important. Only by respecting each other's development path, chosen by their people, as well as each other's core interests and concerns, can they unite in their diversity, expand

common ground and shelve differences so that they can achieve common development.

In recent years, international and interregional groups have been mushrooming. Groups tend to form various orientations, most notably against another State or another international or regional grouping. International organisations among developing countries tend to focus on internal co-ordination, however, aiming at joint efforts for the common development of members within the group, rather than rivalry with outside countries or groups. The ideal grouping is an open house, or open-ended regional co-operation.

China has always emphasised multilateralism in international engagement, promoting economic integration or integration between members, while not excluding other countries outside the region or grouping and carefully avoiding any antagonism. Rather than forming closed groups of their own, BRICS or other Global South groups should engage and co-operate with other groupings at regional and world level, to adapt and reform any existing inappropriate practices.

Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, once said, 'We have come here, not as petitioners, but as partners in an equitable, just and fair management of the global community of nations, which we accept as reality in the globalised world'.⁶ The BRICS countries prefer to keep their options open, seeking parallel forums of activity to balance their involvement with the existing establishment. Regional groupings, country-continent forums (such as China-Africa and India-Africa forums), as well as bilateral institutions, are evolving. More important, they are yielding concrete results in terms of co-operation and development.

There is a renewed consensus for South-South co-operation to harness emerging opportunities to meet the internationally agreed development goals. Many developing countries in Africa, Asia-Pacific, and Latin America try to establish their own political, economic and social institutions, based on relevant cultural, social and economic characteristics of their own. Most of them put the needs of their own people first. Those have relatively succeeded, first of all, by not copying the Euro-American model of development.

The Global South seeks a greater voice in global governance and agenda setting. The formation of various global groupings and alliances of developing countries, like BRICS and other organisations, shows a desire to foster cohesion and joint action among South-South co-operation partners, both to engage in global processes and to address common challenges.

Different as BRICS members may be, they are steadfast in advancing the partnership, which is even more valuable against the background of a sluggish global economy. We are facing the same or even greater pressures compared to others, with GDP growth rates approaching historic lows. Nevertheless, BRICS and some other developing countries remain the most dynamic and fastest-growing economies. The 'big five' have come out racing. This partnership derives from their shared quest for economic and social development and for access to new markets. Co-operation serves not only the mutual interests of BRICS

members, but also the global economy at large, as these countries, put together, now account for 19 per cent of world GDP and 61 per cent of overall global growth.

BRICS is committed to a more democratic and equitable international system, rather than challenging or reconstructing the one we now have. As in an orchestra, BRICS is the new player joining the performance, adding its own elements for a richer symphony, not to play another tune.

BRICS puts common development high on the agenda. Co-operation between its members and other developing countries has been flourishing in recent years and now covers a wide range of fields, including agriculture, industry, trade, banking, taxation, customs, public health, science and technology, and culture.

Yet, South-South co-operation is still far from realising its full potential. Partners in Global South co-operation call for tailor-made support and long-term impact. The role of BRICS members in global governance has not yet matched their weight and achievements in the world economy. Their capability also lags behind in international agenda setting, rule making and decision-making. BRICS members do not see eye to eye on every issue. Divergences do sometimes occur on certain political and trade issues. While BRICS is making a difference in various areas, we need more patience. As the Chinese saying goes, good things take time.

BRICS and other South-South groupings cannot save the world, but they still have a vital role to play. Hopefully, it will lead to rising rise of the South in countries in Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America. While the emphasis in South-South co-operation has been on structural transformation and dynamic growth through industrialisation, it is also important to emphasise technological innovation and structural change within agriculture and related sectors.

In developing countries, where most people depend on agriculture for their living, improving agricultural productivity is important for combating poverty, food security and generating economic surplus for industrialisation and other non-farm sectors. Agricultural transformation and industrialisation are interrelated and mutually enhancing, and could therefore proceed simultaneously. Without transforming smallholder subsistence agriculture, reasonably quick industrialisation is difficult to foresee. South-South co-operation is central to supporting agriculture, linked into agribusiness value-add chains, structural transformation in technology, product mix and improved infrastructure for agricultural production and commercialisation.

China has established 20 agricultural extension centres in Africa, sharing appropriate practices and technological innovation with local farmers. It provides agricultural assistance that combines infrastructural development, such as dam construction, with technical training, input provisioning and storage facilities, and facilitating linkages between agricultural ministries and communities.

The author, while working in Rwanda, often went to Butare to visit the nearby National Agricultural Academy, where the Rwanda-China Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre is located. Extension workers from the Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University of China worked together with Rwandan colleagues, sharing over a period of two years their skills in planting rice with more than one thousand farmers, some of whom were local, while others came from afar. They discovered a kind of 'elephant grass' for growing mushrooms and for erosion control. The hay harvested was not only enough for hundreds of local farmers to feed their cattle, but could also generate biogas. They also transferred a new technique for using smashed grass for the generation of clean power. Ten girls who had graduated from the National University of Rwanda came to the Centre to learn how to grow mushrooms. At the time the author left, their Co-operative was selling produce to five-star hotels and supermarkets in Kigali. They were fortunate enough to have been able to start their own businesses and earn an income for their families. What is more, South Africa's High Commission in Rwanda had several discussions with the author's Embassy on how to achieve co-operation between South Africa, Rwanda and China, with regard to Rwandan agriculture. While some countries only pay lip service to tripartite co-operation, the South countries 'walk the talk'.

SIMILAR DREAMS

Due to different historical legacies and growth trajectories, developing nations understand each other better than developed nations. They share comparable dreams for improving people's livelihoods and effecting a national renaissance. It is these emerging and developing nations that today drive global growth prospects. The African and Chinese economies are interdependent and could foster a complementary win-win relationship. It is vital, however, to share a common vision. As we look to the future, we see a new Global South that is ready to take its rightful place in the comity of nations. China has longer time horizons. It seeks to invest in the long term and build lasting relationships. The current leadership work hard to promote co-operation with emerging nations and developing nations. It is hardly a coincidence that Chinese leaders visited those countries on their first few foreign trips.

During his first trip abroad, President Xi Jinping spoke in Tanzania, calling for China and Africa to work together to achieve their respective dreams. He said that the people of China were committed to realising the dream of a revival of the Chinese nation, working towards the country's prosperity and people's happiness; while the African people were striving to prop up the African Dream, which entailed, among other things, 'unity and achieving development through rejuvenation'. In the same speech, Xi also mentioned a

‘dream of a world [that could bring] enduring peace and common prosperity’.

At the beginning of this new century, in order to announce their renewed determination for Africa’s renaissance, African leaders adopted the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as a blueprint for Africa’s development. Africa is setting out on a unique growth path that reflects the continent’s historical and economic circumstances. By deepening regional integration and broadening international engagement, the continent will gradually emerge as a serious player on the global economic scene.

NEPAD spelt out an African-designed programme for the development of Africa, which was designed to be implemented through an African partnership, especially represented in and through the Regional Economic Communities. Its primary objectives are to: eradicate poverty; place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development; halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process; and enhance its full and beneficial integration into the global economy.

The birth of the African Union a decade ago (in 2002) promised that all Africans would at last realise their long-held dream of all-round emancipation. Africans look forward to working together to build a better future for the people of Africa, based on the realisation of genuine independence and sustainable development. They are committed to achieving the strategic objectives of unity and solidarity, democracy, peace and stability throughout Africa, and sustained economic development which would benefit the ordinary people of the Continent, focusing on the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment. With African dignity, they strive to position Africa and Africans as equals in the global community of nations.

In recent years, more and more African countries have been calling for ownership of their own development through home-grown solutions and self-reliance, opening up space for policy experimentation and learning based on African (rather than foreign) conditions. African nations need their own growth models. As China and Africa have always been a community with a common destiny and strategic interests, China’s dream of national rejuvenation could be complementary to Africa’s dream of self-reliance and development. Their shared values of dignity, liberty and commitment to the happiness of their people hold the potential for them to make a dream team. The fulfilment of China’s dream will open up numerous economic opportunities for African countries.

China is willing to share development opportunities with other countries, so as to facilitate their efforts to realise their dreams. China hopes to see win-win co-operation and common development with the rest of the world. While working to realise China’s dream, the people of China are desirous of realising the world dream through concerted effort with people around the world. China’s approach to Africa has been to experiment with the approach China has taken to modernise and liberalise its own rural economy. Agricultural reform played a central role in China’s own economic reforms and industrialisation. It has

been a consistent priority in China's engagement in Africa to share these experiences with African peoples.

China-Africa co-operation in agriculture has focused on technology transfer and capacity building in order: to improve agriculture production; to strengthen Africa's food security; to develop the related infrastructure and agro-processing industry; and to enhance value-add chains. It hopes to facilitate industrialisation through transformed agriculture and rural development in Africa.

CONCLUSION: A DREAM TEAM

China and African countries have much to gain from co-operating to foster mutual support for development. In the past, China-Africa consultations focused on fostering mutually beneficial trade and investment. More recently, this relationship has expanded to address contemporary development challenges, such as climate change and a lack of food and energy security. Recently, a significant number of African players have played an important role in Chinese football and basketball teams. This exemplifies the mutual benefits to be gained from 'team play'.

China is also going through a 'development co-operation' learning curve with regard to its various instruments of aid in the form of preferential trade access, soft loans and investment. The evolution of China's assistance will not mean simply copying the aid modalities of traditional development partners, however; it is also important for Africa to engage China in its consideration of development co-operation policies, to ensure that China's aid is effective and complementary to aid from traditional donors, rather than competing with it.

China's burgeoning trade with and investment in Africa provide impetus to local economic development, yet it may not benefit all sectors and all people equally. The benefits may not always be fairly distributed among different social groups, for instance, with some people getting more and others less. There is a Chinese saying on governance that goes, 'what is taken from the people is to be used for the people'. China's participation in African development should allow the majority of local people to share in the public good.

To promote industrialisation effectively requires African nations to integrate Chinese investment, as well as other foreign investment, in the national production chain through upstream and downstream linkages. Strong domestic policy frameworks, including strong governance, a competitive economic environment, and the availability of skilled workers, are essential to encourage such linkages and enable African economies to move up the value-add chain.

The group of emerging economies and middle-income countries has expanded. Build-

ing on decades-old South-South co-operation, the contributions of these countries are not only complementing conventional aid by DAC donors and multilateral institutions; the good news is that emerging economies' co-operation also tends to enrich global development by triggering horizontal partnerships in both discourse and practice, rooted in trust, equity and mutual benefit. For example, knowledge exchange, one of the signature features of emerging economies' role in development co-operation, reflects this new horizontality in a very concrete manner. Here, practice-proven expertise and successful solutions are shared, rather than being sold to governments and institutions with scarce resources.

China does not exclude the possibility of tri-partite co-operation in Africa, or even co-operation by more than three formations, but insists on endorsement from the African side. African countries can also initiate such co-operation. For instance, South African companies and state-owned enterprises are already promoting investment on the Continent. As H.E. President Jacob Zuma said at a BRICS Business Council meeting, over the last few years, the South African Reserve Bank approved nearly 1 000 large investments in 36 African countries.⁷ China and South Africa could try tripartite co-operation with other African countries, as in the case of the agricultural extension work in Rwanda mentioned above.

This applies to other fields as well. Professor Deborah Brautigam wrote in her blog, 'Although a lot of people comment that the Chinese are 'everywhere' in the retail sectors in Africa, I see a lot of small-scale Chinese activity and a lot of large-scale South African activity. Look at Arcades, Manda Hill, or another of the new malls cropping up in Lusaka, Zambia, for example.'⁸ Prominent Kenyan and Ugandan supermarket chains are also expanding into Rwanda.

Expectations of BRICS are high, especially in view of the financial and economic crisis melting down aid commitment from the industrialised world. Vividly reflected in their recent Summit in Durban (South Africa), BRICS members are well aware of the opportunities for taking on a strong role as development actors and partners, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.

Joint preparations for a new Development Bank, initially focusing on infrastructure, send a strong message for reform towards existing international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. However, the idea of a BRICS Bank also constitutes an inspiration for further collective effort to institutionalise a multilateral world, where resources, ideas and solutions might come from virtually anywhere, and therefore should be anchored in the new poles of growth.

At the same time, BRICS countries and other regional powers are investing heavily in their institutional and operational capacity to engage in development co-operation in a systematised and sustainable manner. In a qualitative leap, dozens of developing countries are currently setting up or strengthening agencies and departments for international

co-operation. Over the past years, new agencies have been emerging in India, Russia and South Africa to provide development co-operation in a continuous and efficient way.

President Jacob Zuma, speaking at the United Nations General Assembly, stated that 'For Africa in particular, the future development agenda (beyond 2015) should address poverty eradication, income inequality and job creation... the new development agenda can only be effective if it is focused on all three dimensions of sustainable development. These dimensions are the eradication of poverty through economic development, social development and environmental sustainability.'⁹

While economic co-operation is important, it also demands teamwork in political and other fields. For example, the UN Security Council remains 'undemocratic, unrepresentative and unfair to developing nations and small states'. Developing nations from Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America need to work together for a more democratic and representative United Nations.

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Engagement with Style: What China's Peacekeeping in Africa says about China's Engagement with Africa

Meicen Sun

INTRODUCTION

There has been much renewed interest in China's engagement with the African continent in recent years. This interest is primarily focused on China's economic engagement with Africa in the form of trade and direct investment. Meanwhile, on a seemingly separate front, China seems to have been taking a keener interest in participating in UN peace operations, especially since 2003/2004, when it started deploying large numbers of police and armed forces to partake in these peace operations.¹ Just recently, China sent its first active combat troop deployment of 400 servicemen to assist with the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA),² which marked yet another major step in China's deepening engagement with maintaining peace and stability in the region. It is notable that more than half of the recent missions for which China has deployed police and/or forces were located in Africa, which has prompted some to speculate about a possible link between China's economic interests in the region and its peacekeeping efforts.³

In light of such speculations, this chapter attempts to tease out the principal motives behind China's UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa, as well as any potential linkage to its economic interests on the continent. In so doing, it will reaffirm the relative separation of China's decision to participate in UN peacekeeping from that to co-operate with Africa on trade and investment. And because China's participation in UN peacekeeping efforts is not directly influenced by its economic activities in Africa, it can be considered as a separate dimension to its overall engagement. This means that peacekeeping provides a different set of strategic objectives in addition to what is already afforded by trade and investment. Taken together, the current level of the Chinese military presence in Africa (as a result of China's increased participation in UN peacekeeping efforts) can be seen as relatively benign and potentially conducive to closer co-operation from both sides.

This chapter will first give a brief overview of China's peacekeeping involvement in Africa, under the auspices of the UN. It will then examine the relationship between this

peacekeeping effort and China's economic relationship with Africa, to show the relative scarcity of evidence for any linkage between the two. The final part of the chapter will consist of the policy implications for those in the policy community and a few practical recommendations for a more successful Chinese presence in UN peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

UN PEACEKEEPING – A TRADEMARK OF CHINA'S NEW ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA

Before delving into the topic of China's 'new' engagement with Africa, it should first be noted that China's engagement with Africa dates back to the founding era of the People's Republic of China. Not only did China contribute heavily to development in Africa, despite it being a developing country itself at the time, but the two also shared a symbiotic political relationship. China assisted in such major infrastructure projects as the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway, with its 'ten kilometres of tunnels and 300 bridges', at a time when even developed countries like Britain, Canada and Germany declined to take up this colossally costly project.⁴ Examples like this attest to the history of 'struggle, hardship' and 'sacrifice'⁵ that China and Africa share – an invaluable bond that has stood the test of time. Meanwhile, the votes cast by African states played a pivotal role in China's accession to the UN in 1971,⁶ which was seen as both a culmination and an enhancement of the mutual trust between China and Africa. There are therefore many reasons to believe that the current partnership between China and Africa is built on a firmly grounded foundation, and that the trust and ties between the two sides will likely continue to provide for sustained co-operation, on both the economic and the strategic fronts.


That being said, China's engagement with Africa in recent years has certainly shown new characteristics that have opened up promising new windows of opportunity. The other authors of this volume have touched on the many ways in which this new mode of co-operation has manifested itself, such as through renewed efforts in development, trade and education. To supplement their insights, I will focus my analysis on one key feature of China's military presence in Africa, namely its participation in UN peace operations on the continent. To distinguish my analysis from one that concerns China's overall engagement, I will limit my examination of China's participation in UN peacekeeping missions to the deployment of troops and other military personnel, separate from other contributions that China makes to these missions.⁷ Not only will doing so afford more focused attention on the military aspect, but it will also shed light on the aspect of China's involvement that is most characteristic of China's new engagement style.

Experts almost unanimously agree that China's participation in UN peacekeeping mis-

sions has been the most positive aspect of China's security engagement with Africa, where 'nearly everyone' commends China's contribution to UN and African Union peacekeeping efforts.⁸ In his recent address at the China Peacekeeping Military Training Centre, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed both deep gratitude for China's UN peacekeeping efforts, and a desire for 'even stronger' involvement from China in this area.⁹ Given such overwhelming success, it is therefore worthwhile for policymakers to ponder the question of what has made China's involvement with UN peacekeeping in Africa so successful, and that of what improvements can be made in order to further such success.

CHINA'S INVOLVEMENT IN UN PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN AFRICA AND THE UPWARD TRAJECTORY

It is essential, first, to consider China's increased military presence in Africa (through UN peace operations) as part of its increased involvement in UN peacekeeping efforts overall. Since the early 1990s, and especially after the early 2000s, there has been a dramatic increase in China's deployment of military personnel to UN peacekeeping missions. The most recent deployment to the mission in Mali can be seen as a continuation of this upward trend, adding to the total of 20 000 military personnel that China has so far deployed, including 1 645 in nine current UN missions.¹⁰ This new trend is significant, especially given the fact that China had never participated in one UN peacekeeping operation before the 1990s. In fact, it now supplies the largest contingent of UN peacekeeping forces among the Permanent Five in the UN Security Council, and has been the seventh-largest supplier of peacekeeping funding since 2009.¹¹ This strengthened commitment to UN peacekeeping operations is clearly consistent with China's rising power status.¹² In particular, it is in line with its grand strategic objective of being a responsible major power, and with the 'new historic missions' that were outlined in a presidential decree in 2008.¹³ China's strengthened military commitment to UN peacekeeping operations can be seen clearly from the trend in its troop deployment over time, shown in Figure 8.1:

Figure 8.1: China's personnel deployment to UN peacekeeping 1952–2010

Source: Reproduced from Gill & Huang, 2009

Although China remains a moderate contributor to UN peacekeeping in terms of budget and manpower, it has come a long way from its initial level of participation when it first became a member of the UN.¹⁴ In addition, more than half of the UN peacekeeping operations that China has so far participated in are so-called ‘second-generation’ peacekeeping operations,¹⁵ which encompass traditional tasks (such as ceasefire monitoring and inter-positioning), as well as peace-building tasks (such as the monitoring of local governance, human rights violations and elections).¹⁶ Deputy Director-General of the International Co-Operation Department of the Chinese Ministry of Public Security Guo Baoshan opined that China should take on ‘greater responsibilities beyond the usual tasks of enforcing ceasefires’, to include tasks such as ‘law enforcement...civilian rights [protection]...[and] humanitarian relief’.¹⁷

Quite naturally, this tremendous increase in participation on China’s part has prompted some in the West to be concerned about the motive behind China’s move. Partly in response to some of these concerns that have arisen regarding China’s renewed efforts, and partly to examine in greater detail the nature of China’s peacekeeping in Africa, in this chapter I will first attempt to analyse China’s military deployment to UN peacekeeping missions from a cost-benefit perspective. In so doing, I will show that China’s peacekeeping in Africa is relatively separate from its economic calculation, which largely explains its relative success.

With this evaluation, I will then show that consistent with its objective of being a responsible major power that embraces shared values, China also increasingly sees the interpersonal aspect of its engagement with Africa as a key component to a continued robust China-Africa partnership. Because of this, this chapter will conclude with a few policy recommendations, based both on literature and on first-hand accounts, on the areas in which China can make further improvements to its peacekeeping efforts in Africa.

COSTS AND BENEFITS OF UN PEACEKEEPING FROM CHINA'S PERSPECTIVE

ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS – A SKETCH OF CHINA'S UN PEACEKEEPING IN DOLLARS


Generally speaking, the financing of UN peacekeeping operations is the 'collective responsibility' of all Member States, and the costs of these operations are expenses of the UN to be borne by all Member States.¹⁸ Each operation therefore has its own budget and account, which includes both operational costs (such as transportation and logistics) and staff costs (such as salaries). Both are endorsed by the UN General Assembly.¹⁹ Since the UN keeps no military forces, Member States voluntarily provide the military and police personnel required for each peace operation, the expenses for which are then reimbursed by the UN.²⁰ This means that for Member States deploying troops to UN missions, there is virtually no out-of-pocket financial cost besides the annual contribution that the state has already made to the UN peacekeeping operations.

How much, then, has China been contributing to the UN peacekeeping budget? According to UN data, China is currently the sixth-largest contributor to the budget, following the US, Japan, France, Germany and the UK.²¹ China's current rate of financial contribution of about 3.93 per cent²² follows the country's decision to raise its contribution from 3.15 per cent in 2010.²³ This steady increase from the previous level of about 2 per cent²⁴ may have occurred in response to pressure from the international community, and it can be seen as consistent with the sharp increase in troop deployment in the UN. However, since both are considered to be contributions made to UN peacekeeping by China, it would be unreasonable to consider the budget contribution as the 'financial cost' of troop deployment. Moreover, the increase in financial contribution occurred years after the increase in deployment (shown in Figure 8.1), and thus cannot possibly have caused the latter.

On the other hand, the surge in China's GDP in recent decades may have indirectly led to a slightly lower cost for both financial contribution and troop contribution to UN peacekeeping. By comparing the graph in Figure 8.2 with that in Figure 8.1, although we cannot conclude that there is any direct relationship between the increase in GDP and the increase in UN contribution, we may nonetheless speculate that robust economic growth

has helped provide reassurance regarding an increased contribution to UN peacekeeping.

Figure 8.2: China's nominal GDP in RMB billion 1952–2005.




Source: Wikimedia Commons/Intsoken at en.wikipedia

PEACEKEEPING FOR RESOURCES: WHY AN ECONOMIC INTEREST-BASED ARGUMENT HOLDS POORLY


One popular theory has it that China has engaged in UN peacekeeping primarily to protect its newfound economic interests overseas.²⁵ More than half of the UN peacekeeping operations to which China recently dispatched military personnel are located in sub-Saharan Africa,²⁶ which has prompted some to suspect that China's deployment of UN peacekeeping troops is simply a way to support its own economic expansion on the continent.²⁷ China's economic interest in Africa is certainly enormous and growing, as can be seen in Figure 8.3, which shows the country's trade with Africa since the mid-1990s.

Figure 8.3: China's trade with Africa 1995–2010



Source: National Statistics, Heritage Foundation

Implicit in this argument – that China deploys peacekeepers overseas to protect its economic interests – is the assumption that these troops will ostensibly act on behalf of the Chinese government to help enforce policies under the guise of UN peacekeeping. That the histogram on the left in Figure 8.3 seems to correspond approximately to the increase in China's deployment of peacekeeping troops in Figure 8.1 might indeed lead some to succumb to this line of reasoning. However, this explanation is implausible for two reasons. First, UN peacekeeping operations follow a strict code of conduct and so far, all reliable sources have confirmed an excellent track record of Chinese peacekeepers' adherence to the UN code of conduct.²⁸ Second, one must distinguish between China's trade with Africa and China's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. Of the two, FDI would make a much stronger case than trade for having one's troops stationed in the target country for the purpose of providing immediate on-the-ground support for investment in the same country. The histogram in Figure 8.4 shows China's FDI in Africa from 2003 to 2009.

Figure 8.4: China's FDI in Africa 2003–2009

Source: UNCTAD, based on the Ministry of Commerce of China

As can be seen from the histogram, the peak in China's FDI in Africa only occurred around 2007 to 2008, which is about four years *after* China increased its UN troop deployment. The argument that China selectively participates in UN peace operations to protect its economic interests in Africa therefore holds poorly. In fact, economic interest usually does not dictate China's decision to deploy troops to UN peacekeeping operations. According to the International Crisis Group's findings, China's economic and peacekeeping decision-making tracks operate 'separately', and tensions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the military and the economic actors ensure that 'there is no overall strategic approach to peacekeeping'.²⁹ This effectively rules out the possibility that economic consideration is a principal driving force behind China's UN peacekeeping troop deployment so far. Economic costs and benefits are unlikely to have been a major factor.

It can be seen, therefore, that China's decision to participate in the UN peace operations in Africa was not motivated by economic calculation, as some prefer to believe. On the ground, Chinese peacekeepers have garnered highly positive appraisals through a stellar track record of conduct and discipline. Meanwhile, there are also ways in which these peacekeepers can potentially make an even greater contribution to peace and stability in the region.

I now turn to the current state of Chinese peacekeepers in Africa and a few specific recommendations, based on some of the feedback received so far.

CHINA'S UN PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA – A SUCCESS THAT CAN BE FURTHERED

A RECORD OF EXCELLENCE: UN PEACEKEEPING AS 'TRACK-II DIPLOMACY'

China's active participation in peacekeeping in Africa as part of the UN's peacekeeping force has been highly successful by almost any measure, and Chinese 'blue helmets' on the ground have consistently enjoyed an excellent reputation.³⁰ A wide array of independent sources reaffirms the positive reviews that Chinese peacekeepers have received from local populations and those in the international peacekeeping community. According to a recent report on China's current involvement in UN peacekeeping by the International Crisis Group, those that have worked with the Chinese UN peacekeeping police consider them to be 'highly professional, well trained and able to work effectively in difficult operational environments'. In addition to the highly capable and well-disciplined personnel, the Chinese medical teams and equipment are also said to be 'state of the art'. This is particularly impressive given the fact that China, in the area of UN peacekeeping at least, has already outperformed some of the 'traditional troop-contributing countries, particularly in that their motivations are not monetary remuneration', and that none of the Chinese peacekeepers thus far have been the 'subject of any scandals'.³¹

Accounts of this kind precisely elucidate a crucial characteristic of China's engagement with Africa in the new century, which is that of increased influence and soft power. The fact that China's decision to participate in peacekeeping in Africa is not directly motivated by economic or monetary incentives reinforces this point. It can thus be said that China's peacekeeping in Africa has taken a shape of its own: through repeated one-on-one interaction with the target state's local population, and through a consistent record of good conduct, Chinese peacekeepers have forged an invaluable *interpersonal* relationship with the local people, in such a way that it cannot be substituted by Track-I, or official-level exchange of personnel, goods and services. It undoubtedly takes time and effort to build the kind of trust and amity shared by Chinese peacekeepers, local policymakers and the local public, and this is exactly the area in which Chinese peacekeepers have been doing an excellent job.

It is therefore this interpersonal dimension afforded by intensive, on-the-ground peacekeeping activities that has injected a unique and much needed dose of vigour into the current China-Africa partnership through trust-building. Presumably, it has also helped mitigate others' suspicions about China's increased military presence on the Continent. China's participation in UN peacekeeping, especially since 2003/2004, has been successful also because it corresponds to the grand strategic objective that China set forward in 2008, of building a 'peace-loving, responsible international image' by participating in UN

peacekeeping.³² Chinese officials have also made statements that reaffirm these over-arching goals. A senior Chinese foreign policy official, for example, was quoted as saying that 'China's increasing involvement in UN peacekeeping missions reflected China's commitment to contribute [sic] to global security'.³³ To be sure, the numerous opportunities for interpersonal interaction and trust building in UN peacekeeping operations have given China new leverage for strengthening its relationship, not only with African states, but also with African people. At a time when increasingly more communication takes place behind computer screens and transaction counters, this people-to-people dimension is all the more valuable in sustaining a meaningful relationship. A lot of this has to do with what is often called 'Track-II diplomacy', namely non-official diplomacy through informal interaction between people from both sides.

China has, without question, taken ample advantage of its responsibilities as a major UN peacekeeper. There is reason to believe, however, that China can take this even further. Notwithstanding the positive reviews that the Chinese UN peacekeepers have received, there is also evidence that, at least in one area, some improvement can be made. I now turn to this important area, which is particularly critical given its relevance to the interpersonal dimension of UN peacekeeping activities.

SELF-SEGREGATION AND 'DIFFERENCE IN STYLE'

In the same report by the International Crisis Group, it is said that those who view Chinese peacekeepers favourably also observe that these hardworking 'blue helmets' tend to 'segregate themselves from other peacekeepers as well as the local population'. Some ascribe this apparent aloofness to a lack of language skills, as one UN official speculates:

They have a very strong work ethic, are professional and very committed. The one area where they are often hampered is language and English in particular. On a day-to-day basis they operate well in missions, but during meetings and planning, they can't contribute much. I imagine they could make useful contributions, were it not for this language barrier.³⁴

This UN official is not alone in his speculation. A friend of mine – an international lawyer based in Johannesburg – also recently told me about what he and his colleagues called a 'difference in style' between his Chinese colleagues and his Western colleagues. He could not quite put a finger on it, though he definitely felt that it was there. It was neither good nor bad, he said, just 'different'.

In many instances, it is a good thing to be 'different'. As mentioned in the previous section, the genuine work ethic and the exceptional expertise (including traditional Chinese medicine) of the Chinese peacekeepers set them apart from other peacekeepers. In other instances, on the other hand, differences like those observed by the commenting UN official may become counterproductive. Given that much of the success in UN peacekeeping is measured by the local public's perception, the interpersonal dimension to UN peacekeeping that we just discussed becomes all the more important, and failure in this area is all the more detrimental. This communication barrier between Chinese expats and the local public is in fact central to peacekeeping which, after all, hinges heavily on building peace through close contact with the local people. A closer examination shows that there are two issues in question: that of the 'self-segregation' of the Chinese peacekeepers; and that of their communication skills. In my opinion, these are two sides of the same coin and, in fact, may be mutually reinforcing in practice: partly because of their weak command of English, some peacekeepers may shy away from extensive interaction with the local people and peacekeepers from other countries. In so doing, they pass up even more opportunities to improve their English, to learn about local culture, and to make friends.

My own experience of working in Togo two summers ago provides a case in point. During my three-month research work with the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) in Lomé, Togo, I became good friends with both Chinese professionals working in Africa and professionals from Europe and the US. Over time, I noticed an interesting difference between the lifestyles of the Chinese expats and those of their Western counterparts: whereas most Western expats were eager to try local food and go on local expeditions, my friends from home were generally much less 'adventurous'. Rather than shopping at local grocery stores, they preferred going to Chinese grocery stores and eating at Chinese restaurants only. Their weekend activities usually consisted of hotpot dinner parties and poker parties at their residences, instead of going to the bars and clubs that most Western expats (and many Asian expats from Korea and the Philippines) frequented. Whenever I became too 'bold' in my eating habits, by sampling the more 'adventurous' kinds of local food, my Chinese friends would offer me warnings and even emergency medication.

In reality, this divergence in lifestyle is, more than anything else, simply a reflection of the cultural difference between the Chinese community and other expats. I say so because, based on my own observations and what I consistently heard from others, the Chinese expat community seemed to be a very unique and distinct group as far as their lifestyle was concerned. The choice between going to a local bar on a Saturday and staying at home was, more often than not, simply a choice between the Castle served at the bar and the Tsingtao stacked at home. The preference for the 'Chinese way of life' is therefore little more than that for one's favourite beer and one's comfort zone.

While we should not see this difference as more than what it is, we should also be aware that, at least in certain ways, this difference in style has resulted in a missed opportunity for Chinese peacekeepers to engage more effectively with the local population. To be sure, it is not about only eating at Chinese restaurants and not going to local bars *per se*. Taken together over time, the lack of personal interaction with the local people may have deprived the Chinese expats of an invaluable opportunity to get to know their African friends and to allow their African friends know them better. In turn, this lack of first-hand knowledge may grow into a lack of interest in further interaction, thus sustaining a self-fulfilling prophecy of Chinese peacekeepers being 'aloof and alone' when, in reality, this is hardly the case.

From a policy perspective, to make improvements in this regard is less about changing one's living habits than about stepping out of one's comfort zone. This is relevant, not just for Chinese peacekeepers in Africa, but also for Chinese expats in general. To this end, I will now proceed to discuss six practical ways in which the Chinese peacekeeping community in Africa could forge stronger bonds with the local population. In coming up with these recommendations I incorporate both observations and analyses made by experts and policy-makers, as well as my own experience as a tri-cultural junior professional in the field.

TOWARD GREATER INTERPERSONAL ENGAGEMENT – SIX PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, the six recommendations that I am going to give fall into two categories. The first category (recommendations one through three) pertains to how Chinese peacekeepers can get to know the local culture better; and the second category (recommendations four through six) pertains to how they can help others get to know them better. Of course, the two categories tend to reinforce each other in practice, so it is better to work with all six recommendations as a coherent set of 'best practices'.

RECOMMENDATION ONE: PARTICIPATE IN CULTURAL/SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITH LOCAL PEOPLE

It certainly takes time for one to get into the groove of the local way of life, but one also should not wait too long to do so. Given the Chinese expats' tendency to stay with their own group, team leaders, such as the person in charge of a particular mission, could create incentives for team members to engage in cultural and social activities that entail

quality interaction with the local population (and expats from other countries) on a regular basis. For example, instead of hosting a hotpot dinner at a Chinese restaurant every weekend, they could organise social events at local theatres, museums and bars, with the aim of having meaningful conversations with Africans from all walks of life. Friendships will lead to more friendships and, over time, there will likely be a visible improvement in the Chinese expats' understanding of the local lifestyle, social structure and current affairs.

RECOMMENDATION TWO: INVIGORATE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING

Given that there are currently intensive English training programmes available for Chinese UN peacekeeping personnel, the point worth emphasizing here is that language is as much about proficiency as it is about confidence. English language teaching in China tends to prioritise grammar over the 'feel' of the language, the ability to master precision over that to communicate effectively in a practical setting. Field-specific English language training modules for professionals like those working in UN missions should pay particular attention to trendy vocabulary most relevant to the work. Equally important, however, is the need to accustom Chinese peacekeepers to simply talking more. As noted by the UN official mentioned earlier, one problem with the Chinese peacekeepers is the fact that they do not contribute very much at UN peacekeeping-related meetings. The ability to speak up on these occasions and the confidence that one has something to contribute will not only mean more opportunity for direct conversation between Chinese peacekeepers and Africans, but also for building a positive image of Chinese peacekeepers as friendly, cosmopolitan ambassadors.

RECOMMENDATION THREE: WORK IN PARALLEL WITH OTHER PEACEKEEPERS

An important source of knowledge about the local culture is provided by peacekeepers from other countries. Western peacekeepers and policymakers have traditionally been able to adapt more quickly in Africa, due in part to a linguistic advantage and in part to prior experience and knowledge. Besides gaining direct appreciation of the local way of life, Chinese peacekeepers can also take a 'shortcut' by talking to their Western counterparts. Socialising with other peacekeepers can provide helpful tips for navigating in an unfamiliar environment, as well as interesting insight into the current state of affairs and trendy topics in the host country, from another outsider's perspective that is often valuable.

RECOMMENDATION FOUR: ORGANISE INTERACTIVE CULTURAL/SOCIAL EVENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH LOCAL ORGANISATIONS/EMBASSIES/FIRMS

This recommendation mirrors recommendation one, but with the reverse aim of promoting greater understanding of the Chinese peacekeepers' work. Given the well-defined scope of activities of UN peacekeeping missions, such promotional activities may have to be done in conjunction with the local embassy, government and non-government organisations, and firms. Depending on the situation, co-hosting events with other embassies may also be desirable for jointly promoting the message of peacekeeping to the local population and garnering local support, which will benefit UN peacekeeping as a whole.

RECOMMENDATION FIVE: USE SOCIAL MEDIA EFFECTIVELY

We live in a post-digital age, in which much of our communication takes place in the virtual realm. To effectively use one of the most important information transmission tools of today's world – online social media platforms – will prove increasingly critical to getting the right message across. Wechat groups, Facebook pages, e-newsletters and email lists are but a few examples. To take advantage of the immense virtual space and the Internet's unmatched efficiency of information transmission is to secure a favourable position for public relations and audience engagement. Chinese peacekeepers have already earned themselves a good word-of-mouth reputation among the local public, and social media could easily help take that good reputation to the next level.

RECOMMENDATION SIX: INITIATE DIALOGUE WITH OTHER PEACEKEEPERS

This recommendation in part mirrors recommendation three, but works in the opposite direction: Besides learning from peacekeepers from other countries, particularly the 'traditional' contributing countries, Chinese peacekeepers can also take a more confident step in initiating dialogue with their fellow peacekeepers. Such dialogue will not only be an occasion for the exchange of thoughts, knowledge and expertise, but will also signal goodwill and openness. This could take the form of both Track-I (official) and Track-II (unofficial) dialogues. As much as others are eager to learn about the work of Chinese peacekeepers on the ground, the Chinese peacekeeping community should also take the initiative in creating an environment conducive to such exchange.

CONCLUSION: CHINA'S PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA – ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR MUTUAL BENEFIT

It is widely agreed that participation in UN peacekeeping has been one of the most successful aspects of China's continued engagement with Africa. China's reputation among the international peacekeeping community has been top-tier. Policy reports by groups such as the International Crisis Group and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) all affirm the positive role that Chinese peacekeepers have been playing on the ground.³⁵ In an address he gave, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said that peacekeeping is an area 'where China stands tall'.³⁶ China's efforts in promoting peace and stability in Africa, through participation in UN peace operations, have so far produced generally positive results.

Such success notwithstanding, we ought to acknowledge the areas where Chinese peacekeepers can make further improvements. To achieve more effective engagement with the local population and to better attend to their needs, the Chinese peacekeeping community in Africa needs to place even greater emphasis on interpersonal communication. UN peacekeeping is as much about the outcome of peace as it is about the process of achieving peace through confidence building. Such a process will become increasingly important as China embarks on the road of becoming a 'responsible great power'. UN peacekeeping provides an invaluable avenue simultaneously for influence and for learning, for sharing resources and for gaining experience. Making use of this avenue is the first step in acquiring a deeper understanding of the African continent and in fostering a robust partnership of mutual benefit. If done right, a continued military presence, through UN peacekeeping, will reinvigorate the current relationship between China and Africa in a whole new way.

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Conclusion: South Africa-China Relations into the Future

Yazini April

INTRODUCTION

On 26 March 2013, South Africa and China applauded the phenomenal progress in bilateral relations, which, in the space of fifteen years, evolved from a partnership to a strategic partnership and then to a comprehensive strategic partnership. Also, last year South Africa and China celebrated 15 years of diplomatic relations. This book demonstrates how the strengthening of relations is considered to be indicative of the vitality and growing importance of the bilateral relationship between the two countries. In evaluating the success of the diplomatic relations between the two countries, one can argue that the national interests of both states have been met, based on the level of public diplomacy that has been achieved.

The United States, which has been an avid user of public diplomacy, came up with several definitions of this term in the 1800s. It gained its modern meaning in 1965 when Edmund Gullion, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, stated that 'Public diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses: dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with another; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication, as diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of inter-cultural communications'.¹ The following are considered strategic goals or *outcomes* of all public diplomacy objectives:

1. Increasing understanding of policy and culture
2. Increasing favourable opinion towards the countries concerned
3. Increasing cultural influence on the countries concerned

While there are still challenges and room for improvement in the diplomatic relations between China and South Africa, substantial progress has been made. As Shelton

states in his chapter, the past 15 years of South Africa-China co-operation have seen positive progress in a wide area of activity, creating expectations for future close collaboration and co-operation in a wide range of areas. Ambassador TIAN Xuejun also reinforced this factor in his keynote address wherein he introduced the three Vs that have influenced South Africa-China relations: Vision, Velocity and Vitality. In essence, the dynamic relations between South Africa and China reflect a strategic partnership built on mutual respect and political trust, and a commitment to economic interaction in a balanced manner that will deliver sustainable mutual benefits and co-operation in multilateral fora. Therefore, one has to ask whether, as twenty-first-century emerging countries, South Africa and China have been able to effectively apply the national interest concept in their diplomatic relations.

NATIONAL INTERESTS FROM A PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PERSPECTIVE

Mark Freeman argues that international affairs are being radically reshaped in the current century. The evidence of a new multipolar world is everywhere: the shift of power dynamics from the G8 to the G20; the continuing emergence and growing influence of BRICS; and the gradual decline of the power of the P5 to shape events in the international arena. At the same time, new alliances and new powers, such as BRICS, are themselves subject to trends and events largely outside of state control, including the Internet, the global economy and global warming.² In this context, Freeman argues, the winners in international affairs in this century will, in all probability, be those that lead in the creation, not only of alliances and rules for states, but also of alliances and rules for business, the media and civil society. National outcomes and national laws now matter less than ever before. Those fixated on the national interest, too narrowly defined, likely risk enjoying only the most ephemeral and illusory of victories over the course of this century.

As regional leaders, the complexity of contemporary international affairs affects both South Africa and China. Both countries have excelled in ensuring that their national interests effectively incorporate areas once considered 'soft': education, the environment, technological innovation, women's advancement, and the establishment of a truly global rule of law in their state agendas and common positions. These two twenty-first-century emerging countries have both been able to effectively apply the national interest concept in their diplomatic relations. This can be demonstrated through the three public diplomacy objectives identified earlier.

INCREASING UNDERSTANDING OF POLICY AND CULTURE

There has been a high level of policy and culture exchanges from a political and economic perspective. Sino-South African bilateral relations have undergone rapid and all-faceted development, based on frequent high-level and other kinds of mutual exchanges between the two countries. The co-operation and exchanges between the two countries in the fields of trade and economy, energy, science and technology, culture and education have continuously expanded. Furthermore, in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that is set out in the Beijing Declaration signed in 2010, the two countries expressed the desire to further strengthen and deepen their co-operation in both political and regional affairs by establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership based on equality, mutual benefit and common development - an initiative which is fast gaining momentum. Bi-national commission meetings have been held since 2001 and the cordial relationship has been expressed in many ways (political and economic).

INCREASINGLY FAVOURABLE OPINION BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES

A favourable opinion has been created of the level of engagement between the two countries. For the past 15 years, almost all successive Chinese leaders, including presidents, NPC chairmen and premiers of the State Council, have visited South Africa. Likewise, many South African leaders have visited China on various occasions. In July last year, President Zuma visited China and attended the opening ceremony of the fifth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation. And in March last year, the new Chinese President, Xi Jinping, paid a highly successful state visit to South Africa, which was generally welcomed and given significant favourable media coverage, and a positive community reception, compared to the visit of United States President Barack Obama, which was fraught with controversy.

INCREASING CULTURAL INFLUENCE BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES

People-to-people relations have flourished. South Africa is China's largest trading partner in Africa. Moreover, in 2012, more than 130 000 Chinese tourists travelled to South Africa, an increase of 56 per cent from the previous year. South Africa, compared with other African countries, has the largest number of sister cities in China and the largest number of Confucius Institutes, and also attracts the largest number of Chinese tourists and Chinese overseas students. Finally, in the year 2013, the Chinese government

increased the number of scholarships to South African students to 200 over a period of five years.

CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD

The national interests of South Africa and China play a major role in the diplomatic relations of both countries, regionally and globally. This book proposes the following recommendations as a way forward:

Tripartite collaboration: Three chapters in this book emphasize a need to establish a tripartite collaboration between South Africa, China and the African Union, in order to promote much needed development. One chapter asserts that, given the technological impact of both countries, South Africa and China should assist the AU in minimising the digital divide regionally and globally. The other two chapters stress how the two countries share a lot of common values, a similar philosophy and similar aspirations, which could be implemented continentally and globally. In essence, strengthened South Africa-China linkages should promote the foundation for China-Africa development.

Continental peacekeeping: The mushrooming of continuing low-intensity warfare, revolts and the like in Africa demonstrates a need for continued security efforts. Amongst some of the recommendations made are suggestions that, given the expectation by the international community for China to play a more active role in Africa's peace and security, China could collaborate with South Africa, which has knowledge, influence and a demonstrated devotion to the African agenda. Sun argues that while UN peacekeeping has been one of the most successful aspects of China's engagement with Africa, 'to achieve more effective engagement, the Chinese peacekeeping community needs to place greater emphasis on interpersonal communication'.

Education co-operation: This is an effective public diplomacy tool at the people-to-people level, which has been actively implemented between the two countries. However, the book is clear in demonstrating a need to clarify the deliverables of this process in a transparent manner, in order to effectively measure the impact thereof. The process is also problematic due to a perceived uneven exchange, consisting mainly of Africans

going to China. Finally, the author recommends further clarity on whether the South Africa-China engagement is co-operation or aid engagement.

Trade: The trade imbalance between the two countries is unsustainable. South Africa should clearly identify its strategies for addressing the trade imbalance. South African companies should also work harder to compete in Chinese markets. Given that most exports to China are mineral-based, the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) was implemented in order to promote job creation and industrialisation. Finally, increased involvement in the SADC's transnational rail and road networks could facilitate economic growth in the region and expand Africa-China exports.

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Perspectives on South Africa-China Relations

The year 2013 marked 15 years of the phenomenal diplomatic relations between South Africa and China. The relationship between South Africa and China has been developing since diplomatic ties were established on 1 January 1998. Since then, South Africa-China's bilateral relations have undergone rapid and all-facet development. There were frequent high-level and other kinds of mutual exchanges between the two countries. The bilateral relations within the space of fifteen years have evolved from a Partnership to a Strategic Partnership, and then to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Furthermore, in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which was set out in the Beijing Declaration signed in 2010, the two countries expressed the desire to further strengthen and deepen cooperation in both bilateral and regional affairs by establishing a comprehensive strategic partnership based on equality, mutual benefit and common development. The agreements range from political dialogue, trade, investment, mineral exploration, manufacturing, and agriculture to joint efforts in the global arena, such as in the United Nations, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS).

In recognition of the aforementioned bilateral achievements, on 19 September 2013, an Ambassadorial forum was co-hosted by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa, and the Africa Institute of South Africa – Human Science Research Council (AISA-HSRC). The objective of the Ambassadorial Forum was to provide an opportunity for reflections on the past and outlook on the future diplomatic relations between South Africa and China. This book presents the official keynote addresses which provide strategic thinking and foresight into the bilateral relations between the two countries. The main substance of the book is a collection of the Ambassadorial Forum papers that were submitted. The papers evaluate economic and political progress from a national interest perspective. Progress is measured against variables such as trade growth, people-to-people development, partnerships, and the implementation of state agreements, all against the background of the theory of national interest.

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